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Volume LXXIX *September 1964* *Number 3*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

KENNEDY IN THE PRESIDENCY: A PREMATURE APPRAISAL

THERE are many ways to look at the performance of a president of the United States. One way—not the only one—is to assess his operational effectiveness as man in office, a single individual amidst a vast machine. This has been my own approach in previous writings on past presidents. Regarding our most recent President, John F. Kennedy, it is foolhardy to attempt appraisal in these terms. He died too soon and it is too soon after his death. Still, the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY has asked me to attempt it. And assuming that my readers will indulge the folly, I shall try.

I

In appraising the personal performance of a president it is useful to ask four questions. First, what were his purposes and did these run with or against the grain of history; how relevant were they to what would happen in his time? Second, what was his "feel," his human understanding, for the nature of his power in the circumstances of his time, and how close did he come in this respect to the realities around him (a matter again of relevance)? Third, what was his stance under pressure in office, what sustained him as a person against the frustrations native to the place, and how did his peace-making with himself affect the style and content of his own decision-making? This becomes especially important now that nuclear technology has equipped both Americans and Russians with an intercontinental capability; stresses on the presidency grow apace. Fourth, what was his legacy? What imprint did he leave upon the office, its character and

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public standing; where did he leave his party and the other party nationally; what remained by way of public policies adopted or in controversy; what remained as issues in American society, insofar as his own stance may have affected them; and what was the American position in the world insofar as his diplomacy may have affected it?

With respect to each of these four questions, the outside observer looks for certain clues in seeking answers.

First, regarding purpose, clues are found in irreversible commitments to defined courses of action. By "course of action" I mean nothing so particular as an endorsement for, say, "medicare," or anything so general as a pledge to "peace." (All presidents desire peace.) By "course of action" I mean something broader than the one but more definable than the other: Harry S. Truman's commitment to "containment," so called, or Dwight D. Eisenhower's to what he called "fiscal responsibility." By "commitment" I mean personal involvement, in terms of what the man himself is seen to say and do, so plain and so direct that politics—and history—will not let him turn back: Truman on civil rights, or Eisenhower on the Army budget.

Second, regarding feel for office, sensitivity to power, clues are drawn from signs of pattern in the man's own operating style as he encounters concrete cases, cases of decision and of following through in every sphere of action, legislative and executive, public and partisan, foreign and domestic—Truman seeking above all to be decisive; Eisenhower reaching for a place above the struggle.

Third, regarding pressure and its consequences, clues are to be drawn again from cases; here one examines crisis situations, seeking signs of pattern in the man's response—Truman at the time of the Korean outbreak, or of Chinese intervention; Eisenhower at the time of Hungary and Suez, or of Little Rock—times like these compared with others just as tough in terms of stress.

And fourth, regarding the man's legacy, one seeks clues in the conduct of the *next* administration. Roosevelt's first New Deal in 1933 tells us a lot about the Hoover presidency. Truman's troubled turnabout in postwar foreign policy casts shadows on the later Roosevelt presidency. And Kennedy's complaint at Yale two years ago about the "myths" retarding

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economic management is testimony to one part of Eisenhower's legacy, that part identified with the redoubtable George Humphrey.

To list these sources of the wherewithal for answers is to indicate the folly of pursuing my four questions when the object of the exercise is Kennedy-in-office. He was President for two years and ten months. Were one to assess Franklin Roosevelt on the basis of performance before January 1936, or Harry Truman on his accomplishments before enactment of the Marshall Plan, or Eisenhower had he not survived his heart attack—or Lincoln, for that matter, had he been assassinated six months after Gettysburg—one would be most unlikely to reach judgments about any of these men resembling current judgments drawn from the full record of their terms. We cannot know what Kennedy's full record would have been had he escaped assassination. Still more important, we can never know precisely how to weigh events in his truncated term.

Truman's seven years and Eisenhower's eight suggest a certain rhythm in the modern presidency. The first twelve to eighteen months become a learning time for the new president who has to learn—or unlearn—many things about his job. No matter what his prior training, nothing he has done will have prepared him for all facets of that job. Some aspects of the learning process will persist beyond the first year-and-a-half. Most presidents will go on making new discoveries as long as they hold office (until at last they learn the bitterness of leaving office). But the intensive learning time comes at the start and dominates the first two years. A president's behavior in those years is an uncertain source of clues to what will follow after, unreliable in indicating what will be the patterns of performance "on the job" once learning has been done. Yet the fourth year is also unreliable; traditionally it brings a period of pause, dominated by a special test requiring special effort—the test of re-election. The way that test is taken tells us much about a president, but less about his conduct on the job in other years. The seventh year is the beginning of the end—now guaranteed by constitutional amendment—as all eyes turn toward the coming nominations and the *next* administration.

So in the search for signs of pattern, clues to conduct, the

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key years are the third, the fifth, the sixth. Kennedy had only one of these.

Moreover, in this presidential cycle, retrospect is an essential aid for sorting evidence. What a man does in his later years sheds light on the significance of what he did in early years, distinguishing the actions which conform to lasting patterns from the aspects of behavior which were transient. The man's early performance will include a host of clues to what is typical throughout his term of office. But it also will include assorted actions which turn out to be unrepresentative. Looking back from later years these become easy to distinguish. But in the second or the third year it is hard indeed to say, "This action, this behavior will be dominant throughout." That is the sort of statement best reserved for retrospect. Kennedy's case leaves no room for retrospect; he was cut off too early in the cycle. (And when it comes to sorting out the legacy he left, Lyndon Johnson has not yet been long enough in office.)

No scholar, therefore, should have the temerity to undertake what follows.

II

Turning to appraise this President in office, I come to my first question, the question of purpose. This is not a matter of initial "ideology," fixed intent; far from it. Franklin Roosevelt did not enter office bent upon becoming "traitor to his class." Truman did not swear the oath with any notion that he was to take this country into the cold war. Lincoln certainly did not assume the presidency to gain the title of "Great Emancipator." The purposes of presidents are not to be confused with their intentions at the start; they are a matter, rather, of responses to events. Nor should they be confused with signs of temperament, with "passion." Whether Kennedy was "passionate" or not is scarcely relevant. Truman certainly deserves to have the cause of civil rights cited among his purposes, but were he to be judged in temperamental terms according to the standards of, say, Eastern liberals, he scarcely could be called a man of passion on the point. And FDR goes down historically as "Labor's friend," although his coolness toward the greatest show of

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that friendship in his time, the Wagner Act, remained until he sensed that it was sure to be enacted. What counts here is not "passion," but the words and acts that lead to irreversible *commitment.*

In his three years of office, what were Kennedy's commitments? Never mind his private thoughts at twenty, or at forty; never mind his preferences for one thing or another; never mind his distaste for a passionate display—taking the real world as he found it, what attracted his commitment in the sense that he identified himself beyond recall?

The record will, I think, disclose at least three purposes so understood: First, above all others, most compelling, most intense, was a commitment to reduce the risk of holocaust by *mutual* miscalculation, to "get the nuclear genie back in the bottle," to render statecraft manageable by statesmen, tolerable for the rest of us. He did not aim at anything so trite (or unachievable) as "victory" in the cold war. His aim, apparently, was to outlast it with American society intact and nuclear risks in check. Nothing, I think, mattered more to Kennedy than bottling that genie. This, I know, was deeply in his mind. It also was made manifest in words, among them his address at American University on June 10, 1963. That speech is seal and symbol of this purpose. But other signs are found in acts, as well, and in more private words accompanying action: from his Vienna interview with Krushchev, through the Berlin crisis during 1961, to the Cuban missile crisis and thereafter—this commitment evidently deepened with experience as Kennedy responded to events.

Another speech in June of 1963 stands for a second purpose: the speech on civil rights, June 11, and the message to Congress eight days later launched Kennedy's campaign for what became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thereby he undertook an irreversible commitment to Negro integration in American society, aiming once again to get us through the effort with society intact. He evidently came to see the risks of social alienation as plainly as he saw the risks of nuclear escalation, and he sought to steer a course toward integration which could hold inside our social order both impatient Negroes and reactive whites—as tough a task of politics as any we have known, and one he faced no sooner

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than he had to. But he faced it. What Vienna, Berlin, Cuba were to his first purpose, Oxford and then Birmingham were to this second purpose: events which shaped his personal commitment.

A third speech is indicative of still another purpose, a speech less known and a commitment less apparent, though as definite, I think, as both of the others: Kennedy's commencement speech at Yale on June 11, 1962, soon after his short war with Roger Blough. He spoke of making our complex economy, our somewhat *sui generis* economy, function effectively for meaningful growth, and as the means he urged an end-of-ideology in problem-solving. His speech affirmed the notion that the key problems of economic growth are technical, not ideological, to be met not by passion but by intellect, and that the greatest barriers to growth are the ideas in people's heads—"myths" as he called them—standing in the way of reasoned diagnosis and response. Kennedy, I think, was well aware (indeed he was made painfully aware) that only on our one-time Left is ideology defunct. Elsewhere it flourishes, clamping a lid upon applied intelligence, withholding brainpower from rational engagement in the novel problems of our economic management. He evidently wanted most of all to lift that lid.

Failing a response to his Yale lecture, Kennedy retreated to the easier task of teaching one simple economic lesson, the lesson of the recent tax reduction: well-timed budget deficits can lead to balanced budgets. This, evidently, was the most that he thought he could manage in contesting "myths," at least before election. But his ambition, I believe, was to assault a lot more myths than this, when and as he could. That ambition measures his commitment to effective growth in the economy.

Stemming from this third commitment (and the second) one discerns a corollary which perhaps would have become a fourth: what Kennedy's successor now has named "the war against poverty." During the course of 1963, Kennedy became active in promoting plans for an attack on chronic poverty. His prospective timing no doubt had political utility, but it also had social utility which evidently mattered quite as much. Historically, the "war" is Lyndon Johnson's. All we know of Kennedy is that he meant to

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make one. Still, for either of these men the effort, if sustained, would lead to irreversible commitment.

Each purpose I have outlined meant commitment to a course of action which engaged the man—his reputation, *amour propre,* and sense of self in history—beyond recall. The question then becomes: how relevant were these, historically? How relevant to Kennedy's own years of actual (and of prospective) office? Here I can only make a judgment, tentative of course, devoid of long perspective. These purposes seem to me entirely relevant. In short perspective, they seem precisely right as the pre-eminent concerns for the first half of this decade.

So much for Kennedy as man-of-purpose. What about the man-of-power?

He strikes me as a senator who learned very fast from his confrontation with the executive establishment, particularly after the abortive Cuban invasion which taught him a great deal. On action-issues of particular concern to him he rapidly evolved an operating style which he maintained consistently (and sharpened at the edges) through his years of office. If one looks at Berlin, or Oxford, Mississippi, or the Cuban missile crisis, or at half a dozen other issues of the sort, one finds a pattern: the personal command post, deliberate reaching down for the details, hard questioning of the alternatives, a drive to protect options from foreclosure by sheer urgency or by *ex parte* advocacy, finally a close watch on follow-through. Even on the issues which were secondary to the President and left, perforce, primarily to others, Kennedy was constantly in search of means and men to duplicate at one remove this personalized pattern with its stress on open options and on close control. Numbers of outsiders—Hans Morgenthau and Joseph Alsop for two—sometimes viewed the pattern with alarm and saw this man as "indecisive." But that was to consult *their* preferences, not his performance. Kennedy seemed always keen to single out the necessary from the merely possible. He then decided with alacrity.

Not everything was always done effectively, of course, and even the successes produced side effects of bureaucratic bafflement, frustration, irritation which were not without their costs. Even so, the pattern testifies to an extraordinary feel

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for the distinction between president and presidency, an extraordinary urge to master the machine. This took him quite a way toward mastery in two years and ten months. We shall not know how far he might have got.

Kennedy's feel for his own executive position carried over into that of fellow rulers everywhere. He evidently had great curiosity and real concern about the politics of rulership wherever he encountered it. His feel for fine distinctions among fellow "kings" was rare, comparable to the feel of Senate-Leader Johnson for the fine distinctions among fellow senators. And with this Kennedy apparently absorbed in his short time a lesson Franklin Roosevelt never learned about the Russians (or de Gaulle): that in another country an *effective* politician can have motives very *different* from his own. What an advantageous lesson to have learned in two years time! It would have served him well. Indeed, while he still lived I think it did.

The cardinal test of Kennedy as an executive in his own right and also as a student of executives abroad was certainly the confrontation of October 1962, the Cuban missile crisis with Krushchev. For almost the first time in our foreign relations, the President displayed on that occasion both concern for the psychology of his opponent and insistence on a limited objective. Contrast the Korean War, where we positively courted Chinese intervention by relying on Douglas MacArthur as psychologist and by enlarging our objective after each success. "There is no substitute for victory," MacArthur wrote, but at that time we virtually had a nuclear monopoly and even then our government hastened to find a substitute. Now, with mutual capability, the whole traditional meaning has been taken out of "victory." In nuclear confrontations there is room for no such thing. Kennedy quite evidently knew it. He also knew, as his performance demonstrates, that risks of escalation lurk in high-level misjudgments *and* in low-level momentum. Washington assuredly was capable of both; so, probably, was Moscow. Accordingly, the President outstripped all previous efforts to guard options and assure control. His operating style was tested then as not before or after. It got him what he wanted.

In confrontations with Congress, quite another world than

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the executive, the key to Kennedy's congressional relations lay outside his feel for power, beyond reach of technique; he won the presidency by a hair, while in the House of Representatives his party lost some twenty of the seats gained two years earlier. The Democrats *retained* a sizeable majority as they had done in earlier years, no thanks to him. With this beginning, Kennedy's own record of accomplishment in Congress looks enormous, indeterminate, or small, depending on one's willingness to give him credit for enactment of the most divisive, innovative bills he espoused: the tax and civil rights bills passed in Johnson's presidency. Certainly it can be said that Kennedy prepared the way, negotiating a bipartisan approach, and also that he took the heat, stalling his whole program in the process. Equally, it can be said that with his death—or by it—the White House gained advantages which he could not have mustered. Johnson made the most of these. How well would Kennedy have done without them? My own guess is that in the end, with rancor and delay, both bills would have been passed. But it is a moot point. Accordingly, so is the Kennedy record.

III

Whatever his accomplishment, does it appear the most he could have managed in his years? Granting the limits set by his election, granting the divisiveness injected after Birmingham with his decisive move on civil rights, did he use to the fullest his advantages of office? The answer may well be "not quite." Perhaps a better answer is, "This man could do no more." For Kennedy, it seems, was not a man enamored of the legislative way of life and legislators knew it. He was wry about it. He had spent fourteen years in Congress and he understood its business, but he never was a "member of the family" on the Hill. "Downtown" had always seemed his native habitat; he was a natural executive. They knew that, too. Besides, he was a young man, very young by Senate standards, and his presence in the White House with still younger men around him was a constant irritant to seniors. Moreover, he was not a "mixer" socially, not, anyway, with most members of Congress and their wives. His manners were impeccable, his charm impelling,

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but he kept his social life distinct from his official life and congressmen were rarely in his social circle. To know how Congress works but to disdain its joys is an acquired taste for most ex-congressmen downtown, produced by hard experience. Kennedy, however, brought it with him. Many of the difficulties he was to encounter in his day-by-day congressional relations stemmed from that.

But even had he been a man who dearly loved the Congress, even had that feeling been reciprocated, nothing could have rendered their relationship sweetness-and-light in his last year, so long as he persisted with his legislative program. As an innovative President confronting a reluctant Congress, he was heir to Truman, and to Roosevelt after 1936. Kennedy's own manner may have hurt him on the Hill, but these were scratches. Deeper scars had more substantial sources and he knew it.

In confrontations with the larger public outside Washington (again a different world), Kennedy made a brilliant beginning, matched only by the start in different circumstances of his own successor. The "public relations" of transition into office were superb. In three months after his election, Kennedy transformed himself from "pushy," "young," "Catholic," into President-of-all-the-people, widening and deepening acceptance of his presidency out of all proportion to the election returns. The Bay of Pigs was a severe check, but his handling of the aftermath displayed again superb feel for the imagery befitting an incumbent of the White House, heir to FDR *and* Eisenhower. That feel he always had. I think it never failed him.

What he also had was a distaste for preaching, really for the preachiness of politics, backed by genuine mistrust of mass emotion as a tool in politics. These attitudes are rare among American politicians; with Kennedy their roots ran deep into recesses of experience and character where I, as an outsider, cannot follow. But they assuredly were rooted in this man and they had visible effects upon his public style. He delighted in the play of minds, not of emotions. He doted on press conferences, not set performances. He feared "over-exposure"; he dreaded over-reaction. Obviously he enjoyed responsive crowds, and was himself responsive to a sea of cheering faces, but I think he rarely looked at their

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reaction—or his own—without a twinge of apprehension. He never seems to have displayed much fondness for the "fireside chat," a form of crowd appeal without the crowd; television talks in evening hours evidently struck him more as duty than as opportunity, and dangerous at that; some words on air-raid shelters in a talk about Berlin could set off mass hysteria—and did. At the moment when he had his largest, most attentive audience, on the climactic Sunday of the Cuban missile crisis, he turned it away (and turned attention off) with a two-minute announcement, spare and dry.

Yet we know now, after his death, what none of us knew before: that with a minimum of preaching, of emotional appeal, or of self-justification, even explanation, he had managed to touch millions in their private lives, not only at home but emphatically abroad. Perhaps his very coolness helped him do it. Perhaps his very vigor, family, fortune, sense of fun, his manners, taste, and sportsmanship, his evident enjoyment of his life and of the job made him the heart's desire of all sorts of people everywhere, not least among the young. At any rate, we know now that he managed in his years to make enormous impact on a world-wide audience, building an extraordinary base of public interest and affection (interspersed, of course, with doubters and detractors). What he might have made of this or done with it in later years, nobody knows.

So much for power; what of pressure? What sustained this man in his decisions, his frustrations, and with what effect on his approach to being president? For an answer one turns to the evidence of crises, those already mentioned among others, and the *surface* signs are clear. In all such situations it appears that Kennedy was cool, collected, courteous, and terse. This does not mean that he was unemotional. By temperament I think he was a man of mood and passion. But he had schooled his temperament. He kept his own emotions under tight control. He did not lose his temper inadvertently, and never lost it long. He was observer and participant combined; he saw himself as coolly as all others—and with humor. He always was a witty man, dry with a bit of bite and a touch of self-deprecation. He could laugh at himself, and did. Often he used humor to break tension. And in tight places he displayed a keen

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awareness of the human situation, human limits, his included, but it did not slow his work.

Readers over forty may recognize this portrait as "the stance of junior officers in the Second World War"; Elspeth Rostow coined that phrase and, superficially at least, she is quite right. This was the Kennedy stance and his self-confidence, his shield against frustration, must have owed a lot to his young manhood in that war.

This tells us a good deal but not nearly enough. At his very first encounter with a crisis in the presidency, Kennedy's self-confidence seems to have been severely strained. The Bay of Pigs fiasco shook him deeply, shook his confidence in methods and associates. Yet he went on governing without a break, no change in manner, or in temper, or in humor. What sustained him? Surely much that went beyond experience of war.

What else? I cannot answer. I can only conjecture. His family life and rearing have some part to play, no doubt. His political successes also: in 1952 he bucked the Eisenhower tide to reach the Senate; in 1960 he broke barriers of youth and of religion which had always held before; on each occasion the Conventional Wisdom was against him: "can't be done." Beyond these things, this man had been exceptionally close to death, not only in the war but ten years after. And in his presidential years his back was almost constantly a source of pain; he never talked about it but he lived with it. All this is of a piece with his behavior in a crisis. His control, his objectivity, his humor, and his sense of human limits, these were but expressions of his confidence; its sources must lie somewhere in this ground.

Whatever the sources, the results were rewarding for this President's performance on the job. In the most critical, nerve-straining aspects of the office, coping with its terrible responsibility for use of force, Kennedy's own image of himself impelled him neither to lash out nor run for cover. Rather, it released him for engagement and decision as a reasonable man. In some of the less awesome aspects of the presidency, his own values restrained him, kept him off the pulpit, trimmed his guest list, made him shy away from the hyperbole of politics. But as a chief *executive,* confronting action-issues for decision and control, his duty and his confi-

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dence in doing it were nicely matched. So the world discovered in October 1962.

Now for my last question. What did he leave behind him? What was the legacy of his short years? At the very least he left a myth: the vibrant, youthful leader cut down senselessly before his time. What this may come to signify as the years pass, I cannot tell. He left a glamorous moment, an engaging, youthful time, but how we shall remember it depends on what becomes of Lyndon Johnson. He left a broken promise, that "the torch has been passed to a new generation," and the youngsters who identified with him felt cheated as the promise, like the glamor, disappeared. What do their feelings matter? We shall have to wait and see.

May this be all that history is likely to record? Perhaps, but I doubt it. My guess is that when the observers can appraise the work of Kennedy's successors, they will find some things of substance in his legacy. Rashly, let me record what I think these are.

To begin with, our first Catholic president chose and paved the way for our first Southern president since the Civil War. (Woodrow Wilson was no Southerner *politically;* he came to the White House from the State House of New Jersey.) While Texas may be suspect now in Southern eyes, it certainly is of the South in Northern eyes, as Johnson found so painfully in 1960. Kennedy made him President. How free the choice of Johnson was as vice-presidential candidate is subject to some argument. But what appears beyond dispute is that once chosen, Johnson was so treated by his rival for the White House as to ease his way enormously when he took over there. Johnson may have suffered great frustration as Vice-President, but his public standing and his knowledge of affairs were nurtured in those years. From this he gained a running start. The credit goes in no small part to Kennedy.

Moreover, Kennedy bequeathed to Johnson widened options in the sphere of foreign relations: a military posture far more flexible and useable than he himself inherited; a diplomatic posture more sophisticated in its whole approach to neutralists and Leftists, markedly more mindful of distinctions in the world, even among allies.

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On the domestic side, he left a large inheritance of controversies, opened by a youthful, Catholic urbanite from the Northeast, which his Southwestern, Protestant successor might have had more trouble stirring at the start, but now can ride and maybe even "heal." This may turn out to have been a productive division of labor. However it turns out, Kennedy lived long enough to keep at least one promise. He got the country "moving again." For in our politics, the *sine qua non* of innovative policy is controversy. By 1963 we were engaged in controversy with an openness which would have been unthinkable, or at least "un-American," during the later Eisenhower years. Events, of course, have more to do with stirring controversy than a president. No man can make an issue on his own. But presidents will help to shape the meaning of events, the terms of discourse, the attention paid, the noise-level. Eisenhower's years were marked by a pervasive fog of self-congratulation, muffling noise. The fog-machine was centered in the White House. Perhaps there had been need for this after the divisive Truman years. By the late nineteen-fifties, though, it fuzzed our chance to innovate in time. Kennedy broke out of it.

Finally, this President set a new standard of performance on the job, suitable to a new state of presidential being, a state he was the first to face throughout his term of office: the state of substantial, deliverable, nuclear capability in other hands than ours. Whatever else historians may make of Kennedy, I think them likely to begin with this. There can be little doubt that his successors have a lighter task because *he* pioneered in handling nuclear confrontations. During the Cuban missile crisis and thereafter, he did something which had not been done before, did it well, and got it publicly accepted. His innovation happened to be timely, since the need for innovation was upon us; technology had put it there. But also, in his reach for information and control, his balancing of firmness with caution, his sense of limits, he displayed and dramatized what presidents must do to minimize the risk of war through mutual miscalculation. This may well be the cardinal risk confronting his successors. If so, he made a major contribution to the presidency.

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ALGERIA, THE ARMY, AND THE FIFTH REPUBLIC (1959–1961): A SCENARIO OF CIVIL-MILITARY CONFLICT

ITSELF brought to power by the impetus of an Algerian insurrection in May 1958,[1] the French Fifth Republic would elicit and conquer two other uprisings of quite different natures before it could manage to disengage from a civil-colonial war that was sapping the unity of the state. The first of these insurgencies was the "rebellion of the barricades," in which, between January 24 and 31, 1960, a congeries of civilian activists led by Joseph Ortiz and Pierre Lagaillarde conducted a mutiny against the legal government and its policy of growing accommodation with the Algerian nationalists. This was a purely civilian conspiracy which the army, though sorely tempted, refused to join, partly because it distrusted the leaders of the coup and partly because it was waiting for the saving word from President de Gaulle that could persuade the military leaders that he sanctioned their conduct of the war and their efforts to keep Algeria French. This magic soothing-syrup seemed to arrive in the chief of state's address to the nation on January 29 when, in referring to the options Algeria would presumably have in a self-determination election (announced first in his speech of September 19, 1959), he proclaimed that nothing would give him greater pleasure than a free choice of the "solution qui serait la plus française." [2] To the army the "most French solution" meant only one thing: the defeat of the FLN followed by a policy of "integration" whereby, in fact as well as in constitutional language, Algeria would become a part of France, "a province like Alsace or Britanny." Though it is impossible in a brief recapitulation to do justice to all the

[1] To the incredulity of Left and Right, de Gaulle would label the revolution of May 13, 1958, an "entreprise d'usurpation" in his speech of July 8, 1962.

[2] The complete text of the speech can be found in Serge Bromberger, *et al.*, *Barricades et Colonels* (Paris, 1960), 392–97.

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reasons conditioning the army's action during the "week of the barricades," de Gaulle's assurance was certainly a prime factor in keeping a tense army out of the paths of sedition. If, in January 1960, the army had gone over to the rebellion, there is every chance that the Fifth Republic could not have lasted. On the other hand, much of the military institution would henceforth nurture an irrepressible bitterness toward de Gaulle for conducting a policy that seemed the contrary of his January statement.

By the spring of 1961 government initiatives toward negotiation and settlement with the GPRA (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne) had become too much for most of the army to bear. A core of high officers, fronted by one of great prestige, Air General Maurice Challe, lately retired as Supreme Commander, Allied Land Forces, Europe, prepared the plot of April which would later be given the name "the *putsch* of the generals."

The *putsch* of April 22 was a unique event. Though it reflected some of the popular and proconsular fever that had, upon General Massu's withdrawal, touched off the "rebellion of the barricades," this was a purely military and professional operation. The seizure of power in Algiers was launched by certain selected troops of the Réserve Générale without civilian complicity. If the "unity of the Army"—that *ne plus ultra* of French military politics—were to be sacrificed, then it must be done for exclusively military reasons and in full consciousness of cause.

General Challe abruptly ended the rebellion and surrendered to the authorities after three days, when it became apparent that the army was being wrecked without result, when he found it impossible even to control all of the Algerian territory, to extract the benefit of earlier promises of support, and to make the least impression on the people of metropolitan France.

The literal events of the two insurrections could detain us for dozens of pages and they have, in any case, been thoroughly related elsewhere.[3] What seems more important is to understand the cardinal premises of the psychology of the

[3] Notably in Bromberger, *et al., Barricades;* André Euloge and Antoine Moulinier, *L'Envers des Barricades* (Paris, 1960); Jacques Fauvet and Jean Planchais, *La Fronde des généraux* (Paris, 1961); and Henri Azeau, *Révolte militaire: Alger, 22 avril 1961* (Paris, 1961).

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French Army during this time and the character of its relations with the Gaullist regime.

I

By 1958, and even well before the coming of the de Gaulle regime, the French Army, long trained to submit to civilian command and operate discreetly within a penumbra of silence, had not only discovered language but the gift of speaking with many tongues. The *grande muette* of former times had become an incorrigible *grande bavarde,* spewing its pent-up feelings about politics, doctrine, and, above all, Algeria at an insouciant public, a scandalized regime, and a restricted but fascinated international audience. This served to confuse the problem of loyalty and discipline still further and to confirm frustrated elements of the service in the political vocation they had chosen.

What sort of game had the regime been playing vis-à-vis its army in the year 1959? Clearly, the motives and the psychology were confused, as confused in Paris as they were in Algiers. De Gaulle's intent to surround himself with the symbols of legal succession—the Mollets and Pinays—as well as the distance he now maintained from former comrades like Soustelle who had taken an out-and-out *Algérie française* position seemed to indicate a preference for republican scrupulosity and a distaste for revolution. But they also provided greater latitude for the development of his still embryonic and empirical policies toward the absorbing colonial question, of which he considered Algeria a mechanical part. For the army, on the other hand, not only was de Gaulle's mixed entourage distasteful, but there was something fundamental, nothing empirical or negotiable, about Algeria.

On March 27, 1958, before coming to power, de Gaulle had received a delegation of the National Action Committee of Veterans Associations (CANAC). In the minutes drawn up after the audience by M. Léon Sanguinetti, the Secretary-General of CANAC, and approved by all the delegates present, we may read the following:

> The general knows that wide sectors of public opinion reproach him for not having made any statements about the Nation's great problems in the last four years; he refrains from making them because he realizes that his words

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and the intentions expressed by them would immediately be deformed and used in a contradictory way by the different factions seeking power.

For example, if he stated that generosity and liberalism were needed with regard to Algeria and Africa, one faction would seize upon this to help bring about capitulation. If he dwelt on the need for the maintenance of the French presence in Africa, another faction would take advantage of it to refuse to approach any African problems through political solutions.[4]

Though by 1959 de Gaulle was himself *le pouvoir* and was ruling by way of instruments of his own choosing, he as yet faced the same delicate balance of pressures which had elicited his prudence a year earlier. If his control over power was being swiftly consolidated, he had not yet mastered the forces that could cause civil disorder. And so he practiced, for better or worse, a politics of ambiguity, which some described as duplicity or betrayal. This pleased neither the Left Wing nor the army.

The Left Wing, in typically doctrinaire fashion, never ceased to accuse the Debré government of coddling its army and failing to recall it to discipline. But the government had to "diplomatize" with the army, and it resorted to the abusive expedient of issuing ambiguous orders or none at all, and of encouraging lines of cleavage that would work to the advantage of its own power position.

The events of the barricades were a watershed, for they marked a turning point in the regime's relations with its army. Solicitous of its fragile unity, the army marked time during the week of January 24–31, 1960, and finally, despite initiatives and temptations of intervention, served as arbiter between the Fifth Republic and the hysterical Europeans of Algiers. This was not, however, an especially willing or profitable arbitration; it increased rather than mitigated the army's own inability to inflect policy, and it restored a political power to Paris that had been lacking since Guy Mollet's visit to Algiers on February 6, 1956.[5] It guaranteed further crises between the regime and the army, but it insured also—

[4] J. R. Tournoux, *Secrets d'Etat* (Paris, 1960), Appendix D, 478.

[5] Mob action in Algiers on this date during Mollet's visit had caused him to withdraw his appointment of the liberal General Georges Catroux as Resident Minister of Algeria.

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not least by demonstrating the metropolitan strength of de Gaulle—that the outcome of any future crisis would most likely be decided in favor of the government.

In its anguish the army would now gradually entertain formidable doubts about de Gaulle's disposition of the Algerian problem. But it would be less able to make its feelings felt without the final, agonized expedient of direct intervention. And it was gnawed, as all traditional armies must be, by the familiar and cherished pangs of loyalty.

The process by which the Gaullist Fifth Republic burned its bridges with an army that believed it had installed the new regime in power with an express mandate to pacify Algeria will remain somewhat in shadow until the dossiers spill out their secrets. However, the concrete grounds of accusation are well known. They consist, in part, of a series of tangible events such as the dissolution of the Committees of Public Safety (in October 1958), the government's shift in nuance toward the disposition of the Algerian problem (pacification to "peace of the brave" to "self-determination"), acts and contacts tending to confer legitimacy on the GPRA, politically inspired military transfers, and so forth. But they concern, in perhaps greater measure, a trial of intention against the government—or more specifically against the single individual who was, *de facto,* the government.

II

The first charge against de Gaulle was that of studied duplicity. Riding to power on a wave which mingled, in an incommensurable formula, the negative revulsion against a degraded political institution and the positive enthusiasm of nationalism centered around the phrase *Algérie française,* the General was held to have abused the sources of his power in a systematically unprincipled way. Frustrated men like Jacques Soustelle, writing from exile, would later attempt to search deep in the past for evidence: "It will probably long be asked whether, in May 1958, General de Gaulle had decided to abandon Algeria. What now appears certain is that during the first years of the rebellion he adopted various and contradictory positions in conversations with those who came to see him in his retirement." [6] Once de Gaulle had

[6] Jacques Soustelle, *L'Espérance trahie* (Paris, 1962), 7.

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returned to power, Soustelle maintained, "the trickery was so skilled, so gradual (at least at the beginning), camouflaged with such astuteness, that it was difficult to penetrate." [7] So difficult, in fact, that Soustelle himself, never granted the coveted portfolio of Algerian affairs, would not leave the Cabinet until after the "week of the barricades" (February 5, 1960). One thing is certain: de Gaulle was totally absorbed in the comprehensive problem of restoring French power. In this problem there was no room for sentimental obstinacy over Algeria. To reduce the barricades the President of the Republic had, to be sure, held out the temptation of the "most French solution." But he had cunningly personalized and conditionalized the statement ("serait la plus française"). In a much later speech (before selected military officers at Strasbourg, on November 23, 1961) de Gaulle intoned what might almost be construed as an echo passage when he referred to "the [understandable but vain] hope . . . that simply by wishing it things could be changed from what they really are to what one desired them to be. . . ." [8]

The second fundamental castigation of de Gaulle was based on the charge of indecision and indirection. This is in seeming contradiction of the first reproach. But Soustelle touches upon it at some length: "At least the government could have taken a firm position, repeated a hundred times, in defining its goals of war and peace, so as to leave no more room for equivocation." [9] Claude Paillat, in his sensational indictment of de Gaulle's Algerian policy,[10] makes much of the "testament of strategy" which General Challe left behind him when recalled from his supreme command in Algiers in April 1960. This collection of documents allegedly outlined in expansive detail, and in ways toward which de Gaulle was known to be hostile, the conduct of counter-revolutionary operations, including heavy stress on psychological warfare. Paillat charges that though the Challe papers were well known, de Gaulle never indicated the government's position by revoking the orders:

> The government . . . allowed the simultaneous edification

[7] *Ibid.*, 12.

[8] Text contained in *Le Monde*, November 24, 1961.

[9] Soustelle, *L'Espérance*, 91.

[10] Claude Paillat, *Le dossier secret de l'Algérie* (Paris, 1961).

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> of two doctrines, one for the use of the Army and the Algerians, the other for the use of the *métropole*. The [Challe] directives, far from being secret, could not have been more official. General de Gaulle never addressed the least criticism to the commander-in-chief over them. And when the latter left Algeria, the government did not take advantage of it to have them cancelled. They remained in force under his successors.[11]

In fact, there is no doubt that the lines of command and information between Paris and Algeria had progressively broken down, so that one had not only to conjure with opposition but with misunderstanding. Under the Fourth Republic the army had resented all the inconveniences of feeble government and coalition politics. A collapsing cabinet or military credits refused by the Assembly could interfere annoyingly with the conduct of the war. Yet there were basically stable relations between Robert Lacoste, the Resident-Minister, and Messrs. Bourgès-Maunoury, Morice, and Chaban-Delmas, successively the Ministers of National Defense (especially the first two), between Lacoste and his military counterpart, General Raoul Salan, and between General Paul Ely, the Chief of Staff, and the military commanders in the field. If the regime was often unable to provide basic political support for the military effort (witness the "bons offices" undertaking of the Félix Gaillard government in the Tunisian dispute of March 1958, which, more than anything else, was the mechanical cause of the fall of the Fourth Republic), it was still true that the conduct of the war had passed mostly into the hands of the army and sympathetic civilian overseers.

Under the Fifth Republic, after the civil-military euphoria of the summer of 1958, this situation changed drastically. The major policies were no longer fabricated by compromise and debate, but were imposed by fiat, often obscurely, and without warning or preparation. As Premier, Charles de Gaulle himself assumed the responsibility for defense matters and further sub-delegated them to General Salan in Algeria. This meant, in one respect, a large concentration of power in the hands of the Algerian commander-in-chief; but, in another, the breakdown of useful hierarchical communications with Paris. When de Gaulle became head of state and

[11] *Ibid.*, 393.

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Messrs. Guillaumat and Messmer successively received the attribution of Minister of the Armies, these latter frequently had little more premonition of policy changes than did the nation at large. Neither, it seems, did M. Michel Debré. The television screen and radio set became official channels of communication. Field commanders had the President's speeches recorded on tape so that they could be studied minutely for the nuances that took the place of standard hierarchical directives. Of course many officers sought for ways to misinterpret them, a ruse which might have been obviated by a more orthodox system of transmission. The wish remained father to the thought in Algeria.

It seems also that the government lacked, at critical moments, the precise information it needed to deal with the bewildering complexity of the Algerian affair. At the outbreak of the barricades insurrection M. Debré was forced to make a hurried and emotional night journey to Algiers to form an on-the-spot impression of the balance of forces despite the fact that numerous military and political consultations had been held in Paris prior to his departure.

When General de Gaulle posed the three alternatives of "independence," "francization," and "association" in his famous self-determination speech of September 19, 1959, with a scarcely disguised preference for the last, no implementing directives followed the declaration. Colonel Gardes, Chief of Psychological Action, launched an immediate campaign for "integration" (the more usual word for the second option) with the conditional approval of General Challe. Before a month had passed he was abruptly called to order by M. Paul Delouvrier, the Minister-Delegate. Hints had been received from Paris: don't go too strong on the second solution. But hints were all: a succession of critical events passed, and still the equivocation was never entirely dissolved.[12]

The procedures by which de Gaulle effected his radical changes in Algerian policy did not respond to consistency nor, in a real sense, to honor. But to the objective observer it is difficult to see that they did not conform to reality, to *raison d'état,* and to the demands of empirical finesse. De Gaulle had once written, years earlier: "The French military spirit is loath to recognize that the action of war wears an

12 *Ibid.,* 298.

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essentially empirical character. It tries unceasingly to construct a doctrine that would permit it to undertake this action *a priori*." [13] There is every likelihood that he applied the same standard to politics, and especially to that sector of public affairs where war and politics meet. But no one can affirm that, successful as they may have been, de Gaulle's actions were not destined to demoralize the French Army.

III

This army, momentarily so vexing to the French President, was nevertheless designed—in a new image—to become a prime instrument of his policy of prestige. Therefore, suggestions that he could have relied much more heavily on public support than he did to oppose it are doubly misplaced. De Gaulle was anxious to change the army but not to crush it. "France's finest army since Napoleon," he is quoted as saying. "We must put it back on the Rhine." [14] Furthermore, "popular force" and "public opinion" were, in the Gaullist sense, merely other descriptions of the untamed chaos of French politics, the self-interest of the parties of a divided state against the general will which he incarnated as Supreme Legislator. Opinion was to be used as a monolithic expression of endorsement, not as an instrument of national division. The art was in temporizing, in keeping all potential disruptive forces off balance; the goal was a magisterial equilibrium created above the battle rather than issuing from it.[15]

Above and beyond this strategy there were lingering doubts that the Algerian question could be solved in any prefigured way: the involuted tactics of the unstable leadership of the FLN were not reassuring. De Gaulle was not fanatically dedicated to any single method of settling Algeria; he was simply resolved that it must be settled. Until that moment arrived, the army was there to fight and to support

[13] Charles de Gaulle, *Le fil de l'epée* (Paris, 1932), 98.

[14] Quoted by Serge and Merry Bromberger in *Les treize complots du 13 mai* (Paris, 1959), 133.

[15] During the *putsch* of April 21–24, 1961, there was much agitation for the arming of civilian militias to meet expected parachute drops of the rebels, especially among the labor unions. This had no appeal for the government, which discreetly went through the motions of arming and organizing a few UNR militants. Happily the plot was over before these civilians could take to the field.

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France's bargaining position. It was indispensable to preserve its mission. But its excesses had to be dealt with.

On the one hand, the regime was cautiously penalizing extremism and transferring "dangerous" officers from critical posts, not recognizing that its methods were having the effect of making loyal officers "dangerous" as well. On the other hand, it acquiesced in certain policies designed to placate the army and hold it shy of the brink of rebellion. Chiefly, thanks to a fortunate inheritance from the Fourth Republic, it resorted to the Biblical expedient of leading a chosen part of the army to the top of a mountain and tempting it.

In early 1956, unnoticed by all but the most careful observers, France had fought out the battle of whether or not it would develop atomic weapons.[16] The controversy was disguised in the Euratom debate in the National Assembly, which took place in July 1956, some five months after the investiture of Guy Mollet's "Front Républicain" government. Two lines of politics crossed in this conjuncture: in the first place, there were M. Mollet, some of his Socialist colleagues, and the virtual whole of the MRP, who believed in the creation of "European" institutions; secondly, there was a large bloc on the Right that deplored France's reticence in entering the atomic weapons competition, a government policy that had been formalized by M. Edgar Faure's statement of April 13, 1955: "It is necessary for France to become an atomic power. We should make rapid progress toward that realization. But we have decided to eliminate research devoted to specifically military uses. Consequently we do not intend to devote any study to the creation of an H-bomb or any other bomb. . . ." [17]

Guy Mollet temporized without any great misgivings; three of his Radical colleagues, Félix Gaillard, Maurice Faure, and Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, strongly favored France's entry into the field of military nuclear development. A numerically impressive coalition of the "Europeans" and the "belligerents" carried the Euratom treaty through the Assembly by a vote of 332–181. Both the ideals of "Eu-

[16] See the parliamentary debates in the *Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale,* July 1–July 11, 1956. I have treated this subject in greater detail in my "The Political Background of the French A-Bomb," *Orbis* (Fall, 1960), 284–306.

[17] *Le Monde,* April 14, 1955.

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rope" and the "independent deterrent" were mutually forwarded. Mollet's double-edged conviction on the subject was well-expressed in the following words:

> The position of the government is the following: France agrees not to explode an A-bomb before January 1, 1961 [a pledge later contravened]. Considering the retardation of studies and manufacture, which the High Commissioner of Atomic Energy [M. Francis Perrin, who testified extensively in the debate] has evoked, this moratorium cannot set our program back.[18]

The evolution from this time is perfectly clear: France pursued her atomic research toward the production of a bomb. M. Jules Moch, M. Félix Gaillard, and others made this amply evident in statements and interviews in the two years following. When General de Gaulle (already on record from much earlier days as a pro-bomb exponent) came to power at the beginning of June 1958, he found at least one situation tailor-made to his views that the previous regime had created. He incorporated the bomb and the supplementary idea of a *force de frappe* into his diplomacy and attempted to use it, incidentally, as a technical sop to the discontented Army of Algeria.[19]

Disputes arose in the military between the growing school of nuclear strategists (like Generals Charles Ailleret and Paul Stehlin) and the Algerian revolutionary war specialists, competing over resources, strategies, and political preferences. We cannot very well criticize these technical polarities except in the light of the political events surrounding them. Since General de Gaulle was their fervent ally, the "nuclearists" were apt to be found at the core of the government's support in April 1961, while the "subversives" would, not surprisingly, furnish the kernel of the opposition.

On February 13, 1960, two weeks to the day after the capitulation of the barricades, the first French atomic bomb was exploded at Reggane, in the Sahara. This, too, was to prove a watershed in the regime's relations with its military forces.

At the same time as the government was holding out its nuclear blandishment to a suspicious army, it was working

[18] *Ibid.*, July 12, 1956.

[19] See General de Gaulle's press conference of November 10, 1959, in *Le Monde*, November 11, 1959.

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much more subtly in another sphere to loosen the military grip on Algeria. This was a side effect and subsidiary intention of the "Constantine Plan," [20] announced shortly after the General returned to power as a means for dramatically raising the indigenous standard of living through investment, public works, education, and the creation of employment opportunities at rapid cadence.

The trained economists knew much better than the soldiers that the goal of trans-Mediterranean equality, if not an out-and-out pipe dream, was at best a very distant prospect. However, the Constantine Plan at least promised some progress against the dual specters of galloping pauperization and cruel demographic pressure. Conveniently, this would also be a means of releasing Algeria from the administrative grip of an ardent army which had acquired *de facto* control over the province as a result of M. Lacoste's delegations of power of 1956, confirmed by government edict in June 1958.[21] The appointment of the technician, M. Paul Delouvrier, as Salan's replacement was intended to confirm the will of the government to concentrate on the sphere of economic reform. As we know, political events swiftly outstripped all but the preliminary effects of the Constantine Plan; nevertheless, it was disturbing to the army to find itself challenged obliquely in an area where its power was especially vulnerable.

IV

These problems, vastly magnified by the trauma of the barricades, were all festering in the bosom of the army when the President of France, accompanied by M. Pierre Messmer (who had just replaced M. Guillaumat as the Minister of the Armies) and General Ely, set out on March 3, 1960, for his famous *tournée des popotes* ("tour of the mess halls") in Algeria. The junket was not the direct result of the insurgency of January—it had been previously planned to begin on February 5—but the events of Algiers underscored its urgency. It was of critical moment that *le pouvoir* should re-establish the lost contact with *la force*.

20 De Gaulle's five-year plan for Algeria, offered at Constantine on October 3, 1958. The plan foundered badly in 1960 from want of confidence in the private sector.

21 On this subject, see the highly suggestive essay by François Gromier, "Le 'trouble' de l'Armée," *La NEF* (July–September 1961), 5–18.

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The impact of de Gaulle's impromptu speeches to the officers of a number of military posts—reported (improperly some would claim) by a single Agence France Presse correspondent—was abundantly clear when the tour had ended. The difficulty is that it was clear to different persons in different ways, and that it would generate ambiguity and equivocation in the years to come.

For example, in defense of the now classic argument that de Gaulle had betrayed both his previous positions and the national interest, the army would later be able to point to such statements as: "There will be no Dien Bien Phu in Algeria. . . . The independence demanded by Ferhat Abbas and his gang is a farce." (Hadjer-Mafrouch, March 4); or "After military operations come to an end there will be a long time before we can proceed to elections. It will take years. Till then there is a duty to be done. The Army has only to accomplish its mission." (Redjas, March 4); [22] or "The people who say 'independence' commit an absurdity. Algeria can't go it alone." (Aumale, March 5).[23]

But the President had said other things, too. On March 5, he had cautioned the officers at Barika: "For the moment you are the sword of France in this place, but the day will come when it will be somewhere else. You always have to think of that. You are not destined to be the French Army in Algeria forever." [24] More significantly, he declared at Zafirete on the day of his departure (March 7):

> France has not only got the Algerian problem on her hands. She has many others. We, the State, have to consider each thing in its place with relation to all the rest, Algeria included. I have been anxious to tell you this, *messieurs les officiers,* so that you will make no mistake.[25]

This statement is perhaps the most succinct version one can find of the pure Gaullist theory of the Algerian situation. New days make new demands. But it went curiously unperceived at the time. For de Gaulle, France's position in the world depended on a calculus of dozens of factors; for

[22] This and the preceding from *Le Monde,* March 5, 1960.

[23] *Ibid.,* March 6–7, 1960.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] *Ibid.,* March 8, 1960.

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much of the army, all of France's honor, esteem, and success depended on a single issue—Algeria.

De Gaulle also lifted the equivocation concerning his position on the self-determination referendum, which he had stated might be years away. He announced himself as favoring the third solution, *association* with France (apparently a part of his Community conception): "I believe that [the Algerians] will say [at the referendum], an Algerian Algeria tied to France." [26]

The army was either unwilling to settle for this solution, or else the remark had passed over their heads. The army was not now content to consider itself the blind instrument of opportunistically shifting national policy, whatever de Gaulle's calculus of the situation might be. The new constitution made the President of the Republic the defender of the national territory, and stated that no part of it could be arbitrarily alienated. Besides, not only did the army believe itself bound by solemn contract to the defense of the European population and, especially, its Muslim allies; it was also combatting revolutionary war at the last outpost "in defense of the West." For the majority sentiment in the army, colonialism was a dead issue and would never reappear again in its previous form. As an anonymous officer told a Left-Wing correspondent rather pointedly:

> If M. Sartre throws in my face: "You are bastards because you have waged war against a friendly people," I would object, because this is wrong. We will always be ready to love and respect that people. We have risen instead against that enemy that is ours and yours, the one who, tomorrow, will stop you from being allowed to read and write. You are in peril of death and you don't know it. We know it for you and we are defending you.[27]

The army declared that it was no longer capitalist, not as capitalist as de Gaulle himself. Many of the officers most devoted to the proposition of *Algérie française* avowed how they detested the banks and the big capitalist enterprises, the apathy of the Champs-Elysées and the selfishness of the *gros colons* of the Algiers suburbs. They equally detested the

[26] At Azziz, March 7. *Ibid.*

[27] Cited in Claude Dufresnoy, *Des Officiers parlent*, in the preface by Jules Roy (Paris, 1961), xii.

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French Left, which was sabotaging their effort with all the means at hand. If the Left would abandon its insane idea of Algerian independence and throw its weight toward the creation of social equity under French rule, then, according to one officer, "that day you would no longer be perverted intellectuals but would be our masters, for we are desperately looking for a Barrès. The Right offers us nothing but mountebanks." [28] But this was clearly an impossible proposition.

Increasingly, the younger military came to favor an indefinable "national-gauchisme" that would impose equity, clarity, and decisiveness of policy through efficient technical means rather than political bargaining. Let us listen to the argument firsthand in the words of Colonel Antoine Argoud, Massu's former Chief-of-Staff and *éminence grise,* who was later to choose the side of direct rebellion:

> You would be surprised to learn how much the majority of officers are leftist. We have understood that you have to fight communism on its own ground; in other words, we can't put up with the privileges of the banks and the capitalists, etc. . . . If the Army had really been able to do what it wanted in Algeria, there would have been a radical land reform with expropriation of the big estates long ago.[29]

To be sure, not all of the officers were Young Turks, after this fashion. But it was perhaps the most dynamic of the attitudes one encountered. At the least, there was majority agreement on three points: (1) the Algerian War as the "defense of the West," against a *guerre révolutionnaire* playing into the hands of global communism; (2) a contract to protect the Europeans and the loyal Muslims, and a determination to fight the pacification out "for twenty years if necessary"; (3) the resolution not to suffer defeat, by political chicanery or any other means.

This made of Algeria an absolute, when de Gaulle would have it a shifting value in the mathematics of international affairs.

Surely not all officers were potential insurrectionists,[30] nor

[28] *Ibid.*, xv–xvi.

[29] Claude Krief, "Portrait d'un colonel" (interview with Colonel Argoud, November 1960), *La NEF* (July–September 1961), 54.

[30] Raoul Girardet's careful description is *à propos:* "If the Army as a whole seems presently inclined to follow the old rules of subordination and obedi-

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did they—national Catholics, national socialists, anguished *pieds noirs,* "psychologues," anti-Gaullists—stand much chance of completing a durable coalition with each other, as later events were to verify. But their morale was harshly shaken by the government's ambiguous progress toward negotiations with the enemy, and their sentiment was, at best, one of conditional obedience. Many of them would continue to be fence-sitters when the blow fell in April 1961.

When a modern democratic army *almost* rebels against its government—especially one of concentrated power led by a charismatic figure of military origin—this is *at least* as significant as its failure to succeed in doing so.

The army had its loyalists and qualified loyalists as well as its insurgents and qualified dissenters. Jean Planchais settles on the terms "libéraux," "gaullistes," and "traditionnalistes," [31] and these distinctions will do as well as any others. The Gaullists, relatively small in number, were those who had been continuous admirers of the General from the days of the Liberation, when "support of de Gaulle had meant a commitment which engaged one's whole life without any immediate hope other than taking part in combat against the enemy," [32] through the deceptive days of the RPF and its aftermath. They were supplemented by some whose attachment to the General on May 13, 1958, had represented more than a tactical posture.

The "traditionalists" were those survivors of the old army and a few younger descendants who believed in the principles of obedience and service, the legacies of the *grande muette,* and the desirability of no political involvement. The position speaks for itself.

Finally, the "liberals" were those officers most closely in touch with normal civilian politics and the attitudes included in that spectrum. To be a "liberal" in the army might range from the admission of legitimate doubt regarding the dogma of *Algérie française* to overt Socialism or Catholic Left-Wing humanitarianism. The essential distinguishing criterion from the other groups was that "liberalism" based

ence, that obedience is essentially defined as one *that is subject to reflection.*" "Pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire dans la France contemporaine." *Revue Française de Science Politique,* March 1960, 33.

31 *Le Monde,* March 11, 1960.

32 *Ibid.*

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its loyalism to the government in part on a political attitude, and not on a personalist one or simply on the mechanism of command and obedience.

The majority of the officer corps may be appropriately described as "conditionalist." However, conditions had a habit of changing. And the essence of realism was changing, too. The demonstrations of Muslim support for the FLN, reaching maximum pitch in the Algerian cities in December 1960—just prior to the referendum on *autodétermination*—probably did a great deal to convince many officers that the cause of *intégration* was lost, whether through natural evolution or through the government's blindness, and that other consequences would follow. Not even at this point, though, did most of the army contemplate the abandonment of the territory with any willingness. The argument now became that the army must remain in all circumstances as the guarantor of the equal civil rights of the two communities. Many in retrospect now had regrets that they had held off in the Ortiz-Lagaillarde coup of January, when, despite the disagreeably "fascisant" inflection of the rebellion, the time had probably been most propitious for backing de Gaulle into a corner.

There was another army, too, a forgotten army learning, like its seniors, the gift of self-expression. These were the draftees, the *contingent,* no longer an illiterate rabble like the Grande Armée of Napoleon but a representatively articulate body of French opinion. Already, by the time of the barricades, the duress and attrition of the war were beginning to weigh on these non-professionals. Although, coming from the most diverse walks of life, many of these young soldiers had discovered an unexpected fraternity and solidarity in the army, increasing numbers began to question the sense and justice of the war. One wrote in a letter:

> Isn't the balance equal between the interests of our countrymen and the aspirations of the Algerian people for independence? The ones want to stay French, they want to protect their goods, they fear for their lives. Haven't we the duty to defend them? The others fight for the recognition of their dignity as Algerians, for the possession of goods in their turn, and for the exercise of powers which, thanks to us, they feel able to assume.[33]

[33] Xavier Grall (ed.), *La Génération du djebel* (Paris, 1962), 47.

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Another stated, not untypically: "We've all learned that Algeria was a political plum. Ever since, I've been disgusted with politicians. The politicos are two-faced salesmen." [34] Like the nation, the rookies were inclined to place their faith in the one man who stood a chance of ending the war on any terms. This feeling would burst forth spontaneously during the "*putsch* of the generals."

At the time of the government's referendum on *autodétermination* (January 8, 1961) a number of high-placed officers were infuriated by the government's scarcely concealed orders to use military pressure in support of "oui," when the government had done all in its power to mitigate the army's political activity in the opposite sense. This inconsistency provoked hesitations on the part of the loyalist Supreme Commander, General Crépin, and had more than a little to do with his transfer to a command in Germany shortly after the referendum. General de Gaulle recognized Crépin's Algerian service magnanimously but with a hint of innuendo in his letter of January 12, 1961:

> My dear Crépin . . .
> I fully recognize the type of abnegation which, in these circumstances, has had to govern the conduct of many persons. Second to none I understand why and to what degree the profound transformation of Algeria, both within and in its future relations with France, is heartfelt among the soldiers. . . .[35]

Prior to this a group of sixteen retired generals had issued a manifesto urging support of the "non" at the referendum; these were answered by individual professions of loyalty from General Billotte, General de Larminat, and others. The battle of the following spring was already being joined on the printing presses. This period also covered the "trial of the barricades" and was affected by the general feeling of apprehension throughout the officer corps caused by Colonel Gardes' indictment and the quasi-seditious testimony of many senior officers, up to and including Marshal Juin. It was at this point that Juin broke his "amitié cinquantenaire" with the President of France.

In the midst of these events, and reaching its apogee in the

[34] *Ibid.*, 101.

[35] Text in *Le Monde*, January 14, 1961.

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period just preceding the week of the barricades, *l'action psychologique* had run its course.

V

L'action psychologique was the doctrine proceeding from the widely accepted premise that the Algerian war was a revolutionary struggle fought primarily for the control of the minds of the inhabitants of the war zone.[36] At its extreme, it was a concoction of mechanical techniques of persuasion based on intensive propaganda effort and applied crowd psychology. Variants of psychological action were addressed not only to the Muslim population, but turned by the propaganda artists of the army on the institution itself and on the French civilians. This branch of warfare was conducted by a regular hierarchy of staffs (the *cinquièmes bureaux*) and coordinated by the Service d'Action Psychologique et d'Information in Algiers.

About a year after General de Gaulle's coming to power—and after the psychological action of the army had served its purpose in the first referendum campaign—the regime made positive attempts to limit the scope of the new doctrine and induce the officers to comply with new definitions. In taking this step, the government recognized the existence and applicability of *l'action psychologique,* but gave it very precise boundaries. All of this is contained in a significant "instruction sur les fondements, buts et limites de l'action psychologique," signed by M. Pierre Guillaumat, the Minister of the Armies, on July 28, 1959. The document is worth quoting at considerable length:

> *Psychological war* is designed to harm the adversary. Its purpose is less the conquest of territory than of the enemy population. Always an accompaniment to a "hot war," it is one of the principal forms of the "cold war." As with other weapons, the limits imposed on its use depend as much on the enemy's practice as on the elementary rules of warfare.
>
> Quite to the contrary, *psychological action* has the mission of facilitating the training and information of the fighting forces of the nation. Known under a new name because it works with modern techniques, it seeks to achieve some-

[36] See my essay, "Revolutionary War and Psychological Action," *Military Review,* September 1960, 4–13.

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thing that has always been a chief preoccupation of the high command: the strengthening of the morale of the combatant, *in time of peace as in time of war.*

On the practical plane, this action aims to immunize the combatants against the adversary's initiatives of demoralization, for which the people at large are often the conscious or unconscious agents, and also to give them concrete ideas about national realities, the evolution of different kinds of conflict, the general organization of defense, and the role of the armed forces.

Fortifying the determination and combative will of friendly elements, it likewise encourages the active sympathies of others, which it cannot do without in time of peace, especially in a period of cold war. . . .

The West is indebted to France in particular for having been able, over the course of its history, to develop a certain number of values . . . love of liberty, respect for the human person and its rights, support and glorification of the national ideal.

These things that make life worthwhile, undisputed for the French of European origin, preserve all their value for the French North Africans and for all peoples of the Community that have been nurtured and penetrated by French culture. With regard to these latter, we must apply ourselves to implanting these notions in the contexts proper to their civilizations and their particular ways of life.

Our behavior should be such that the spirit of teamwork and solidarity, as indispensable in a regiment as in the factory or the fields, should never in any way violate the rights of the person. . . .

It is appropriate to emphasize that if discipline and psychological action are not mutually exclusive, they should be confused neither in their principles nor their methods. . . . Thus understood, psychological action as it applies to the armed forces aims at nothing else but raising the morale of the soldier and his unit, improving their cohesion, assuring their connection with all elements of the nation, and inducing the citizen to participate with free conviction in safeguarding France, the Community, and, in doing, the free world.[37]

As an injunction M. Guillaumat's directive was perhaps a

[37] *Le Monde,* October 3, 1959.

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little abstract to deter these convinced practitioners of the "war in the social milieu." The *cinquièmes bureaux,* distressed by the trends of government policy and eager to create their diverse committees of liaison among the activist groups, finally lent themselves, in some cases, to complicity with the insurrectionists of January 1960.

As soon as the government had prevailed over the rebellion, it took the obvious step in its own defense, with the justification of the events of the preceding weeks: it ordered, by decree of the Council of Ministers, on February 10, 1960, the suppression of the psychological action organs of the army. Suppression may be a slightly misleading word, for in Algeria these same functions were redistributed between the *3e bureau* (Operations) and *2e bureau* (Intelligence). At least, the locus of power, the citadel of psychological action was swept away.

To many officers, the *cinquième bureau* had seemed the cornerstone of the civil-military effort, the "bureau population" whose activities had cemented the two communities through the creation of social, medical, and youth centers; its dispersal threatened to produce a lapse of these contacts. It had also taken upon itself a multitude of administrative responsibilities (with the Sections Administratives Spécialisées) in scattered communities. This latter prerogative was answered crisply by a presidential directive of February 20, 1960, defining strictly the limits of the military authority and, at least on paper, returning the Algerian administrative system to what it had been before 1956. An immediate aim of the instruction was to discourage the army from intervening forcefully in the prospective cantonal elections, as it had in other consultations. The order read in part:

> By decree of June 28, 1958 the government had prescribed that "by virtue of the present exceptional situation regarding public order in Algeria, the military authority will exercise the powers normally attributed to the civil authority."
>
> Subsequently a variety of measures have tended to restore a normal balance of attributions between the civil and military authorities.
>
> Henceforth, and by virtue of the decree of February 20, 1960 ordered by me at the proposition of the government,

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> the civil authority will once more, in principle, exercise in the Algerian departments the whole of the attributions which are its normal prerogative. However, and by reason of evident necessities of public order, special dispositions shall remain or enter into force.[38]

The end of a long, dark tunnel? Scarcely, because the army, having become a kind of state within a state and persuaded—with some justice (Marshal Lyautey had first announced it)—that it understood and administered Algeria better than the civilians, would not easily relinquish its grip on a territory where military precautions were still very well advised.

The government tactic of decentralizing the psychological war services altered few convictions and probably exasperated others, but it lowered the point of direct political danger by subversion and may have cost the four generals a valuable channel of authority when they made their *putsch* in April 1961.

As the year 1960 progressed, moreover, certain currents of conviction in the army were perceptibly changing. Largely this was a function of realism, not of the abandonment of too long and too closely held ideals. Few officers relished the thought of relinquishing Algeria to the GPRA, but an increasingly large number saw the end of their adventure in sight and silently submitted to the imperative that they would not make war on the government to save an irretrievable situation, albeit with valor. The demonstrations of the FLN's grip over the Muslim civilian populations of Algiers, Oran, and other urban centers in the "journées musulmanes" of December 1960 and the retaliatory European *ratonnades* of the same month shook sentiment in the army badly and dissipated the tenacious dreams of an "integrated" Algeria that might have remained. For the first time since Massu had cleaned out the Casbah there was real danger of generalized race war, and the army, with its prevailing social sympathies, wanted no part of it. The FLN had won the "second battle of Algiers."

Previously, the army's "social liberalism" and its doctrine had been all of a bloc. Theorists would have boiled both down to a desire for the reassertion of man "on the human

[38] *Ibid.*, March 4, 1960.

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scale": [39] subversive war exalted the primacy of the individual in making judgments and involved his moral and ideological qualities, just as contacts with the Muslims "on an equal footing" seemed a vast progress in the sphere of fundamental human relationships. The events of December 1960 seemed to show that this basic connection had been severed. The brave scheme of friendship between the two communities had not come into the realm of the possible, and it seemed to some that the cause of this rupture might be discovered in the false or improper application of the principle of *la guerre révolutionnaire* itself.

In some circles, to be sure, there had been a continuous questioning of the foundations of ideological war, generally by those officers who would be impatient of any political doctrine.

The best, and most influential, document of this "guerrier" position was a long letter appearing in the *Revue Militaire d'Information* in late 1959, signed with the *nom de plume* "Simplet" (otherwise identified as a colonel commanding a regiment in Algeria). "Simplet" attempted, among other things, to "demystify" the ideological interpretation of the Indochina war:

> In the Indochina conflict there wasn't any action of revolutionary or psychological war, and I am persuaded that the young soldier of the Viet Minh who rose—and with what courage!—to assault our positions at Dien Bien Phu was not thinking of the triumph of international Communism but of "kicking the foreigner out of the place where I belong." . . .[40]

Whether or not this was an oversimplification of the role of ideology in Indochina, or whether it had indeed been essential that the "young soldier" should possess the ideological conviction of his leaders, this is an attitude that deserves to be recorded in the spectrum of opinions that assailed and divided the army in Algeria.

[39] See François Gromier, "Une conception archaïque," *Cahiers de la République* (November–December 1960), 18: "The Army, for a time, found confidence in its destiny, somehow proportional to the distance it adopted with regard to its former and present missions: it discovered or rediscovered 'man' through an ideological or moral screen, borrowed, it is true, from the theory of *la guerre révolutionnaire* of a new age. . . ."

[40] "Guerre Révolutionnaire, Guerre Psychologique, ou Guerre 'tout court,'" *Revue Militaire d'Information* (October 1959), 99.

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But for some, bitter and extreme, the doctrine of "revolutionary war" was not to be blamed for failure. It was that the French Army had not followed out its political implications. "Why have we lost *la guerre révolutionnaire* in Algeria?" asked a young officer in an anonymous article in *La NEF*.[41] "Because *at no moment* have we waged *la guerre révolutionnaire*." The war in Algeria had been fought purely and simply to protect the interests of the French settlers, their "statute of superiority which distinguished them from the Muslims." The lieutenant's analysis of what ought to have been done did not diverge profoundly from current theories; he was adamant in claiming, however, that none of these things had been done:

> In a war like this one, military victory can be a defeat . . . if it leads to nothing. To conquer, it would have been necessary to take the regrouped peoples in hand, rally them around the Army in the same fight. That presupposed that the Army had truly revolutionary objectives. But it couldn't have any, since it was at the service of an unrevolutionary State.[42]

Algeria: another revolutionary, subversive struggle lost—according to the candid and private admission of an increasing number of officers as the year 1961 progressed and Belkacem Krim was about to come to Evian. Politics as usual had spun the plot. The inflection of some of the bitterness had now changed, as with Lieutenant X, who crisply commented: "Precisely because the military command . . . was able to take the widest initiatives, its responsibility is the greatest." But could the military command ever have attacked the banks, the large landholders? Colonel Argoud, at least, had thought not. The majority of the army did not share the special, autocritical misery of "Lieutenant X." They found a solidarity of anguish in the conviction of metropolitan duplicity and turned with pain on the government, keeping uneasy silence or preparing to take arms against it.

Yet, when the military *putsch* of April 1961 burst forth, it seriously misfired. There were a number of essential flaws in its planning. Commitments previously gained were not

[41] 'Lieutenant X,' "Pourquoi nous avons 'perdu' la guerre d'Algérie," *La NEF* (July–September 1961), 20 ff.

[42] *Ibid.*, 36.

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honored in the time of trial; *attentisme* ("wait-and-see-ism") penetrated the hierarchies of Algeria. But two factors particularly stood out. The negative dissents of the French Army had not crystallized into a single opposition; staring over the brink into the pit of parricide, a substantial number of the malcontents drew back. Then, too, the time for insurrection had grown less ripe since 1960. A whole French population had become war-weary. The army had found its realistic goals of a preferred Algerian solution sapped. Melancholy had replaced anger. The nation, for which the army has historically aspired to speak and act "as best guide," had itself spoken through the infernal Gaullist referenda. By a series of means, prudent and calculating, uncertain and empirical, de Gaulle had brought his inconsolable army to heel by a whisker. He had dealt with it in half-truths, but had not broken it. Its hurt remained, but its touch was lost.

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MONETARY REFORM TO FURTHER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT *

SUPPOSE that when the United Nations publishes its next *World Economic Survey,* country after country in the underdeveloped world turns out to have struck gold since the last report, and that we can count on a yearly addition of three or four billion dollars to the world's monetary reserves from this new production. Is such a report good news or bad?

Good news, clearly, for a number of reasons:

(1) *The world reserve problem.* The supposed sharp acceleration in gold production would eliminate the threat of inadequacy in world monetary reserves. In recent years, gold production has been small compared to the growing need for monetary reserves, and, of this small production, a large share has been absorbed by private hoards. For most industrial countries, the growth of reserves has indeed been satisfactory —but only because the "balance of payments deficit" of the United States has transferred claims upon world reserves from the United States to other countries. Once this deficit is corrected, as it must be before long, there are ominous prospects of a general shortage of reserves.

Financial experts of the economically powerful industrial countries which constitute the "Paris Club" have been busily seeking ways to forestall this problem by making each country's currency serve as reserves for the others but the situation remains shaky. Our supposed change in gold production, however, would really solve the problem, and would permit the "Paris Club" to adjourn *sine die.*

(2) *Hard currency income for underdeveloped countries.* The industrial countries are always willing to buy gold; gold

* This article represents an elucidation of a somewhat technical paper, "The Case for an International Commodity Reserve Currency"—Conference document E/CONF.46/P/7, which was jointly submitted to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development by Nicholas Kaldor (Cambridge University), Jan Tinbergen (University of Rotterdam), and me. The present version incorporates emendations made by Mr. Kaldor in the process of making a version of the article available to the Conference as an annex to the technical paper.

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producers can be absolutely sure of getting as much in U.S. dollars, deutsche marks, French francs, or pounds sterling as their gold amounts to at well-known established prices. This is a sharp contrast to the position of producers of coffee, rubber, copper, jute, and other primary commodities, who may find that their command over hard currency is reduced by market gluts or by depressions in the industrial countries. Thus with the supposed change in gold production, the underdeveloped countries would have a sure thing instead of a gamble: they would be certain of their ability to find the wherewithal to buy the industrial equipment and partly processed goods they need to develop their economies, and to buy reasonable quantities of finished products of types they cannot efficiently produce as yet.

(3) *Secure markets for industrial exporters.* The counterpart of the secure hard-currency income of the gold producers is a secure market for the industries which produce industrial goods for their use. Overseas markets for such goods would not only be enlarged by our supposed acceleration of gold production; they would also be made more certain. These markets would have a general tendency to stimulate activity in the industrial countries, and they would hold up as strong points of activity in any industrial recession. A valuable side-effect would be that, given the larger scale and greater security of the overseas market, producers would have incentives to compete by adapting their products better to overseas needs.

(4) *Private investment in underdeveloped countries.* With our supposed acceleration of gold production, the underdeveloped countries would be a much more attractive field for private investment—both for foreigners and for their own citizens, who at present are tempted to place their capital in industrial countries. The intermittent famines of foreign exchange which now make so much trouble would be a thing of the past. Investors would not need to fear being frozen in by emergency rules which block withdrawal of capital or even of earnings upon it. At least as important, investors would not have to fear that the productivity of their enterprises would be crippled because they could not get permits to import key materials, spare parts to maintain their equipment, or supplementary equipment to enable them to

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modernize and lower their costs of production. Furthermore, the new situation would mean larger and more secure markets for industrial enterprises *within* the underdeveloped countries, as well as for industries which ship into those countries from outside. Thus the market stimulus to industrialization of underdeveloped countries would be strengthened.

(5) *Reduced international tensions.* The supposed acceleration of gold production would create easier and more dignified relations between industrial and underdeveloped countries. To the extent that trade fails to provide underdeveloped countries with enough hard currencies, aid has to be sought to fill the gap. Added gold production would be "trade" from the standpoint of the new gold producers; it would both reduce their need for grants and loans and make it easier to negotiate and to service such loans as might still be necessary. This fact alone would make it easier for industrial and underdeveloped countries to develop their relations on a footing of mutual respect. There would be an easing of tension also in consequence of the more secure position of private investors in underdeveloped countries. These countries could afford a treatment of such investors which the investors and their home governments would readily accept as "reasonable," and there would be few occasions for the governments of industrial countries to exacerbate relations by intervening on behalf of the investments of their nationals.

Another aspect of the supposed acceleration of gold production would be an easing of commercial policy. The restrictions on imports which survive in the industrial countries, despite a long continued swing toward liberalization, command support chiefly as defensive measures—to guard against losses of monetary reserves from excessively rapid growth of imports and to guard against unemployment from displacement of local by imported products. On both scores, larger gold production overseas would make liberalization safer and easier. In the absence of an adequate source of new monetary reserves, one country can build up its reserves through a "favorable" balance of payments position only insofar as other countries have "unfavorable" positions. At any given time, several of the industrial countries are always

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in some difficulty with the balance of payments—and the rest remember recent difficulties and have a lively awareness that they may soon be in trouble again.

But as points are scored in the balance of payments game, a large flow of gold enables everybody to score simultaneously. Gold-producing countries do not think of the gold outflow as a "loss of reserves"—on the contrary, it is merely an export, but (for the reasons indicated above) if anything, rather more satisfactory than other exports. From the standpoint of industrial countries which import gold, what comes in *is* a "gain of reserves." Thus the industrial countries can be in a "favorable" balance of payments position without their trading partners being in difficulties. They can, therefore, afford to be more receptive to merchandise imports because they have gold imports. The stimulus to activity provided by the flourishing export industries simplifies the problem of finding jobs for the young men who would otherwise seek places in the import-competing industries. Thus our supposed acceleration of gold production reduces the pressures to maintain trade barriers. In particular, it offers prospects of satisfying one of the most urgent needs of the underdeveloped countries by opening up industrial countries to products which constitute the first stage of processing of the primary products which now are shipped in raw form (or the second stage where now the first stage of processing is near the source of supply).

This cheerful account of the effects of our supposed jump in gold production by the underdeveloped countries is not mere rhetoric. The economic history of the nineteenth century shows how in periods like the eighteen-fifties (when gold production jumped in the then underdeveloped countries of the United States and Australia) there was a sharing of prosperity between these overseas countries and the industrial economy of Europe. There is only one thing wrong with the picture: the supposed widespread expansion of gold production overseas does not seem to be happening.

POSSIBLE SYNTHETIC EQUIVALENTS TO INCREASED GOLD PRODUCTION

If such a desirable development will not take place "naturally," the obvious next question is whether concerted pol-

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icy action by industrial and underdeveloped countries could not bring about an equivalent development. The purpose of this paper is to show how this could be done. The method I suggest—which has been laid before the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in the paper by Nicholas Kaldor, Jan Tinbergen, and me—is to base expansion of monetary reserves on production in the primary-producing sector of the world economy. Since gold production shows no signs of being either large enough or well enough distributed among countries, we propose to base the additional monetary reserves on goods the underdeveloped countries can and will produce in adequate volume—on a composite of primary commodities which meet certain minimum standards of quality-standardization and of storability.

Before analyzing the methods by which such commodities could be made to serve as monetary reserves, however, I must comment briefly on other more familiar proposals for world monetary reform. These rest essentially on the substitution of credit for gold at the level of world monetary reserves. Such a substitution has already been made in the *internal* monetary structures of the industrial countries; and while the resulting temptations led to serious upsets while we learned the art of monetary managements (and while conservatives still complain of the loss of familiar monetary landmarks), credit money now works satisfactorily in the industrial countries. Important credit elements have already been incorporated in world monetary reserves by the development of a "sterling area" and "franc area" with reserves in London and Paris, and more recently by the inclusion in monetary reserves of large claims on New York, generated by the American balance of payments deficit. Could not this credit system of monetary reserves be generalized?

If we look at world monetary reform simply as a problem of accommodation among the rather small group of financially strong industrial countries which constitute the "Paris Club," it is not hard to visualize a workable system of credit-based reserves. The outlines for such a system were sketched by Lord Keynes during the war, and more recently Robert Triffin has filled in the essentials of a scheme for setting up an effective credit-creating world central bank by rather moderate changes in the structure of the existing International

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Monetary Fund. Discussions in the "Paris Club" have demonstrated, in fact, that even without changes in the written constitution of the IMF or in the statutes of national central banks, it may be possible to mobilize large credit elements to support the international reserves of the leading countries.

But we must remember that while they own virtually all of the world's monetary reserves and carry on much of the world's commerce, the countries of the "Paris Club" are not the world. The basic economic problem of the world is economic development for the benefit of the huge majority of the human race who live in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Orient. This development requires a healthy expansion of the trade of the underdeveloped countries. It is obvious that the reshaping of the world monetary system is bound to have a powerful influence on the development of trade. It is not enough to satisfy ourselves that a proposed monetary reform will work well for the world's industrial nucleus. It is at least as important to use the opportunities created by monetary reform to further the trade and internal development of the underdeveloped countries.

What is attractive about our supposed acceleration of gold production is that it would help the underdeveloped countries earn their way into development; with their own resources, they could pay for the industrial imports they need. This benefit would not flow from a monetary reform which consisted of some sort of credit swapping within the "Paris Club" family. Only very incidentally and indirectly can such a reform enhance the earning power of the underdeveloped countries.

Some variants of credit-based monetary reform plans suggest that instead of credit swapping among industrial countries, the additional reserve base might take the form of loans by a world central bank to underdeveloped countries. Evidently this would put hard currencies in the hands of such countries, and thus make some contribution to development. But the drawbacks are serious. For an underdeveloped country, to sell bonds to a world central bank would not be at all the same thing as to sell gold. The whole process would hinge on decisions by bank officials on the "credit-worthiness" of individual underdeveloped countries. Their ability to repay loans would have to be estimated; to safeguard the

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"soundness" of the loans, all kinds of conditions would have to be attached. Ability to pay off old loans would depend on a steady and expanding extension of new loans. Any weakening of markets for primary products might simultaneously increase the need of the developing countries for new sources of hard currency and reduce their "credit-worthiness" so much that a credit mechanism could not fill the need. Such a foundation for expansion of monetary reserves would contain a built-in tendency to intensify the tensions which expansion of gold production would relax. It becomes urgent to look for alternative solutions which do not share these defects.

THE COMMODITY-COMPOSITE RESERVE PROPOSAL

Proposals to base monetary reserves on a composite of primary commodities have been under discussion among economists for thirty years and have been considered intermittently in United Nations commissions and the like for at least ten years. While many aspects of the problem remain to be worked out, therefore, these proposals should not be seen as mere improvisations, but are entitled to consideration as responsible recommendations.

The key concept of the scheme is that of a "bundle" of primary commodities, fixed in physical composition, and including as elements so many pounds each of aluminum, barley, butter, cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton, and so forth—in proportion to the tonnage of each commodity which has moved in world trade in the years just before the scheme goes into force. A reserve stock of such "bundles" would be owned by an international monetary agency (presumably a department of the International Monetary Fund). Just as the U.S. Treasury stands ready to buy or sell gold at a buying price and selling price very close to "par," the agency running the commodity reserve (say the IMF) would stand ready to buy or sell "bundles" at predetermined buying and selling prices *for the whole bundle.* The currency in which the IMF would make these offers would be an international currency—call it the bancor—to which individual currencies would be related by official parities as at present they are related to the IMF's "gold dollar." Just as the buying and selling offers of the U.S. Treasury and monetary agencies of other countries set

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narrow limits to the fluctuation of gold prices, the IMF offer for commodity bundles would set narrow limits to the fluctuation of the price of such bundles—equivalent to an index number of primary product prices, weighted by the number of pounds of each included in the bundle. To fix the price of the bundle, however, is *not* equivalent to fixing the prices of all the individual commodities included. Any of these prices might fall *on condition that other prices rose by enough to maintain the index.* For example, a bumper crop could lower the prices of cereal grains included in the bundle, to the extent that (for example) metal prices rose. As soon as a drop in grain prices pulled the price of the composite bundle down to the point where the buying offer became effective, the IMF would be obligated to buy—not cereals alone, but complete bundles including metals, beverage crops, fibers, and so forth. The effect would be to abate the fall in grain prices and bring about a rise in other commodity prices.

From the standpoint of underdeveloped countries as a whole, such an arrangement would mean that their export proceeds from primary products would move in proportion to the quantity they exported (as does the income of exporters of newly produced gold today). Under present arrangements, if primary exporters expand their shipments over a decade by twenty per cent, they are likely to find that markets move against them and their gain in export proceeds may be ten per cent or five per cent or less. Since a commodity-composite reserve plan does not fix individual commodity prices, it includes no guarantee of such proportional gains for *individual* commodities; if the producers of cocoa, let us say, choose to expand fifty per cent in a decade, they are virtually sure to face a considerably lower price of cocoa. But if individual commodities keep reasonably in step, their producers can expect to share in the proportional expansion of income; and any country which manages to spread itself over a variegated list of primary exports can insure itself against fluctuations of export proceeds. In the broad, therefore, the commodity reserve plan is designed to put primary producers in the happy position now enjoyed by gold-producers, where expansion of output is rewarded with certainty by a proportional expansion of income.

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The strategy of the proposal is to include in the bundle as many primary commodities as possible. It would be necessary to exclude items like apples which do not store well. (The line must probably be drawn at items which cannot be kept in good physical shape with an annual turnover of stock.) Items with a wide range of qualities which are not reduced to economic equivalence by systematic grading are ineligible because to set a stated number of pounds in such a case is not to set an *economically* meaningful quantity. (This consideration would apparently exclude dried fruits, for example, but would not exclude wheat despite the wide range of varieties.) An implication of the insistence on systematic grading is that commodities included must have well-defined routes of trade; for an economically meaningful specification must include not merely physical attributes but the place and conditions of delivery. It would be necessary to exclude commodities for which storage costs are very high, and probably commodities whose prices are likely to be subject to organized price-raising drives (though commodities subject to internationally supervised commodity agreements need not be ruled out). If none of the criteria just stated happened to apply, it would probably be wise to exclude petroleum, on the ground that this one item would have so much weight that its inclusion might dominate the composite. These exclusions, however, leave a long eligible list, including most major cereals, coffee, and other beverage crops, many animal and vegetable fats, cotton and wool and other major fibers, and most of the non-ferrous metals. Total world trade in eligible commodities is over twenty billion dollars a year, and the value of world production over eighty billions. When we compare these magnitudes with world gold production of about $1.3 billion per year (excluding the unreported output of communist countries), it is plain that the scheme can have enormous economic leverage. Contrary to gold—which is produced primarily in response to monetary demand—the reserve commodities would of course be produced almost entirely for consumption. But any time the primary-producing countries ran into difficulties in obtaining hard currency, there would be plenty of production which could flow into monetary reserves. In view of postwar tendencies for commodities to pile up in "agricultural sur-

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pluses" and in "strategic reserves" of minerals (and taking account of prospects of production and consumption), it seems likely that the average annual growth of commodity reserves would be of the order of three or four billion dollars.

MONETARY MACHINERY OF THE SCHEME

Like proposals for setting up a credit-creating world central bank, the commodity-reserve proposal involves an agreement by the countries of the world to hold a considerable share of their monetary reserves with IMF—just as commercial banks in the United States hold their reserves in the form of "reserve deposits" with Federal Reserve Banks. The international bancor unit would probably be represented only by figures on bank statements, checks, and debt instruments; there is no reason why bancor coins or engraved bank notes should ever be issued, as each member country would continue to have its own currency and provide its own public with "pocketbook money" as at present.

Since the objective of the scheme is orderly development of the world monetary system, continuity with the existing "modified gold standard" would be essential. For both gold and commodity bundles, the IMF would present both buying and selling prices—with a slight spread between them to make it unnecessary to be in the market continuously. Probably it would be best to have a standing offer to buy gold at some such figure as ninety-nine per cent of "parity" in bancor and commodity bundles at some such figures as ninety-five per cent—with corresponding selling offers at 101 per cent of parity for gold and 105 per cent for commodity bundles. The initial arrangements should include deposit with IMF of a good share of the world's existing gold reserves, so that IMF would be the world's largest owner of gold, and reserve deposits with IMF would be a large and increasing element in the world's monetary reserves.

To make its buying and selling offers for commodity bundles effective, the IMF would probably need its own commodity operations department. We can imagine that this department has representatives in all the key markets for reserve commodities—a rice representative in Rangoon, a coffee representative in New York, a copper representative in London. If prices were hovering around the level where, for

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example, a bundle with a parity in bancor equivalent to $100,000 could be bought for $95,000, these representatives would send hourly cables to headquarters, quoting the lowest price at which they could buy, and how many units of commodity they could get at that price. These reports would be fed into a computer. If when they were added up it turned out that a bundle would cost $95,100, no purchases would be made. But if, for instance, the price of coffee in New York at 2 o'clock were enough below the price at 1 o'clock to pull the bundle down to $94,950, buying orders would be flashed to all the agents, who would buy not only coffee in New York but rice in Rangoon, copper in London, and so forth. Buying would continue until some of the prices involved firmed up enough to raise the composite to $95,000. In the other direction, if prices were hovering around the $105,000 mark, the hourly reports would be of prices at which the representatives could sell, and selling orders would go out whenever the prices added up to $105,000 or more. When they bought commodities, the representatives would pay with bancor drafts on IMF which would add to the reserve account of the countries where they took title to commodities. When they sold, they would receive local currency with which they would buy bancor from the local monetary authorities. The representatives would have authority to deal either in physical commodities or in "futures." Commodities would be stored in places appropriate to the normal flow of trade, which would permit giving or taking delivery at the places normal for the trade.

HOW TO GET STARTED

To a considerable extent, the commodities which would make up the commodity bundles to enter the reserve are already on hand in such forms as "agricultural surplus" stocks of grains and cotton, "buffer stocks" of coffee and similar commodities, or "strategic reserves" (of which more and more are being declared surplus) of lead, tin, and the like. If it is aimed to include in the reserve eventually (for example) seventy-five per cent of a year's trading volume, there will be some commodities for which this target can be reached at one jump by purchases out of stocks already in being.

The monetary reform aspect of the proposal makes it ad-

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visable to transform the monetary reserves held by many countries in such forms as dollar claims upon New York into bancor claims upon IMF. Thus at the outset, the United States would find itself owing (let us say) twelve billion dollars worth of bancor to the IMF, instead of owing twelve billion dollars to "official" holders of New York funds. Insofar as intial purchases of commodities came out of U.S. holdings, the United States would be obligated to apply the proceeds so as to pay off its debts at IMF. Insofar as Brazil acquired bancor for coffee bought at the outset, there would be an obligation to catch up on certain arrears in Brazil's international accounts; to some extent this would put the United States in funds to pay off more of its liability to IMF.

Clearly, the initial international agreement to transform the world monetary system along commodity reserve lines would have to include rules for deciding upon such initial commodity purchases, and for using the proceeds so as to clean up the awkward situation that has developed in recent years under the "gold-exchange standard." It would also have to include agreement to deposit enough gold with IMF to give it a secure initial position, and arrangements that would bar a run upon IMF gold.

Upon the establishment of the new system, most countries would set official bancor parities for their own currency units —perhaps 0.0010 bancor per U.S. dollar, and 0.0028 bancor per pound sterling. Countries which preferred could declare "floating rates" instead of declaring parities, subject to ground rules to be included in the basic agreement. As under the existing IMF system, exchanges could fluctuate without inconvenience within one per cent of par on either side; any substantial change of parity (or transition to a floating rate) would call for prior consultation with IMF.

TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Since existing stocks would not permit setting up at the outset a balanced reserve of commodities, there would have to be a "build-up period" during which the IMF was engaged in assembling the missing elements of the commodity reserve. Purchases during this period would not be of complete units; since, for example, enough wheat to meet the target could be bought at the outset but very little rice is immediately

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available, purchases during build-up would have to be unbalanced in the opposite direction from the initial purchases.

During the build-up, therefore, it would be necessary for the IMF to operate in individual commodities. Unavoidably, it would therefore influence individual commodity prices, and the initial agreement would have to include rules for dealing with such prices. It is obvious, for example, that the agreement could not simply instruct IMF to buy certain quantities within three years regardless of consequences; nobody would want to provide (in effect) that in case rice crops are bad, so many thousand people must starve for lack of rice in order to put so many tons of rice into the reserve by the end of 1968. Accordingly, the initial agreement must include price stops; rice, for example, would not be bought beyond what could be purchased without pulling the price above some agreed relation to its initial price. For each commodity, there would have to be a "declared value" and the instruction to IMF would be to buy as much as it could at or below the declared value (in effect *at* that price, since nobody would have incentives to sell for less while it was in effect) up to the target quantity set in the initial agreement.

Evidently the actual course of purchases will depend on the course of markets—on crops, on business fluctuations in consuming countries, on labor disputes at the mines, on speculative expectations of holders of commodities. Common sense calls for a limit (such as three or five years) to the length of the build-up period. At the end of that time, even though target quantities had not been reached for some commodities, full operation in composite commodity bundles should go into effect. Obviously the composition of the official bundle will have to be adjusted to some extent to the composition of stocks in hand. Accordingly, final determination of the makeup of the bundle must be left until the end of the build-up period.

It is conceivable, of course, that markets may be so strong that prices of most commodities rule above declared values—as would have been the case, for example, had a start been made in 1963 with declared values based on 1962 prices. In this case, the rules would not permit any purchases of most of the commodities on the list, beyond those made at the outset out of pre-existing stocks. In this case, two adjustments

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would come into play: (a) under rules which must be set up in the initial agreement, IMF would be authorized to raise declared values if experience showed they were inappropriate. This would be the proper inference if the combination of normal production of the commodity (without, for example, major crop failures) and normal activity in the industrial countries yielded a price which held for two years or more well above the initial declared value. And (b) also under rules in the initial agreement, the build-up period should be stretched out if a stated proportion of the total target stocks had not been reached before the date originally intended for the start of full operations. From the standpoint of the basic objectives of the plan, such a stretchout would not be a misfortune. Failure to accumulate stocks rapidly would simply indicate that for the present the spontaneous forces of the market were taking care of the problem of providing primary producers with adequate incomes. Long experience with primary markets proves, however, that upswings of primary product prices do not continue for many years unless there is a steady and ample expansion of monetary reserves.

POSSIBLE HAZARDS

What risks are there that in the long run a commodity reserve plan might prove to be a trap? In particular, is there danger that there might be long periods when commodity reserves changed in one direction only, so that the reserve would either become exhausted or grow so large as to be an intolerable burden? Since either outcome would obviously be a serious evil, this discussion should not be closed without looking into these possibilities.

Consider first the situation where reserves tend to run down. This might well be the tendency if after the scheme went into full operation the industrial countries let money wages rise rapidly while maintaining their parities in bancor. To hold constant both these exchange parities and the bancor price of the commodity bundle would involve a "cost-push" increase in bancor prices of industrial products. In these circumstances, primary producers might find that to support their incomes expressed in bancor would not suffice to protect them against a deterioration in the terms of trade.

Against this course of events, however, there are powerful

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safeguards in the structure of the world economy. If the growth of monetary reserves is halted while industrial wages show an uptrend, some of the industrial countries will find themselves again in major difficulties with their balance of payments and holdings of monetary reserves. Some countries in this situation will find themselves forced to devalue their currencies—that is, to raise the official price of bancor and with it the price level (in their currencies) of primary products. Primary-producing countries can now better their terms of trade by buying in the countries which have devalued. Competitive pressure will tend to spread devaluation to other industrial countries. In short, if there is a tendency toward "cost-push inflation"—either in particular industrial countries or in the industrial world as a whole—its adverse effects on primary producers will be limited by the reaction upon the bancor parities of industrial-country currencies. A *net* adverse effect of such a process on the underdeveloped countries is hard to imagine; it would entail a net reduction in the *amount* of commodity reserves, whereas even a reduction in the *rate of growth* of such reserves would tend to protect reserves by confronting the industrial countries with the alternatives of devaluing or putting a stop to the "cost-push" process.

Looking in the other direction, what if commodity reserves accumulated on an enormous scale? One could imagine the possibility that more favorable price prospects for primary products would call forth a massive increase in production, so that the IMF buying offer was called into play on a large scale. What if presently there came to be an expansion of commodity reserves at the rate not of three to four billion dollars, but of ten or fifteen billion dollars per year?

The answer is essentially the same as in the case of an excessive growth of gold stocks under a nineteenth-century gold standard. Such a situation would put inflationary pressure on the industrial countries. Trying to spend the bancor income from their large sales to IMF, primary producers would be calling upon the industrial countries for a huge expansion of exports. Insofar as the industrial countries had slack which permitted them to expand production for export, they would welcome the opportunity to do so, with the resulting stimulus to activity, and all parties would gain. But once

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all slack in the industrial economies was taken up, to expand exports further would be inflationary. The industrial countries might choose to let the inflation carry itself through (as, on the whole, industrial countries accepted inflation under the gold standard in the decades of the nineteenth century when gold stocks grew rapidly). If the industrial countries chose to avoid internal inflation, they could do so by revaluing their currencies upward (*lowering* the official price of bancor and thus the price level in their currencies of primary products). This sort of anti-inflationary adjustment by revaluation has been made at various times by Sweden, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands, and its feasibility and effectiveness are thoroughly charted. Either to accept inflation or to obviate inflation by revaluation would raise prices of industrial products relative to prices of primary products. The result would be a rise in the costs of producing primary products, which would restrain their production and gradually stop the excessive growth of reserves.

It will be seen that to adopt a commodity reserve system would not be to abolish the long-run forces which adjust primary production to its market outlets. But these forces would be channeled in such a way as to do minimum damage. In particular, the industrial countries would be given strong incentives to move as far as they could in the direction of expanding production (and thus increasing the absorption of primary products and the flow of income from their production), *before* they started exerting pressures which would cut back primary production and impair the terms of trade of primary producers. Furthermore, the long-run growth of monetary reserves (which would presumably roughly keep pace with the growth of world trade) would offer a permanent enlargement of the market for primary products. This is a factor in the world situation much like the hypothetical increase in gold production from which this discussion started. If such an increase in gold production did take place in the underdeveloped countries and became the foundation for a satisfactory growth of world monetary reserves, the three billion dollars or so by which reserves would be growing each year would be achieved by adding that much to the earnings of the underdeveloped countries. The general tendency of the commodity reserve plan is to organize affairs so that the

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expansion of primary production that *is* feasible can play the income-generating role of the increase in gold production that is *not* feasible.

FAVORABLE LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES

To enlarge the income of underdeveloped countries by safeguarding their terms of trade while expanding their primary production is strongly favorable to development. The commodity-reserve mechanism offers great advantages on this side as against proposals to defend the terms of trade by commodity agreements. In addition to their limited scope and risks of breakdown, commodity agreements have the defect that they can maintain prices only by restricting primary production to a pace set by the industrial economies. A system of commodity agreements provides no mechanism by which rapid expansion of primary production can itself stimulate industrial expansion. Neither does a system of unregulated markets, where the adverse price effect of any rapid growth of primary production tends to choke off that growth much more than it stimulates industrial activity. In contrast, the expansion of primary production under commodity reserves will generate larger outside markets for the products of the industrial economy, as we saw above.

The resulting stimulation of industrial activity, it must be stressed, will not be limited to the countries already industrialized. On the contrary, the process of spill-over of additional demand from parts of the industrial economy which have taken up their available slack to parts where slack still exists will benefit the growing industrial sector within the underdeveloped countries themselves. Like export producers in the industrial countries, the industries within the underdeveloped countries will find the demand for their products stronger and more reliable. As was noted above, they will also find they have better access to capital for expansion.

The alleged danger of an "excessive" expansion of primary production must be seen in this perspective. Once a rapid and self-sustaining process of industrialization is well under way, absorption of primary products by industrial activity within today's underdeveloped countries is bound to rise rapidly. An expansion of primary production which might

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seem "excessive" if we took account only of prospective needs in the countries already industrialized may be barely adequate in the wider framework. In the underdeveloped world, industrialization is not held back by shortage of manpower; on the contrary, widespread "under-employment" is typical. The need for capital will be largely filled by the self-generating process observed in all successful industrializations (though pump-priming through attracting funds from the industrial world can help to start the process, and outside capital with associated "know-how" will offer continuing reinforcement to any industrialization process). Limitations of markets are of decisive importance; and if these limitations were broken through, industrialization might come up against a materials bottleneck. The commodity reserve proposal aims to help simultaneously in enlarging markets and stimulating the production of basic materials.

It will be obvious that this brief analysis is incomplete. It has not traced out, for example, the problems of operating a commodity reserve so as to avoid excessive costs—or methods of financing the costs which will prove unavoidable. Neither has it traced out the way in which the benefits may be divided between the primary-producing sector of the industrial countries and that of underdeveloped countries, or the methods of steering the benefits on an adequate scale to the latter. Above all, it has not traced out the way in which the opportunities opened for economic development by increasing the export proceeds from primary production can best be used. No scheme for merely making more money available for development will automatically generate development; the outcome depends heavily on the ability of governments in the underdeveloped countries to mobilize the financial resources of their countries (including export proceeds) and to use them effectively for the welfare of their people. But in a situation where we have difficulty doing more through aid, and where adverse market trends impair the support of economic development through trade, a supplement to income from the monetary side may prove of enormous value.

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THE CONCEPT OF BUREAUCRACY IN CAMERALISM

THE Cameralists shared on the surface a concern with us for the grand themes of governmental intervention in both the social and economic spheres. The term, of course, implies the regulation and supervision of the society and economy by governmental agencies of one type or another. But as long as we consider the writings of the Cameralists to be analogous to modern discussions of economic development and official planning, we will fail to understand the peculiar springs of action that animated them. Cameralism was a child of the Central and East European cultures of the early modern period: it drew its theoretical support from the teleological and juridical postulates of the Old Regime, and it remained a captive of that antique period. Many of its students have tried to disentangle some central theme from the writings of the multitude of Cameralists. Cameralism has been defined, for example, as the German equivalent of mercantilism, as a primitive concept of totalitarianism (*Volkstaat*), as the forerunner of List's "National Economics," as a program for a "eudamonistic welfare state," and, by Albion Small, as the primitive beginnings of modern "Political Science." [1] This essay will consider one particular facet of Cameralistic thought, a facet previously slighted, that which might be termed its concept of bureaucracy.

The Cameralists did not, surprisingly enough, often discuss those problems which we now consider characteristic of human organization. To be more explicit, they did not usually

[1] See Louise Sommer, *Die Österreichischen Kameralisten* (Vienna, 1920–25), II, 460–82 for a perceptive bibliographical essay on the most important students of Cameralism up to her time. As she states, most studies have either consisted of literary résumés of the writers in chronological order, or they have centered on particular problems within the whole Cameralistic literature. Recent examples of the latter include Anton Tautscher, *Staatswirtschaftslehre des Kameralismus* (Bern, 1947) and Ingomar Bog, *Der Reichsmerkantilismus* (Stuttgart, 1959).

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discuss internal managerial problems and the decision-making process. One of the last of the Cameralists, J. G. Justi, did assert, for example, that the government possessed the fundamental duty of bringing material prosperity to the subjects of the state. He, in common with others, devoted much space to consideration of the types of economic planning that might be suitable, but did not explore, in depth, the precise role of the bureaucrat in effecting change. We will attempt to discover the reasons for this strange reticence later. The Cameralists did develop a distinct bureaucratic ethos, but it lies submerged in the mass of descriptive, textbookish, detail concerned with public finance, police authority, and other aspects of public policy.

I

The early Cameralists lived during the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. They also lived during the period when the Holy Roman Empire ceased to be an important political entity and when the constituent states of that empire achieved autonomy in fact. The twin forces of *Religionsstreit* and *Staatenbildung* created formidable problems for those who tried to analyze the place of government in society. The form and structure of the new Central European states was emerging but gradually. In this epoch the legal theorists accomplished the necessary theoretical accommodation to the times by the time of Christian Wolff. They were aided by the brilliant political theorists of Western Europe and England. In the eighteenth century the *Naturlehre* jurists completed the legal foundations of absolutism.[2] Unfortunately for the Cameralists, there were no economic or administrative theorists of stature to prepare the ground for them. The Western European mercantilists cannot be considered the intellectual equals of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Hobbes. Melchior von Osse and his successors stumbled along the way; each advance in thinking was late in arrival and usually rather unimportant. Because of this tardiness in theory construction, the most advanced Cameralists of the

2 Otto Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500 to 1800* (Boston, 1957), Trans. by E. Barker, remains the authority on this problem. See, in particular, Christian Wolff, *Institutions du Droit de la Nature et des Gens* (Aleyde, 1772), II, Sect. II, 147–48.

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middle eighteenth century still carried with them excess baggage in the form of outworn platitudes, dubious assumptions of the nature of economic and social life, and easy slogans. This baggage was the worthless legacy of the early Cameralists.

The beginnings of administrative theory can be found in the writings of Melchior von Osse (1506–57),[3] a jurist and theologian who filled various offices in several south German states. These offices were primarily judicial in nature. His chief work, the *Political Testament,* attempts to delineate the judicial and police structures of the main German states with concentration upon the Electorate of Saxony. Because of his religious orientation as well as his professional attachment to jurisprudence, von Osse subordinated social and economic problems to central questions concerning the theoretical foundations of authority in both secular and sacred affairs. Jurists should be "pious, God-fearing, and upright" persons chosen by the prince to dispense justice according to the dictum of Moses in Deuteronomy 16: "Judges and officers shall thou make thee in all thy gates, which the Lord thy God giveth thee, throughout thy tribes: and they shall judge the people with just judgment." Such officials should be educated in Roman and canon law in the universities. Von Osse was preoccupied with the problem of expertise; he lamented the lazy and "undisciplined" youths of his day who provided such poor recruits for the legal profession. He declared that the universities should be strictly regulated by the prince in order to mold students into the proper pious and learned mold. Religious indoctrination in the universities assumed paramount importance for him. The prince has been given charge of his subjects by God. In fact, as St. Paul said, he should stand *in loco parentis* in secular affairs. The public officials were instruments of the prince, with no separate identity. These officials, he indicated elsewhere, should be intelligent, industrious, learned, as well as pious. But no one official should obtain so much authority that he eclipsed the monarch; *Ministrissimo* was a pernicious danger to the ruler. He hoped that poor but able youths might be recruited for the universities, educated at state expense, and

[3] O. A. Hecker (ed.), *Politisches Testament, Schriften Melchiors von Osse* (Berlin, 1922), 270–72, 298–307, 317–23, 359–67.

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then brought into official ranks as docile apprentices. There they would rise slowly to positions of eminence in unselfish service to the prince.

In the sixteenth-century German principality the authority of the ruler was still greatly circumscribed. Von Osse conceived of the *regimen dominativum* to be the organization of the society under the paternal overlordship of the ruler. The ruler was *pater familias* over society, the good *Hausvater*. Aristotle had described the functions of the household to include: *regimen conjugale, regimen paternale,* and *regimen dominativum*. The first two encompassed the theory of *pater familias* and the third described the effective authority over society the prince possessed. Significantly, von Osse lumped the mundane management of the ruler's palace kitchen and cellar together with the collection of taxes and the supervision of crown lands. The range of governmental functions still did not include much more than the supervision of the royal household and the ruler's personal property. Von Osse stated that proper bookkeeping procedures had to be instituted to handle such revenues from the domains but also those received from taxation. Because of the small-scale nature of governmental operations those officials concerned with revenue collection truly performed humble clerical duties. The jurists wielded considerably more authority than these fiscal bureaucrats before 1650 because they were more closely connected to the old *Ständestaat*. Von Osse could not envisage a fiscal officialdom trained in the universities specifically for the management of revenues; high officials were jurists and theologians first and accountants and treasurers only secondarily. These latter functions as well as those connected to the supervision of the crown lands were quickly and cursorily described by von Osse. He did stress the necessity of benevolence on the part of those who exercised supervision over the peasants, basing his arguments on scriptural exhortations rather than upon secular expedients.

By 1656 Veit von Seckendorff had managed to clear away a great deal of the confusion concerning the relationship between jurisprudence and fiscal management that obscured the thinking of von Osse. In fact, the basic schematic design of the whole Cameralist school stands revealed in his *Fürstenstaat*. In the theoretical background which he sketched

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at the beginning of his magnum opus he remarked that sovereignty consisted of the "highest and greatest authority of the legitimately reigning prince which he possesses over the estates and subjects of the principality, as well as over the land itself." [4] The ruler possessed, by definition, total authority over the regulation of the material existence, the "spiritual and secular estates, and the judiciary." Officials appointed by him administered the domain lands as well as the other fiscal and judicial functions. Even though von Seckendorff recognized the distinct nature of a fiscal bureaucracy as opposed to a judiciary, he wrote in an era when the total authority of the prince remained rather closely restricted. The aristocratic associations, the patrician corporations in the municipalities, and the localized economic and social life combined to resist the pretensions to power expressed by the ruler and his spokesmen. The prince obtained most of his income from the domain lands, and tolls and excise taxes. But the latter source of revenue became important only when the autonomy of the cities ended with the coming of the bureaucratic tax collector. These *Commissarii* successfully imposed the tribute-collecting power on the municipalities during the course of the seventeenth century, especially in Brandenburg-Prussia. Von Seckendorff, however, wrote too early to determine clearly the ramifications of the princely subordination of the cities. He devoted most of his space to consideration of the management of the ruler's own household and property. His bureaucrat remained little more than a palace servant and humble bookkeeper. Seckendorff did not consider to any great extent the possibility of officials taking command of manufacturing enterprises, for example, nor did he discuss the official granting of privileges or monopolies to entrepreneurs.

The *Fürstenstaat* was in reality an attempt to describe the seventeenth-century German principality as a happy unification of two governmental systems. On the one side of this image the ruler is depicted as possessing absolute authority over all his subjects, but on the other side he is shown to be *primus inter pares* in regard to his vassals. Seckendorff lived in an age when feudal thought patterns still survived and

[4] Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff, *Teutscher Fürstenstaat* (rev. ed., Frankfurt, 1700), 53 ff., 1–23.

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when medieval rights and privileges constituted more than polite expressions. At the same time that he remained ensnared in the concept of feudal legitimacy he also recognized that the power of the ruler depended upon the establishment of a regular and relatively large source of income. His book he intended to promote as a textbook for the humble palace servants of the prince. They could follow its precepts in their daily collections of revenues from the domains or from the municipalities. He showed them how to keep accurate records of income and expenditure and attempted to organize bureaucratic work in a rational and efficient fashion within this framework. In no sense can we consider the *Fürstenstaat* to be a daring declaration of bureaucratic supremacy and autonomy within the commonwealth.

Seckendorff described the particulars of bureaucratic work in a pedantic fashion that was to be aped by practically all his imitators and successors later. First, he proclaimed, the prince should issue general instructions (*Cammer-Ordnungen*) establishing boards or directorates of officials to supervise administrative work in all levels. Such a general ordinance would specify the meeting times of the *Cammer,* the general objectives of such a board, as well as the procedural norms to be used in session. Officials composing the directorate should read aloud appropriate correspondence and edicts, keep records of their decisions and of incoming and outgoing correspondence, keep official information secret, and comply with a multitude of other rules. The officials who collectively possess official authority in the *Cammer* or *Collegium* vote on all matters that involve the jurisdictional competence of a single member. Underneath the Councillors of the *Collegium* we find Seckendorff describing the subordinate element within the bureaucratic organization. Even the humble clerks, porters, and copyists receive detailed job definitions at his hands. The prince receives periodic reports of official activities and issues appropriate decrees upon the recommendation of the *Cammer.* Seckendorff expends much space in his efforts to describe accounting procedures, the recording of the minutes of sessions of the *Collegium,* and the maintenance of accurate and current records of all official actions. He was one of the first to devote attention to the purely fiscal side of administration as

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well as to delineate the nature of bureaucratic work.[5] Seckendorff's *Fürstenstaat* seldom rises above the level of the clerk's handbook.

Seckendorff became one of the founders of Cameralism primarily because he summarized the structure of routine bureaucratic functions. He is important in the history of the development of the theory of formal organization precisely because he unimaginatively attempted to reduce the whole of work to a routine systematization. He seemed to think that officials could be indoctrinated in the rules of the prescribed routine and that they would then become efficient and loyal public servants (or servants of the prince). In the *Fürstenstaat* we find elaborated the clear concept of the hierarchical ordering of offices and the division of labor so characteristic of modern formal organizational theory.

In the writings of the early Austrian Cameralists we find in turn a further development of a distinct bureaucratic ethos. Becher, Schröder, and Hornigk placed much greater emphasis on the prerogatives of the purely fiscal officialdom as opposed to the judiciary than did von Osse or Seckendorff. They placed considerably less emphasis on the semi-medieval side of princely authority and proclaimed in more daring terms the absolutism only vaguely expressed by their predecessors. Writing under the shadow of Louis XIV and of Colbert, they could comprehend the concept of the Leviathan State.[6] At the same time that they hesitatingly outlined absolutism Becher and his contemporaries tried to promote the new bureaucratic gospel.

Becher embraced Catholicism and became physician to the Elector of Mainz and professor of medicine in the local university. He proceeded to elaborate a unique variation of Cameralism fitted for south Germany; he combined a strange Thomistic creed with the mundane platitudes of Seckendorff to form a mystical concept of the state. Becher's state, in

[5] *Ibid.*, 469–75 in particular. See Gustav Marchet, *Studien über die Entwicklung der Verwaltungslehre in Deutschland* (Munich, 1885), 30 ff.

[6] Kurt Zielenziger, *Die alten deutschen Kameralisten* (Jena, 1914), 134 ff., makes a clear distinction between the juristic tradition and the new Cameralism of these three Austrians. Herbert Hassinger, *Johann Joachim Becher, 1635–1682* (Vienna, 1951), 74; Heinrich Gerstenberg, "Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk," *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, CXXXIII (1930), 813–67. Heinrich Srbik, "Wilhelm von Schröder," *Sitzungsberichte Kais. Akad. der Wissenschaften* (Vienna, 1910), 98–99, emphasizes the absolutism evident in Schröder.

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fact, was based on the idea that the ruler possessed an obligation to rule benevolently over his subjects because he ruled by mandate of God. The ruler lived in fear of damnation and hell, as he pungently remarked. Becher consequently conceived the functions of the civil service to be revelations of God's will as transmitted through His spokesman, the prince. Since God possessed five qualities (omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, perfection, and eternal being), and since man likewise possessed five basic qualities, Becher stated that the civil service should be headed by five bureaus. Although his scheme depended upon a kind of theological numerology we should not dismiss it as a quaint anachronism. The first of these bureaus, the *Collegium spirituale,* he made responsible for the shepherding of souls through the regulation of religious associations, as well as through the promotion of public devotions. Becher supplemented this ecclesiastical control body with a *Collegium morale* which, he intended, should administer police services to insure the maintenance of the "good order of government." The *Collegium doctrinale* was responsible for the education of youth, the regulation of intellectual life, and the support of scientific research. He subordinated the supervision of municipal governments, the collection of taxes, and the expenditure of public funds under the *Collegium civile.* Leaving no stone unturned, Becher next erected a bureau (*Collegium vitale*) to preside over the physical well-being of the subjects of the ruler. Each *Collegium* he further divided into four departments. Within the *Collegium civile,* for example, the first department supervised "the countryside and cities, peasants, artisans, merchants, poor houses, charitable organizations, and banks." A Commerce Bureau within this *Collegium* would attempt to increase the population through economic management. The remaining subdivisions of this *Collegium* regulated, altogether, waterways, building codes, fire ordinances, finance, and the judiciary. Becher had surveyed the totality of German society as he comprehended it and had endeavored to subordinate all facets of life to bureaucratic regulation. Significantly, he left no room for the traditional institutions of the *Ständestaat,* nor for an ultramontane ecclesiastical establishment.[7]

[7] Zielenziger, *Kameralisten,* 202–17; Hassinger, *Becher,* 47–85. Wilhelm Roscher, "Die Österreichische Nationalökonomik unter Kaiser Leopold I,"

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Within Becher's system the ruler derived his authority directly from God as long as he served as the "mirror and watchman of the common people." At this juncture he came close to elucidating an all-important problem which no previous Cameralist ever grappled with, the problem of definition of the authority of the ruler. If the ruler in abstract possessed absolute and legitimate authority how did one insure that a particular ruler would always act in the public interest? Becher failed to provide any useful method for removal of incompetent or criminal incumbents from the highest post of the state. He remarked, however, that monarchy was often subject to "imprudence, sloth, luxurious living, and struggles over the succession." Only when the elaborate administrative system becomes operational will the hidden dysfunctional elements of monarchical absolutism be eliminated, he seems to suggest. He castigated the pernicious influence-peddling of "officials, chancellors, and favorites" around the court of the prince. In fact, he implies, if only the irresponsible and irrational influences on the decision-making power of the monarch were removed, the responsible and rational bureaucracy could work in constructive harmony with its absolute chief. The very emphasis which he placed upon the absolutism of the monarch gave him an opportunity to emphasize that the ruler could not be allowed to exercise capriciously the high authority granted him by God. He could not, of course, emphasize his belief that a thoroughgoing bureaucratic governmental system would, in fact, reduce the "absolute" monarch to the status of amiable chairman of the civil service boards of directors. Becher walked on dangerous ground, to say the least, in his efforts to provide a rationalization for the power-seeking drives of many bureaucrats.

While Becher dressed his theory in a curious theological garment his underlying ideology was indeed radical. No previous Cameralist since von Osse had claimed such exaggerated authority for the bureaucratic retinue of the prince. Nor was he the only Cameralist of his generation to state this theme; the Austrian patriots von Hornigk and Wilhelm von Schröder followed suit in somewhat different fashions.

Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, II (1864), 50–55, also gives a clear summary of Becher's system.

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Schröder justified his absolutism by claiming that "the welfare and material wellbeing of the subject is the fundamental consideration upon which the total actions of the prince should be based." He, together with Becher, placed great stress upon the reorganization of the civil service to eliminate the old concentration upon the duties of the palace bookkeepers of domain accounts and to substitute in its place the ambitious claims of the new *Commissarius*. With each attempt to glorify the power and theoretical authority of the prince, the prestige and effective authority of the ambitious bureaucrat also rose. In the writings of these Austrian Cameralists the aristocratic Estate is scarcely mentioned, nor are the burgher associations. Government stands revealed as the prerogative of the civil service. Honest and pious von Osse would have been astonished to see the apparent disappearance of the old patriarchal system and the subordination of both courts and clergy to humble roles under the bureaucratic expert. Both Becher and Schröder followed the late seventeenth-century "Colbertism" in proposing the establishment of state-operated commercial clearing houses and warehouses. The *Kaufhäuser* and *Werkhäuser* served in their theories as bureaucratic control points where officials could coordinate industrial production and commercial exchange in the interests of the state. Such refinements went far beyond the dreams of Seckendorff and von Osse.

By 1700 the main outlines of a theory of bureaucracy had begun to emerge from the writings of the early Cameralists. The most important characteristic of this new theoretical corpus was the attempt to ascribe total theoretical authority over the life of subjects to the prince. In the process of elevating the status and prestige of the prince, the early Cameralists also subordinated correspondingly the status and apparent authority of the semi-medieval corporations such as the urban patriciates, the Estates, and the gilds. They also relegated the old aristocratic and amateur ideal of civil service to the background once and for all. We can only contrast this latter development with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the gentleman-dilletante in public service which remained the hallmark of civil service in the West for many generations. In the place of the aristocrat-official, the Cameralists substituted the still shadowy figure of the "honest, pious,

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loyal, and diligent" bourgeois servant of the prince. Despite the fact that many of the Cameralists, including Seckendorff and Schröder, were borderline members of the aristocracy, the ideals they espoused, their interest in trade and manufacturing, and their consistent attempts to subordinate rural economic and social interests in favor of the urban economy placed them in the same camp with the entrepreneurial class of the German cities.

II

Whereas Becher and his predecessors had built their central theories of monarchical absolutism upon a firm theological base, the Cameralists who wrote after 1700 no longer felt obliged to consider this particular rationale. Instead, they developed purely secular concepts to justify the theoretical authority of the ruler. Schröder daringly stated that absolutism depended upon "das Heft in der Hand und Geld im Kasten." Such authority was justified only, he added, if the ruler promoted the welfare of his subjects. Johann von Justi similarly defined the state as "a combination of a number of persons under a higher authority for the purpose of advancing their fortunes." [8] The later Cameralists based their bureaucratic power structures upon this secular explanation of political activity, or minor variations of it.

Justi and his contemporaries concerned themselves with two main problems: how to secure an increase in revenues and how to justify absolutism. The necessity of promoting revenue-raising measures followed from the unspoken realization of the Cameralists that the ruler looked to the official to provide funds for military service as well as for the expenses of civil government including those of the ruler's household. The Cameralist-official found it necessary to promote absolutism in order to justify his own place in the monarchical sun. He also had to sell this absolutism to the sullen adherents of the *Ständestaat* who had not ceased their complaints and intrigues despite their loss of actual power.

[8] The secularization of the doctrine of sovereignty in Cameralism has been emphasized by Srbik, "Schröder," 95–97, and indirectly in practically all of the other studies cited previously. Marchet, *Studien*, 123; Bielfeld, *Institutions Politiques* (Leiden, 1760), I, 78; J. G. Justi, *Staatswirtschaft* (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1758), 34.

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This problem was far greater than one might assume since East Elbian society remained throughout the eighteenth century semifeudal in structure. If the Cameralists made strident claims for the supremacy of the monarch we must remember that their aristocratic opponents were making equally strident claims in the moribund estates for the revival of corporate power. The tragedy of Germany in the eighteenth century was that Western ideas of a non-absolutist and non-feudal nature found little acceptance amidst the clamor of bureaucratic and aristocratic politicians.

The later Cameralists such as Justi never subordinated the central problem of revenue collection to their vague program of industrial support and the development of trade. For example, although they desired to restrict the importation of luxury goods they never proposed a policy of complete exclusion. Such imports could be taxed, and the national revenues could be thus increased. Justi and many other Cameralists advocated the establishment of a statistical bureau which would collect reports from the customs officials and prepare an annual table (*Handlungsbilanz*), for the guidance of the ruler and his ministers.[9] This concern with bureaucratic procedure was present also in their discussions of the encouragement and support of industry.

All deplored the establishment of state-owned and operated manufacturing firms. In view of the Cameralists' interest in subordinating social and economic life to the authority of the prince, and by definition, to that of the civil service, such an animus against state ownership appears peculiar at first glance. As was the case in the determination of excise and tariff policy, however, they could not forget the problem of revenue. Philippi, for example, vetoed such undertakings on the ground that the state would lose taxes by establishing its own workhouses instead of aiding taxable private entrepreneurs. Justi believed private entrepreneurs

[9] Justi, *Staatswirtschaft,* 197–202, 264–65; Ernst Klein, "Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi und die preussische Staatswirtschaft," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte,* XLVIII (1961), 145–202; Von der Lith, *Politische Betrachtungen über die verschiedene Arten der Steuern* (Breslau, 1751), 24; Johann Albrecht Philippi, *Wahre Mittel zur Vergrösserung eines Staates* (Berlin, 1753), 83–86; Joachim Georg Darjes, *Erste Gründe der Cameralwissenschaften* (Berlin, 1768), 222–28; Bielfeld, *Institutions Politiques,* II, 213–27; Joseph von Sonnenfels, *Grundsätze der Policey, Handlung, und Finanz* (6th ed., Vienna, 1796), II, 175–76.

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would produce more cheaply and efficiently than public agents because they were animated by the profit motive.

Abandoning public ownership the later Cameralists thus concerned themselves with the alternate possibility: state support of private entrepreneurs. In state-administered warehouses bureaucratic inspectors could regulate the quality and quantity of manufactured goods. Many of the maxims of the later Cameralists were inherited from Becher and Schröder as well as inspired by "Colbertism." It was, however, in the key area of political control of industrial production that the Cameralists failed to make themselves clear. They never explained who was to determine whether those entrepreneurs producing silk goods should be favored over those producing porcelain wares, for example. Only Bielfeld concerned himself with definition of the crucial problem of official control of the entrepreneurs. He did not explore the delicate and difficult question of authority and subordination, or, more explicitly, of how officials could control entrepreneurs within a framework of procedure that would minimize possible influence-peddling, bribery, and general collusion between public and private agents. Bielfeld, in short, advised the ruler to subsidize only persons who were "sufficiently intelligent, with integrity and diligence, as well as recognized probity." [10] He at least recognized that the state, and, hence, the civil service, had to develop some means of control over the hosts of entrepreneurs and would-be tycoons that haunted the anterooms of the official dispensers of privilege and monopoly.

The later Cameralists thus exhibited a curious and paradoxical behavior in connection with their discussions of the economic role of the bureaucrat. They never really developed a theory of economic development of lasting consequence because they could never abandon fiscalism nor could they define, in depth, the precise role of the official planner. We cannot say that the bureaucratic director of a workhouse, for example, was an entrepreneur-official. He did not, in so far as Justi, Bielfeld, and others revealed, approach industrial management with an overriding itch for profit maximization, nor was he a "risk-taker" or even a very sophisticated organ-

[10] Justi, *Staatswirtschaft*, I, 295–96, 307; II, 47, 605; Bielfeld, *Institutions Politiques*, II, 212–56; Darjes, *Gründe*, 459; Philippi, *Mittel*, 85.

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izer of productive effort. In fact, the official who dealt with merchants and manufacturers (including artisans) tended to consider himself a glorified tax collector. Entrepreneurs received subsidies because officials hoped to increase the revenues of the state directly and indirectly. Eventually such entrepreneurs could expect to be taxed to provide the necessary fiscal augmentation. To the bureaucrat-Cameralist, the individual entrepreneur was only one particular agent that had to be considered in his manipulatory efforts to obtain a favorable balance of trade as expressed in specie payments. Such a concept relieved the official planner of direct responsibility for the direction of economic endeavors; this is the real reason why the Cameralists disliked state-owned and operated enterprises. In short, the Cameralists wanted officials to form collectively a new ruling elite, an elite that interceded between the monarch on the one hand and the rest of the population on the other. This bureaucratic elite would concern itself only with questions of state and would not deign to take responsibility directly for economic development. To assist it in its task, the elite would enlist a second bureaucracy: the hidden corps of subsidized merchants, manufacturers, and domain contractors. This shadow bureaucracy would continue to take responsibility for the success or failure of agricultural, industrial, and commercial developmental projects. Because, however, of the vague status of this subordinate, informal, bureaucracy, which lacked formal organization and a chain of authority and subordination, no one could actually place responsibility on it for success or failure. If we accept this interpretation we can explain at once the ambiguous attitude of the Cameralists toward the crucial question of state planning in the economic sphere. It is truly an ignoble explanation because it suggests that neither the Cameralist nor the official cared to assume responsibility for the success or failure of public policy, although each desired to take absolute authority over policy determination.

III

The caution and innate conservatism of the later Cameralists is nowhere better illuminated than in their discussions of the *Policeystaat* and their maxims regarding official rela-

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tions with existing social groups. The *Policeystaat* (roughly: "Police State") was no totalitarian police state in the twentieth-century sense, as we shall discover. But before we explain this assertion we will have to show how the Cameralists approached East Elbian social structure.

What is most intriguing about the whole Cameralistic discussion of rural social structure was its acceptance of the landed aristocracy and serfdom as permanent fixtures of the rural society. When Justi and others came to devise their *Policeywissenschaften* they incorporated no radical social planning programs precisely because they really accepted East Elbian society as fixed. Again, as cautious, practical-minded, and career conscious gentlemen they would have been surprised if any other course had been proposed to them. Perhaps Bielfeld expressed the views of many of his fellow Cameralists when he stated: "Europe is not composed of Platonic states," and that men are not naturally equal, or equal in social status. By birth, he stated, everyone is automatically a member of one of three estates: the nobility, the *Burgerschaft*, or the peasantry. Each of these estates is necessary to society as a whole, and, since the ruler is bound to observe the "general utility," he must grant impartial aid and justice to each. "The welfare of society asks that the sovereign exercise a judgement exactly distributed, granting the benefits for each condition according to the prerogatives of that condition. It is rare, in our day, to see this proportional equality observed." [11] Thus Bielfeld expressed the views of most Cameralists when he stated that all estates are equally subordinate to the ruler, and, by implication, to the civil service. *Policeywissenschaft* aimed to eliminate all political associations except that composed of the ruler and his faithful bureaucratic servants. Everyone would be subordinated to the benevolent and protective overlordship of the "impartial" civil service.

To be quite precise, the Cameralist concept of *Policeywissenschaft* did not reflect an overriding concern with the elaboration of a totalitarian state system. Marchet believed that the Cameralists conceived of the *Policeystaat* as a benevolent bureaucratic system designed to promote the general welfare. But the Cameralist proceeded to occupy himself with the means of augmentation of public revenues and the enhance-

11 Bielfeld, *Institutions*, I, 145–46, 154–55.

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ment of the prestige and authority of the official elite and never made social reform a true objective of state policy. Justi defined the prevailing temper when he said: "all means whereby the wealth of the State can be increased through official action belong to the jurisdiction of the *Policey Collegium.*" He therefore subordinated not only the financial, manufacturing, commercial, and agricultural directorates to a single bureau (*Policey Collegium*), but also the courts. The *Policey Collegium,* or General Directory, did not correspond exactly to a central planning board, however, but resembled a super board of arbitration. Darjes considered the *Policey Collegium* to be merely one of three top agencies in the government; it shared honors with the fiscal directorate and with the supreme court. Only the supervision of schools, religious sects, working conditions of artisans, medical personnel and facilities, censorship of cultural media, and the maintenance of law and order came under the cognizance of this *Policey Collegium.* True, Darjes did subordinate all three directorates to a central directorate, the *Ober-Policey Collegium,* but he might as well have called the latter the Privy Council instead. Von Bielfeld confined his remarks to the same scope as those of Darjes and Justi.[12] Although the Cameralists claimed total authority over the lives and property of the subjects for the ruler, they did not imagine that such authority actually would be exercised by the royal civil service, except in a limited and fiscally-oriented fashion. The social and economic framework within which they lived remained for them an accepted and permanent limitation to the exercise of political power, whether by ruler, bureaucracy, or by the corporations of the *Ständestaat.*

IV

In regard to the description of the role of the bureaucrat vis-à-vis that of the ruler, Justi and other late Cameralists did not depart too much from the path laid by the seventeenth-century Cameralists. The late Cameralists maintained that absolute theoretical authority remained in the hands of the prince and that officials were the executors of monarchical decisions. Justi stated, for example, that the ruler should

[12] Marchet, *Studien,* 136, *passim*; Justi, *Policey-Wissenschaft,* 5–6, 203, 335–37.

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demand efficient performance of duty from his officials and should not allow any official to acquire so much independent authority that the latter became the real ruler. The ruler should not grant officials the privilege of using *lettres de cachet,* he suggested. Philippi advised the monarch not to allow the directorates to choose their own recruits without his approval. Also, the ruler should not appoint officials to higher posts who had not previously served in the lower ranks. Gradually Justi elaborated a new recruiting and promotion system which would, in fact, reduce the authority of the ruler to that of rubber stamp verification of bureaucratic decision-making. Justi was aware, for example, of the existence of a comparatively highly trained judicial bureaucracy within the German states, a bureaucracy possessing intimate connection with the faculties of jurisprudence in the universities. From the latter, apprentice jurists were drawn to fill vacancies in the lower courts. In contrast, the universities did not provide a very useful recruiting service to the new fiscal bureaucrats. Justi complained in this connection: "One often hears strident complaints from the learned that the untrained are preferred for appointment to state service, and that the learned, well grounded in science, must thank God if they obtain a poor position, offering only a bare subsistence." He went on to state: "the time when judicially trained were useful in all state positions is no more. The whole shape of things has changed. There are ten times more officials needed with a knowledge of Cameral, Police, Commerce, and economic affairs." Clearly, he stated, the education of future fiscal and administrative officials was being neglected. The establishment of two chairs of Cameral Science by Frederick William I of Prussia at Halle and Frankfurt on the Oder had not proved to be successful. Only one of these chairs had been occupied since its establishment. As a solution to the problem of recruitment Justi recommended the founding of a *Collegium Fundamentale* in key cities throughout the realm. One professor therein would teach "manufacturing," one, taxation, and a third, forestry. A professor of politics would train future ministers and ambassadors; a professor of chemistry, "future smelting engineers"; and professors of mechanics, mining and metallurgy. Obviously he hoped to establish a permanent feeder system

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for the fiscal bureaucracy.[13] Justi and his fellow Cameralists quite clearly hoped to keep the ruler from arbitrarily appointing officials; regular apprentice programs as well as established recruiting procedures would serve this purpose.

But the later Cameralists used the concept of the supreme directorate to serve as the real limiting factor on the arbitrary power of the monarch. Bielfeld suggested that all administrative authority, aside from the purely judicial, should be entrusted to a single Department of Finance, which would be responsible to the ruler for increasing the population of the realm in order to gain new taxpayers, to augment the riches of society through the promotion of circulation of specie, and, hence, to increase the total wealth of the state. At the head of this directorate would stand a Minister of Finance who would exercise complete authority over the department. More than one minister, he stated with the traditional *collegium* in mind, leads to intrigue, envy, ambition, and conflicting jurisdictions. He does *not* nominate the ruler for this rather important position. Under this Super Minister subordinate chiefs would be appointed to preside over different provinces and different administrative functions. Each province would have a Chamber of Finance headed by a president. All matters not settled *in camera* in the province for one reason or another would go to the Department of Finance. The Minister of Finance would make plans for fiscal and economic programs which he would submit to the sovereign for approval. Curiously enough, Bielfeld evidently used the Prussian system as a base and continued to think primarily within the old *Collegium* tradition, but introduced the supreme minister concept. Aside from Bielfeld all Cameralists appeared to accept the prevailing administrative practice of their era in so far as they were familiar with it.

V

Paradoxically, neither the early nor the later Cameralists could rescue themselves from the horns of the dilemma they had created. This dilemma consisted of the two basically irreconcilable problems: the quest for total bureaucratic authority within the existing commonwealth and the quest for

[13] Justi, *Staatswirtschaft*, xxvii ff., 115; Philippi, *Mittel*, 11–16; Justi, *Policey-Wissenschaft*, 337 ff.

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bureaucratic identity within the corporate image of the ruler and his humble servants. In place of a definitive answer to this elemental problem of bureaucratic subordination the early Cameralists before 1700 devised a cumbersome role-concept for themselves which we may term "subservient bureaucracy." They henceforth refused to depart from the level of platitudes in their description of organizational functions and springs of action. All officials they assumed to be either loyal and diligent, or palace toadies. They hastened to add, in connection with the second category, that certain courtiers, cronies, mistresses, and other irresponsible persons peddling influence with the monarch also shared this discreditable limelight. Subservient Bureaucracy enshrined as a concept of duty served as a safe theoretical position from which one could discuss the authority of the civil servant. A ruler could, if he were so disposed, read Schröder or Becher and could subjectively consider his officials to be hirelings almost of the same nature as his palace cooks and footmen. The civil servant could believe that he exercised power in the name of the prince and under the protective cloak of monarchical legitimacy. Of course, the old-line patricians and aristocrats were not fooled; they recognized the civil servant to be a new wielder of political power. These disgruntled persons saw him as a representative of the prince with whom they should negotiate, or against whom they should conspire. At the same time that this new role-concept captured the fancy of the civil servants it also served to tie them tightly to the apron strings of the ruler. Without the prince they enjoyed no authority, no prestige, and no material emoluments. The concept of Subservient Bureaucracy thus proved to be the most significant part of the excess baggage which the pioneer Cameralists passed on to their successors.

If the later Cameralists sometimes tried to devise a bureaucratic system which would function almost automatically with or without the presence of the ruler, they dared not throw off the cloak of Subservient Bureaucracy. Bielfeld, despite his liking for bureaucratic power-seeking, nevertheless glorified the ruler as the "genius" who must forward the prosperity of his subjects. Justi and most of the other Cameralists likewise proclaimed the supremacy of the prince. They, themselves, were only the humble, if well-trained and

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industrious, servants of the prince. Subservient Bureaucracy continued to be the source of role and authority definition.

The concept of Subservient Bureaucracy served, in summary, two main purposes. As long as the Cameralists glorified and exalted the prince and claimed to be mere servants of him, they remained within a system of beliefs readily understandable to society within the central and eastern German states. In the climate of opinion that prevailed among the educated and near-educated, the doctrine of absolute monarchy, whether divinely or humanly inspired, remained the chief instigator of the political clichés which served to mold and to express public opinion. But within the framework of this political creed the new bureaucrat could not easily find a place for himself. The landed aristocracy, from the penurious gentleman petitioning for appointment to a minor office to the fairly wealthy East Elbian estate-owner with properties in several countries, existed collectively as the *Adelschaft*. Similarly the peasant found a place for himself in the public creed, even if it was not a particularly lovely one. Within the municipalities the old patrician oligarchy as well as the established gilds composed the *Burgerschaft*. But beggars, tramps, day laborers, and the new fiscal bureaucrats remained indigestible elements within the antique public creed. Of course, along with the new fiscal bureaucrats we must also classify the jurists, the new entrepreneurs, the theologians, and teachers of all levels. All of these groups came, during the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to look to the prince in their search for identity within the public creed. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the cooperation of these heterogeneous groups helped to make the eventual evolution of the "absolute" monarchy possible. The prince welcomed these questing souls and encouraged them to worship in his temple. Through the prince they found at last a place in the collective life and thought, but through devotion to him they became his dependents. Without the prince, the bureaucrat did not exist—hence the development of the doctrine of Subservient Bureaucracy.

The excess baggage of the early Cameralists also included several other retrogressive ideas. Since their occupational roles were conceived in terms of the doctrine of Subservient

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Bureaucracy, they had to adopt many of the conscious or unconscious beliefs of the prince regarding social, political, and economic affairs. All of the early Cameralists gave tacit approval to the semi-feudal rural social order. None of them opposed serfdom nor called for the release of serfs to work in the towns. None of them as yet had the temerity to attack the aristocratic and patrician strongholds of political and social power directly. Their concern with the problem of balance of trade as expressed in specie payments led them to espouse a narrow fiscalism which envisaged the interests of the state to be equivalent to the securing of an increase in revenue. Becher, it is true, did possess a semi-totalitarian political philosophy, but he never really considered how such a system would be established nor how the five *Collegia* would approach the existing social and economic structure. He painted his picture in broad and bright strokes and failed to consider mundane problems of politics in his haste to complete his impressionistic tour de force. He was a conservative in regard to contemporary society and merely aimed to replace the old ruling class of aristocrats, clergy, and patricians with a new bureaucratic elite. This displacement of personnel did not necessarily mean that he advocated wholesale changes in the economic and social underpinning of the commonwealth. The second dubious legacy of the early Cameralists to their successors thus became the idea of Social Disengagement. From Becher onward, the Cameralists concerned themselves more and more with the acquisition of bureaucratic prestige and authority and glossed these ignoble aims with platitudes expressing support of the welfare of the people at large. Marchet, one of the nineteenth-century students of Cameralism, allowed himself to be fooled into thinking that the Cameralists favored the establishment of a "eudaemonistic welfare state." Actually, the Cameralists, with rare exceptions, did not vigorously promote social and economic reforms except when such would increase bureaucratic prestige and authority.

In his overriding concern for advancing his power-seeking ambition, the Cameralist-bureaucrat soon abandoned any truly reformist bias he might have possessed. Only the achievement of effective managerial authority came to mean anything; only the manipulation of the old associations of

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the *Ständestaat* came to occupy a place within the purview of bureaucratic expertise. With the continued acceptance of the doctrine of Social Disengagement, and with the adoption of the associated theme of surrender to the antiquated ideals of the *Ständestaat,* the Cameralist isolated himself more and more from the intellectual life of Western Europe. Justi was no *philosophe.* The encyclopedists, despite their regard for certain excess baggage inherited from the pre-Newtonian and pre-Bayle age, really did not favor the continuance of the encrusted social patterns of the ancien régime, nor did they really favor absolutism. Adherence to the doctrine of Social Disengagement served to render the Cameralists social reactionaries. But they convinced themselves readily enough that the prince possessed his authority as understood within the existing public creed at East Elbia, and that he had no intention of destroying the *Adelschaft,* nor the traditional agrarian social order. Therefore, being practical and ambitious, as well as cautious, the Cameralists and the civil servants in general emphasized the importance of custodial management rather than planning for future innovations of any importance.

Finally, the most enduring legacy of the early Cameralists came to be what might be termed "the Routine Duty Concept." By 1700 they had elaborated a fairly cohesive but detailed work code to govern bureaucratic behavior. All Cameralists tended to concern themselves with the description of the daily work of officials since such work, they felt, fell readily into a pattern of predictable performance. The routine could be established to produce periodic and regular reports of performance, which in turn could be checked through audits. In this sense, of course, the Cameralist stressed the usual rather than the unusual and the expected and predictable rather than the unexpected and unpredictable. Seckendorff's pedantic concern with reports and the division of bureaucratic labor provided the elements Becher attempted to systematize within his fivefold interlocking directorates. In conformance with contemporary practice they also enshrined the collegial system, or privy council, permanently within the corpus of Cameralistic thought. The *Collegium* remained a sacred cow to Cameralists in the eighteenth century because it provided a useful means to divide responsibility. Also, the

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Cameralists believed firmly in the possibility of decision-making through the achievement of bureaucratic consensus in the *Collegium*. They assumed, therefore, that economic, social, and political conditions were apt to change but slowly, and at a rate discernible to cautious and serious-minded officials. For this reason it would be erroneous to assume that the bureaucratic self-aggrandizement expressed by Becher constituted a plan for a dynamic organization of reformers. The Routine Duty Concept became so closely identified with later Cameralistic thought that it ultimately became synonymous with the term *Staatswirtschaft,* and, perhaps, with the nineteenth-century term "bureaucracy."

Once they accepted the inevitability of Subservient Bureaucracy and of Social Disengagement, the Cameralists concentrated on defining the discrete sphere of responsibility for official action. Clearly they had to define the scope of bureaucratic expertise between two stringent limits: one imposed by their determination to stress custodial management rather than innovational planning, and one imposed by their desire to tie themselves to the apron strings of the prince. The resultant formulation of bureaucratic functions, the Routine Work concept, thus emerged out of a multitude of poorly coordinated platitudes and slogans they devised out of half-understood actual bureaucratic experience. Eventually they sketched the prototype of all bureaucrats: the loyal, efficient, methodical civil servant who works in harmony with superiors and subordinates and draws his concept of personal worth and security from the rigid written codification of official life. Printed forms made their appearance to serve as instruments of conformity and the emphasis upon statistical summaries and routine reports epitomized the constant collective effort to find a rationalization for duty. The whole of bureaucratic functions was reduced to a code of pedantic, day-to-day, formal procedures. Routine custodial management they devised to administer a passive, tradition-ridden populace. The bureaucratic utopia revealed itself as a society perpetually held in check in the same manner the benevolent father restrains his unruly and perverse children.

VI

We can now see the Cameralists' concept of bureaucracy in

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a fairly clear light. The Cameralists seemed to say that the fiscal officials composed a new collective body within the commonwealth, that this collective was an elite characterized by the possession of a particular expertise and hence worthy of the deposition of trust in it to carry out the totality of governmental affairs. This new elite, however, understood intuitively that it possessed no mandate to alter the traditional social and economic order, but that it served as the collective custodian of the commonwealth. The ruler, while he possessed supreme theoretical authority, filled the role of the chairman of the board of the commonwealth. He allowed his faithful ministers to formulate all but the most crucial policy decisions and remained the benevolent overseer who left details to his hirelings. The bureaucratic elite recruited and promoted its members according to criteria of merit it devised itself. Problems of bureaucratic supervision and subordination, and of the execution of top level decisions, could be rationalized within a complicated written code which would elicit the loyalty of all officials. Duty would become, in short, rational in orientation, routine in performance, and predictable in terms of concrete results. The custodial elite would replace the disorganized, quarrelsome, and antiquated corporations of the *Ständestaat,* but the pattern of ordinary living would remain undisturbed. Such appeared to be the dream of these cautious and unimaginative textbook compilers before 1789.

It is impossible to extend this analysis of the bureaucratic ethos past that great watershed, the French Revolution, within the present limits of space and subject. We should note, however, that the peculiar notion of the rational official, who administers coolly and efficiently above the regular political life of the state, came to be the explicit and implicit role-concept of civil servants throughout Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Max Weber fortified this bureaucratic ethos. The bureaucrat came to be considered either the efficient man of routine, or the inefficient man of routine, depending upon personal political preferences. The civil service came to be considered a monolithic structure which existed independently of society in an imaginative sphere incomprehensible to the outside viewer. Undoubtedly the modern civil service is not the child of a

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single parent, the antique bureaucracy of the Age of Absolutism, but it seems to bear a family resemblance to it, nevertheless. Identification with authoritarianism, disassociation from social and economic life, and preoccupation with internal regulations and procedures often characterize the modern civil service.

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER TRUMAN, EISENHOWER, AND KENNEDY *

THE National Security Council, in the words of one observer, "constitutes the most ambitious effort yet made to coordinate policy on the cabinet level in the American federal government." [1] Created by the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequently modified or expanded by Congress and the President, it represents an attempt to fill a long-recognized need for a single, top-ranking body to formulate and correlate national policy. Its roots lay in the British Committee of Imperial Defense, a Cabinet agency for coordinating national security matters, and in certain American attempts to provide a similar mechanism. The American efforts dated back to World War I but took form most notably in the Standing Liaison Committee of the early nineteen-forties and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee established in 1944.[2]

Yet the Committee of Imperial Defense was an arrangement more suited to Cabinet than to presidential government, and none of the American examples was extensive or effective enough to solve the pressing problems of policy formulation and direction that arose in the hectic days following World War II. It was at the height of the postwar unification struggle, then, that Ferdinand Eberstadt, in a study prepared for Navy Secretary James Forrestal, urged the

* This study was originally prepared in slightly different form for use by students of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C.

1 Paul Y. Hammond, "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and Appraisal," *American Political Science Review,* LIV (1960), 899.

2 For these and other roots of the NSC, see *ibid.,* 899–901; U. S. Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, *Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security, Report* to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy by Ferdinand Eberstadt, 79th Congress, 1st Session, 1945, 47–54 (hereinafter, *Eberstadt Report*); Ernest R. May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly,* LXX (1955), 161–80.

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establishment of a National Security Council as "a policy-forming and advisory" body of top government officials to assist the President in making and coordinating "over-all policies in the political and military fields." [3]

The National Security Act of 1947 accepted the Eberstadt recommendations for the establishment of the NSC. The Act created a Council consisting of the President, who would chair its meetings or, in his absence, designate another member to do so; the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the three Services; the Chairman, National Security Resources Board; and certain other officials whom the President, if he wished, might designate with the advice and consent of the Senate. A permanent staff would support the Council.

The function of the NSC, briefly stated, would be to assist the President in integrating and implementing national security policy. Specifically, the Council would examine American national security goals in relation to national power, study policies on areas of common interest to those departments and agencies concerned with national security, and suggest guidelines and courses of action to the President. To ensure the availability of an adequate intelligence basis for these deliberations, the 1947 Act also created a Central Intelligence Agency. This Agency, operating under NSC direction, would coordinate all government intelligence activities concerned with national security, would correlate and evaluate national security intelligence, and would advise and report to the Council on all matters within this field.

The National Security Council, while lacking executive authority or in fact any power other than to offer advice, was really an extension of the presidency. With the chief executive as its chairman, its decisions would become his decisions, and its members, as department heads, would be in a position to see that these decisions were carried out. Under a weak president, this sort of arrangement might tend to diminish or diffuse the powers of the chief executive; but under a strong one it would sharpen the decision-making process and render more efficient the implementation of decisions once made. In the final analysis, the personality and individual desires of each president would determine the role and scope of activity of the National Security Council.

[3] *Eberstadt Report*, 7.

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Since the creation of the NSC, three strongly different individuals have occupied the White House. Each regarded the Council in his own way; each used it to satisfy his own needs and intentions. And in each administration, the organization of the NSC and its role in the formulation of national security policy have changed to meet the criteria imposed by the chief executive.[4]

I

President Truman's use of the National Security Council,[5] especially in the three years prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, reflected his strong concern for the authority, responsibility, and prerogatives of the chief executive. Congress had declared that the NSC would consist of certain officials whose function it would be to "advise the President . . . in matters involving the national security." [6] But Truman, among others, seriously questioned whether Congress had the constitutional power to require the President to seek advice from specific individuals before reaching decisions on certain subjects.[7] Truman also recognized that the wording of the National Security Act might be construed to establish the Council as an imitation of the British Cabinet, with

[4] The best source for a study of the birth and development of the NSC is the collection of hearings, studies, reports, and recommendations on the national security structure compiled by a group headed by Senator Henry M. Jackson and published as U. S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, *Organizing for National Security*, 3 Volumes (Washington, D. C., 1961). Especially useful is the "Organizational History of the National Security Council," prepared by James S. Lay Jr., and Robert H. Johnson, two long-time staff members of the Council, which appears in Volume II of this collection. Unless otherwise indicated, this article is based on these volumes.

[5] For this section, see also Sidney W. Souers, "Policy Formulation for National Security," *American Political Science Review*, XLIII (1949), 534–43; James S. Lay Jr., "National Security Council's Role in the U. S. Security and Peace Program," *World Affairs*, CXV (1952), 37–39. These and some of the other articles cited below are also reproduced in *Organizing for National Security*, II.

[6] National Security Act of 1947, Sec. 101 (a).

[7] On this point, see Robert Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV (1956), 442–43; Hammond, "The National Security Council," 903. President Truman's views on his relations with the NSC are described in his *Memoirs*, II, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N. Y., 1956), 59–60, and the quotations in the following paragraphs are taken from this source.

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similar powers and responsibilities, and a subsequent diminution of presidential authority.[8] Indeed, he recalls, "There were times during the early days of the National Security Council when one or two of its members tried to change it into an operating super-cabinet on the British model." This he strenuously opposed, as he did all ideas of adopting any aspects of the cabinet system. Under the British system, he wrote later, "there is a group responsibility of the Cabinet. Under our system the responsibility rests on one man—the President. To change it, we would have to change the Constitution. . . ."

As a means of emphasizing the advisory role of the NSC, Truman did not regularly attend Council meetings. After presiding at the first session of the Council on September 26, 1947, he sat in on only eleven of the fifty-six other meetings held before the start of the Korean War. In his absence, in conformity with Truman's view that the Secretary of State was the second ranking member of the Council and that the Department of State would play the major role in policy development, Secretary Marshall (and later Acheson) presided. Beginning in August 1949, when the Vice-President was added to the NSC, that officer took the chair in the President's absence.

Truman's lack of participation in NSC proceedings has often been explained as a means of permitting a free exchange of views that might otherwise have been inhibited by his presence. Some observers have also suggested that the President was simply too busy to attend. It is quite evident, however, that his absence was aimed at clearly establishing the Council's position with respect to the President and at preventing any apparent dilution of his role as chief executive.

This is not to say that Truman regarded the NSC as unnecessary or undesirable. On the contrary, he viewed it as "a badly needed new facility" in the government. "This was now the place . . . where military, diplomatic, and resources problems could be studied and continually appraised. This new organization gave us a running balance and a perpetual inventory of where we stood and where we were

[8] For a fuller discussion of this question, see Hammond, "The National Security Council," 899–901.

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going on all strategic questions affecting the national security." But the Council was only "a place for recommendations to be worked out." Like the President's Cabinet, it did not make decisions or policy. A vote was "merely a procedural step." Only the President could determine policy and reach decisions, and these were functions he could not delegate to any committee or individual. Even when he sat as chairman of the Council and indicated his agreement with a specific recommendation, this did not become final until the NSC submitted a formal document to the President and secured his written approval. "When the President signs this document, the recommendation then becomes a part of the policy of the government." Here was Truman's understanding of the role of the President, and this firm belief determined his relationship with the National Security Council during the five years that it operated under his direction.

For the first ten months of its existence, the NSC met irregularly in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Beginning in May 1948 meetings were scheduled twice a month, although not necessarily held, and special meetings were sometimes called. Only those officials specified by the National Security Act attended initially, with others invited to participate in discussions of particular interest to their agencies. The Director, CIA, also sat in as an adviser and observer. In January 1949 Truman directed the Secretary of the Treasury to attend all meetings, and, that summer, amendments to the National Security Act eliminated the Service Secretaries from Council membership, added the Vice-President, and, by designating the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the "principal military advisers" to the Council, opened the way for regular attendance by the Chairman, JCS, beginning in 1950.

Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949, effective in August of that year, placed the NSC in the Executive Office of the President, where it remains today. This move not only formalized a *de facto* situation, but was dramatic evidence of the position of the Council as an advisory arm of the President rather than as any sort of policy-making "politburo."

To assist the NSC in dealing with specific problems, the Council began to establish certain standing committees,

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normally representing agencies already participating in its activities but occasionally including members of non-Council agencies as well. These groups were usually created to handle some particularly sensitive matter or one of direct interest to only some agencies on the Council. Among the first of these were two committees concerned with internal security, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, which reported to the NSC through the Council's newly appointed Representative on Internal Security.

The NSC staff, a small body of permanent Council employees and officers detailed temporarily from the participating agencies, was headed by a nonpolitical civilian executive secretary appointed by the President. An "anonymous servant of the Council," in the words of the first executive secretary, "a broker of ideas in criss-crossing proposals among a team of responsible officials," [9] he carried NSC recommendations to the President, briefed the chief executive daily on NSC and intelligence matters and maintained his NSC files, and served, in effect, as his administrative assistant for national security affairs.

The organization of the NSC staff [10] was flexible and, as the Council developed, changed to meet new needs. In general, during the pre-Korean period, it consisted of three groups. First was the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Secretariat, composed of permanent NSC employees, which performed the necessary basic functions of preparing agenda, circulating papers, and recording actions. Next was the Staff, consisting almost entirely of officials detailed on a full-time basis by departments and agencies represented on the Council, and headed by a coordinator detailed from the State Department who was supported, in turn, by a permanent assistant. This body developed studies and policy recommendations for NSC consideration. The third group consisted of consultants to the executive secretary, the chief policy and operational planners for each Council agency. Thus, the head of the Policy Planning Staff represented the

[9] Souers, 537.

[10] In this article, the word "staff" refers to the entire NSC staff organization. The "Staff" and later "Senior Staff" and "Staff Assistants" refer to parts of the "staff."

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State Department, the Director, Joint Staff, represented the Department of Defense, and so forth.

While President Truman, in Walter Millis' phrase, had a "disinclination to make full use" of the NSC,[11] the Council was extremely active in its first years both as a discussion forum and as a medium for drawing up formal statements of national policy on a wide range of subjects. This latter effort was extremely significant. It represented the first attempt in the nation's history to formalize and set down specific national objectives and methods of achieving them in a series of carefully constructed policy papers intended to serve as guides to action for all government agencies. That in practice this attempt turned out to be less successful than many would have hoped is perhaps not as important as the fact that such an ambitious task was ever undertaken in the first place.

Policy papers developed by the NSC fell into four categories. First and most important were the basic comprehensive statements of overall policy, concerned with a broad range of national security problems and the political, economic, and military strategy to be pursued in meeting them. Next were papers bearing on large geographical areas of the world or specific countries. A third category dealt with functional matters such as mobilization, arms control, atomic energy, and trade policies. The final group of papers covered organizational questions, including NSC organization, the organization of foreign intelligence activities, and internal security organization. All of these documents would theoretically dovetail with each other to "form a basis for a balanced and consistent conduct of foreign, domestic, and military affairs related to our national security."[12]

Papers originated in a variety of ways. Some projects grew out of recommendations by the executive secretary, but most developed from suggestions by one or more members of the Council or by the NSC staff. For a while studies or reports prepared by the State–Army–Navy–Air Force Coordinating Committee served as a basis for NSC papers.[13] Ini-

11 Walter Millis, with Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* (New York, 1958), 182.

12 Souers, 539.

13 The State–Army–Navy–Air Force Coordinating Committee had replaced

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tially the State Department was the most important single source of project requests, with the Defense Department a close second.

Most of the early papers developed were of the geographical type, with a basic overall policy document a continuing study under way concurrently. It was not until November 1948 that enough other work had been completed to allow NSC adoption of the first comprehensive basic national security paper. Because this was a formative period for the Council, organizational policies drew next consideration, while few policies of a functional nature were considered. In the spring of 1949, shortly after the beginning of the second Truman administration, the Staff took on the dual job of preparing periodic general reviews of existing policies to determine what revisions were necessary and of drawing up papers on major problems that would discuss policy alternatives without making specific recommendations.

The first step in the development of a paper was usually a meeting of the Staff to consider the problem and define its scope. After each Staff member had obtained the views of his own agency on these questions, one individual would normally be given responsibility for preparation of a draft. The drafts of most of the early NSC papers were written by the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and a few were the products of a number of individual agency contributions integrated into a single report. Whatever its origin, the policy draft was then gone over by the Staff as a whole, which made necessary or desirable changes and attempted to reconcile or spell out any differences of opinion. The paper then went to the consultants who, without formally committing their respective departments, indicated their objections or general concurrences. On occasion, other agencies might also be asked to comment. With this accomplished, the draft, including any unresolved divergencies of view, was forwarded for formal Council consideration. If the subject had military implications, JCS views were also included.

Some papers were submitted to the Council merely for information, others solely as a basis for discussion. Those embodying policy recommendations, however, were forwarded

the wartime State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. Since its functions closely paralleled or even duplicated those of the NSC staff, the Coordinating Committee was dissolved in 1949.

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to the President, together with any JCS views, by the executive secretary. The President would then reconcile whatever differences of opinion were still outstanding and, if he agreed, place his approval on the "Conclusions" section of the paper. The appropriate departments and agencies, as notified by the executive secretary, would then implement the new policy. President Truman developed the practice of designating one department head, normally the Secretary of State, as coordinator of all implementation, and periodic reports were also required by the Council.

Once the President had signed an NSC paper and directed that it be carried out, a new policy had, to all intents and purposes, been established and put into effect. But this did not necessarily make it policy in practice. What gave it reality was the President's "will and capability to get it executed." [14] This might mean a hard campaign on the part of the chief executive to educate or arouse public opinion, a long and arduous legislative battle, or a host of other problems to be met before the policy could truly take effect.

In addition to the formal development of policy papers, the NSC during this period also met a number of times to discuss current problems of vital importance to national security. On these occasions, the Council convened without the formality of elaborate preparations or preliminary briefings. Some of these discussions, of course, served as the basis for policy papers, but in other cases the NSC was simply an intimate forum where the President's top-level advisers could thrash out questions requiring immediate action. The Berlin crisis and blockade of 1948 is a good example of this. With President Truman in the chair and General Lucius D. Clay, American commander in Germany, present to report, the Council met several times to discuss developments and make recommendations that the President could act on immediately.[15]

By the beginning of the Korean War, two years and nine months after the establishment of the NSC, the Council had become a well-integrated, functioning organization. It had held more than fifty meetings and taken over three hundred "actions" in the form of approvals, recommendations, and

[14] Hammond, "The National Security Council," 907.

[15] Truman, II, 124–29.

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other deliberations. But the Council was still a long way from being the type of body that its creators had envisioned, and many problems, both functional and organizational in nature, were becoming evident.

In the first place, for all of its activities, the NSC could hardly be regarded as the top policy-formulating agency of the government, or even as the primary presidential adviser on national security. President Truman, jealous of his powers and unwilling to rely on the NSC simply because Congress had said he should, did not hesitate to turn to other advisers, in the Cabinet or executive office, or to solicit the advice of members of the Council as individuals in preference to the corporate recommendations of the entire group. The Secretaries of State and Defense were two officials whose counsel the President sought with increasing readiness. Especially important was the role of the Bureau of the Budget in establishing ceilings on defense spending, which gave that agency an impressive fiscal veto on any program recommended by the NSC.

Even the hundreds of policy papers produced by the Council failed to carry overriding weight. These, more often than not, avoided coming to grips with major issues, or when they did so, "lacked the precision and decisiveness necessary if they were to serve as guides to action." [16] Composed less as specific policy directives than as broad statements of principle, they were frequently too general for practical implementation.

In the field of policy-making, as Walter Millis put it, "The effect of NSC is not prominent; NSC no doubt considered the staff papers, debated policy and arrived at recommendations, but every glimpse we have been given of the actual policy-making process in this period shows Defense, State, the Budget Bureau, the White House, making the independent determinations—usually on a hasty if not extemporaneous basis—which really counted." [17] Before the Korean War, noted another observer, NSC actions, with or without presidential approval, "did not play a decisive or a particularly

[16] Millis, 182.

[17] *Ibid.*, 223.

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significant role in the defense policy-making or the administration of the military establishment." [18]

If this situation was the result of Truman's unwillingness to use the NSC as Eberstadt had envisioned its use, there were other weaknesses in the system, a few reflecting the President's attitude but others probably the standard organizational growing pains to be expected in such a new and completely different agency.

In the first place, attendance at Council meetings, originally limited to the statutory members, had gradually broadened to include the consultants and other departmental advisers. This not only made for too large a group for free discussion, but also encouraged NSC members to look to their departmental advisers and to present their departmental rather than individual views of problems. In the absence of the President, moreover, discussion was more rambling and diffuse than if he had been present, and important actions were sometimes delayed or taken later outside the Council. Then too, while the executive secretary briefed the President on the meeting, Truman could neither hear the direct expression of individual viewpoints nor, more important, could he discuss these with Council members. This sometimes led members to seek out the President after an NSC meeting and give him their ideas separately, a procedure that downgraded even further the relative importance of the Council as a corporate body.

There were also problems in the functioning of the NSC staff. Other agencies that detailed individuals to the Staff tended increasingly to look upon these people as "foreigners," out of touch with problems and attitudes of their parent organizations. The NSC consultants, on the other hand, heavily engaged in responsibilities within their own departments, were less and less able to devote attention to NSC matters. As a result, Council members began to by-pass the Staff, submitting their policy recommendations directly to the Council, and, at the same time, the Council tended to refer many of its problems not to the consultants but rather to *ad hoc* NSC committees. The absence of sound preliminary staff work frequently led to confusion and delay,

[18] Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1961), 233.

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as did the necessity for relying on *ad hoc* committees, unfamiliar with the overall national security picture and hampered by difficulties of coordination and perspective. An additional problem was the absence of JCS representation on the Staff, which made it hard to anticipate and allow for probable JCS views on papers before they reached the Council table.

And finally there was the growing anomaly of the Staff representative of the State Department holding the position of Staff Coordinator at a time when the bulk of matters coming before the Council was no longer concerned primarily with foreign affairs. With problems of atomic energy, internal security, defense mobilization, and military strategy becoming increasingly important, and with the consequent growth of the role and responsibilities of other departments and agencies, the Staff Coordinator found himself torn between his duties as an impartial chairman and his function of advocating the State Department position. What was needed, clearly, was a Staff Coordinator without departmental ties and one, moreover, in close and constant contact with the President and thus personally familiar with his views and requirements.

Recognition of all of these problems led, in late 1949 and early 1950, to considerable study of the role and procedures of the NSC. As a result of recommendations by the executive secretary, deliberations by the Council itself, further investigation by an *ad hoc* committee, the outbreak of the Korean War, and President Truman's own thoughts on the NSC, a number of functional and structural changes took place.

Within a few days after the beginning of the war in Korea, Truman directed that the NSC would meet regularly each Thursday and that all major national security recommendations would be coordinated through the Council and its staff. He himself began presiding regularly at these sessions, missing only nine out of seventy-one NSC meetings held from June 28, 1950, through the end of his administration in January 1953.

In late July 1950, in a directive again underlining the role of the Council in policy formulation, Truman ordered a reorganization and strengthening of the NSC. He limited at-

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tendance at NSC meetings to statutory members[19] plus the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman, JCS, the Director, CIA, the Special Assistant to the President (W. Averell Harriman), Sidney W. Souers (former Executive Secretary and at this time a Special Consultant to the President), and the Executive Secretary. No one else would be present without Truman's specific approval. The President also directed a reshuffling of the NSC staff. The permanent Secretariat remained, but the Staff and consultants were replaced by a Senior Staff and Staff Assistants. The Senior Staff was composed of representatives of State, Defense, NSRB, Treasury, JCS, and CIA, and shortly thereafter of Harriman's office, and headed by the Executive Secretary, an official without departmental ties. Members were generally of Assistant Secretary level or higher and in turn designated their Staff Assistants.

The Senior Staff participated closely and actively in the work of the Council. Not only did it continue the functions of the Staff, but it also took over responsibility for projects formerly assigned to *ad hoc* NSC committees. It thus provided the Council with continuous support by a high-level interdepartmental staff group. The Staff Assistants, who did most of the basic work for the Senior Staff, spent a large part of their time in their respective agencies, where they could better absorb agency views and bring them to the fore during the developmental phase of NSC papers. The position of the executive secretary, moreover, as chairman of the Senior Staff and also head of the permanent NSC staff in the White House, gave that official an intimate view of the President's opinions and desires that he could bring to bear quite early in the planning process. And finally, JCS and Treasury representation on the NSC staff filled needs that had been long felt.

Other changes also took place on the heels of the 1950 reorganization. At the end of 1950, the President directed the head of the newly created Office of Defense Mobilization to attend Council meetings, and a few months later the ODM Director nominated a Senior Staff member. The Mutual Security Act of 1951, establishing a new foreign aid or-

[19] The President, Vice-President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and Chairman, National Security Resources Board.

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ganization, made the Director for Mutual Security a statutory member of the Council, and he too nominated a member for the Senior Staff.[20] Also, at about the same time, a representative of the Bureau of the Budget began sitting in at certain meetings of the Senior Staff to provide fiscal advice and liaison. And finally, to coordinate the implementation of national security policy and ensure that the NSC was provided with current information, Truman directed the establishment of a unit within the NSC staff to receive and channel to the Council agency reports on the status of approved national security programs.

One other addition to the NSC system came into being in the spring of 1951. This was the Psychological Strategy Board, consisting of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director, CIA, with a full-time director and staff. The PSB would develop and coordinate psychological strategy and, as one writer put it, "was to be a sort of a general staff to plan and supervise the cold war." [21] While not actually a part of the NSC, it reported to the Council and its director attended NSC meetings as an observer and was represented by an adviser on the Senior Staff. It marked the first attempt to pull together the nation's psychological planning and operations amidst a growing recognition of the need to counter Soviet use of psychological and other unorthodox methods in the heightening cold war.

The 1950 reorganization did not change substantially the procedure of preparing NSC papers, although it did somewhat tighten up the process. Aside from policy matters concerning the Korean War and related security areas, most Council papers were of the regional policy type and these continued to be prepared in initial draft by the State Department. Depending upon the subject, of course, other agencies, the Staff Assistants, and the Senior Staff also contributed to or initiated the draft process. Although President Truman now presided at Council meetings, he did not make an

[20] The new Director was Harriman, already a member of the NSC as Special Assistant to the President and already represented on the Senior Staff. He and his representative simply remained at their respective Council assignments, although with different titles.

[21] Colonel Wendell E. Little, *White House Strategy-Making Machinery, 1952, 1594*, Air War College Studies, No. 2 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1954), 20.

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immediate decision on NSC recommendations. This he reserved until after the executive secretary had formally presented him with the Council recommendations and actions.

In the first year after the beginning of the Korean War, the NSC and its Senior Staff were quite active, with the Council meeting about three times each month and the Senior Staff getting together at least twice weekly. By the end of 1951, however, the Council was meeting on an average of a little less than twice a month, the Senior Staff about once a week, and NSC activity was generally lighter. For the most part, during the Korean War phase of the Truman administration, the NSC played a somewhat larger role in helping to formulate national policy. Yet as a body it was still not dominant, since the President continued to look to individuals or other agencies for advice and recommendations in the national security field. The NSC "provided a convenient mechanism" for staffing and coordinating interdepartmental views, but "its position was still somewhat casual." [22]

As summed up by the executive secretary near the close of President Truman's term of office:

> . . . the National Security Council provides the President a readily available means of ensuring that a policy decision he has to make for the security of the nation has been carefully considered from all points of view and by all of the responsible officials in the Executive Branch who are directly concerned. . . . The existence of the Council gives the President a permanent staff agency in his Executive Office which can . . . bring to bear on each grave issue of national security all the talents, resources, and considerations which will help him find the best possible solution.[23]

The NSC was there if the President wanted to use it. But it was no more nor less than he wished to make it.

II

If Harry S. Truman to a large extent limited the role of the National Security Council in policy formulation and integration, Dwight D. Eisenhower may be said to have institutionalized it. President Eisenhower "reactivated NSC

[22] Millis, 255, 388.

[23] Lay, 37.

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and infused into it a greater responsibility than it had enjoyed under Truman."[24] He did this by formalizing, developing, and expanding the structure and procedures of the NSC and in effect creating an NSC *system* of which the Council was itself the primary but by no means the most significant portion. The NSC system consisted of the central Council supported by a grid of highly standardized procedures and staff relationships and a complex interdepartmental committee substructure. In its final form, this machinery was geared to support the executive decision-making process not as Truman or Kennedy would conceive of it, but, properly, as Eisenhower practiced it. Not surprisingly, the Eisenhower NSC reflected the Eisenhower view of government and specifically of the role of the President.[25]

During the 1952 election campaign, presidential candidate Eisenhower criticized Truman's use of the NSC. He promised that if elected he would elevate the Council to the position originally planned for it under the National Security Act and use it as his principal arm in formulating policy on military, international, and internal security affairs. Accordingly, he asked Robert Cutler, the Boston banker who was soon to become the new President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, to make a study of the NSC and recommend ways and means of improving it. Cutler's report, submitted to Eisenhower in mid-March 1953, became the basis of an immediate structural and functional reorganization aimed at systematizing the NSC. Subsequently, these initial changes, and other studies, led to further adjustments during the eight years of the Eisenhower administration.

By 1960, the NSC had developed into a highly complicated but nonetheless smoothly operating machine, with clear lines of authority and responsibility and elaborate yet systematized staff work.[26] The heart of the machine was, of course, the

[24] Millis, 182.

[25] The literature on the Eisenhower NSC is more extensive than for the Council under Truman. Three NSC officials have written or spoken publicly on the Eisenhower NSC, as have many knowledgeable writers and critics, and extensive testimony was heard by the Jackson subcommittee. A considerable amount of the literature has been reproduced with the testimony in *Organizing for National Security*.

[26] For a step-by-step account of organizational developments, see Lay and Johnson, 23–52.

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Council itself, with its five statutory members: the President, Vice-President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.[27] The Council met regularly on Thursday mornings. In addition to the statutory members, as many as a score of others might be present. Normally, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Budget Director attended NSC meetings and, when items pertinent to their responsibilities were being discussed, so did the Attorney General, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. At the determination of the President, officials such as the Secretary of Commerce or the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers might also be present for specific items. Occasionally private citizens, appointed by the President as informal advisers to the Council, might appear to present and discuss their reports. And a large number of others, not formal participants, also attended regularly in various capacities. The JCS Chairman and CIA Director were there as advisers. The Assistant and Deputy Assistant to the President, the Director, USIA, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy and for Science and Technology, and the White House staff secretary all attended as observers. Staff representation was provided by the President's Special Assistants for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination and by the NSC Executive and Deputy Executive Secretaries.

As Chairman of the Council, the President was directly supported by two White House Staff members, the Special Assistants for National Security Affairs and Security Operations Coordination. The former was by far the more important. The principal supervisory officer of the NSC, he advised the President on the Council agenda and briefed him before each meeting, presented matter for consideration at the meetings, appointed (with the President's approval) special committees and consultants, and supervised the executive secretary in the direction of the NSC staff. He also had

[27] With the abolition of NSRB in 1953, the Director, ODM, replaced the NSRB chairman on the NSC and in 1958 this NSC membership was assumed by the Director, OCDM. Membership in the NSC of the Director for Mutual Security (subsequently the Director, Foreign Operations Administration) was dropped in 1955.

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the major responsibility of chairing the Council's two major subsidiary organizations, the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board.

The NSC Planning Board had essentially the same functions as the old Senior Staff and a similar, somewhat expanded, membership. It met regularly on Tuesday and Friday afternoons. Those agencies with permanent or standing representation on the Council itself were represented on the Planning Board by officials at the assistant secretary level, nominated by the department heads and approved by the President. Advisers from JCS and CIA as well as the Special Presidential Assistant for Security Operations Coordination also attended meetings, as did observers from other interested agencies. Staff representation consisted of the NSC Executive and Deputy Executive Secretary and the Director of the Planning Board Secretariat. Planning Board activities were supported by a staff of Board Assistants, the old Staff Assistants under a new name.

The second major staff agency of the NSC was the Operations Coordinating Board. "The OCB," wrote Robert Cutler, "arose like a phoenix out of the ashes of the old Psychological Strategy Board." The PSB "had been premised on the fallacious concept of an independently existing psychological strategy," whereas the members of the Eisenhower administration believed that psychological strategy was an integral part of an overall national security program and could not practically be separated.[28] The purpose of the newly established OCB was not only to coordinate and integrate psychological with national strategy, but also, and more importantly, to act as the coordinating and integrating arm of the NSC for all aspects of the implementation of national security policy.

The OCB met regularly on Wednesday afternoons at the State Department. Permanent membership included the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Directors, CIA, USIA, and ICA, and the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Security Operations Coordination (who served as Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively). The Chairman, AEC, Under Secretary of the Treasury, and Deputy Director

[28] Cutler, 448.

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of the Budget attended on a standing basis and other agencies participated on an *ad hoc* basis. An elaborate staff supported the Board, and several of its members normally attended OCB meetings. Despite the strong military representation in other parts of the NSC, no representatives of the JCS participated in the activities of either the OCB or its staff.

Completing the organizational structure of the NSC were the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, and other special and *ad hoc* committees, and the NSC staff, which included the Planning Board, OCB, and Internal Security Coordinating staffs.

President Eisenhower's concept of the NSC, as stated by him, was that

> The Council is a corporate body, composed of individuals advising the President in their own right, rather than as representatives of their respective departments and agencies. Their function should be to seek, with their background of experience, the most statesmanlike solution to the problems of national security, rather than to reach solutions which represent merely a compromise of departmental positions. This same concept is equally applicable to advisory and subordinate groups, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NSC Planning Board, and the Operations Coordinating Board; although the members of the latter two Boards are responsible also for stating the views of their respective departments and agencies.[29]

Within this concept, policy formulation followed a somewhat formalized pattern. A subject for consideration or action might be raised by any part of the NSC system, from the President on down. It might deal with a new problem area, the result of some particular development in world events; it might merely be a suggestion that a standing policy be reviewed; it might be a combination of these or other factors. Discussion or preparation of a preliminary staff study would then begin within the Planning Board. A first draft, prepared by the agency of primary interest, would next be considered, gone over by the Board Assistants working with

[29] Quoted in *Organizing for National Security*, II, 129. See also Lay and Johnson, 32–33.

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others within their own departments, and then restudied by the entire Board. This procedure might be repeated several times, frequently in smaller subgroups and often in conjunction with outside consultants, and the whole process would constantly be monitored by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Executive Secretary. Before formal Council consideration, finally, each member would receive an advance copy of the paper, with JCS comments, and be individually briefed by his Planning Board representative.

Under the Eisenhower administration, NSC papers included a Financial Appendix, something they had not previously contained. This document, specifically called for by the President as a regular part of most NSC papers, was intended to indicate the fiscal implications of the proposed policy and was to be carefully considered by the Council in determining its recommendations.

President Eisenhower sometimes made his decision on these recommendations at the NSC meeting itself, but in most cases a formal record of actions was circulated for comment by the members before it was submitted for final presidential approval. Once the President had made his decision, it was the OCB's function to coordinate and integrate the activities of those departments and agencies responsible for executing the new policy.

The OCB had no authority to direct or control these activities, but it provided a means by which the responsible agencies could consult and cooperate with each other. The Board's own operations were limited to advising, expediting, and following up, although since OCB members were on the Under Secretary level they each had enough authority within their own agencies to see that agreements reached within the Board were carried out. Also, while it did not make policy, the OCB developed or initiated new proposals for action within the existing framework of national security policies. In practice, all of the Board's activities were limited to policies affecting international affairs, since other coordinating mechanisms already existed for the fields of internal security and defense mobilization.

The whole process of policy formulation and implementation has been described by Robert Cutler with a simple and

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arresting metaphor. The NSC was at the top of "policy hill." Policy recommendations moved up one side of the hill, through the Planning Board to the Council, where they were "thrashed out and submitted to the President." Approved by the chief executive, the new policy traveled "down the other side of policy hill to the departments and agencies responsible for its execution." A short distance down the slope was the OCB, to which the President referred the new policy for coordination and operational planning with the relevant departments and agencies.[30]

The neatness and mechanical order of this process was praised by its supporters as the most efficient means of transacting the heavy load of business with which the National Security Council concerned itself under President Eisenhower. During his first three years in office, for example, the Council met 145 times and took 829 policy actions, as opposed to 128 meetings and 699 policy actions in its more than five years under Truman. Critics, however, labeled this "mass production, packaging and distribution," and questioned whether truly effective policy could be developed by a form of standardized bulk processing.[31] In reply, supporters of the system pointed out that in times of emergency —President Eisenhower's two illnesses, for example—it had provided a "reservoir of accumulated policy guidance" that enabled agency and department heads to continue functioning with the full knowledge that they were following approved guidelines within "the broad policy concept established by the President." [32]

This sort of exchange was typical of the growing controversy over the NSC that had developed by the late nineteen-fifties. Critics admitted that the Eisenhower NSC had "infused a new order and system into decisions which were once more various and chaotic," that it had "assisted in bringing the departments together in more orderly and cooperative effort"

30 Cutler, 448. For case histories of two hypothetical policy decisions, see Cutler's testimony, *Organizing for National Security*, I, 579–83, and Timothy W. Stanley and Harry H. Ransom, "The National Security Council," a study prepared for the Harvard University defense policy seminar, January 1957, in *ibid.*, II, 199–200.

31 Millis, 390.

32 Cutler, 445; Dillon Anderson, "The President and National Security," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXCVII (1956), 46.

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in areas of "comparatively minor importance," [33] and that its theoretical potentialities were great. But they also charged that the Council was incapable of dealing with large, basic problems, that it was overstaffed, excessively rigid, and unable to bring any real focus to bear on major aspects of national security policy.

Basically, they argued, the NSC was a huge committee, and suffered from all the weaknesses of committees. Composed of representatives of many agencies, its members were not free to adopt the broad, statesmanlike attitude desired by the President, but, rather, were ambassadors of their own departments, clinging to departmental rather than national views. Moreover, the normal interagency exchanges and cross-fertilization that should have taken place outside the NSC were cut off in favor of action within the Council system, where members engaged in negotiation and horse-trading in a process essentially legislative rather than deliberative and rational. The result, as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson charged, was "agreement by exhaustion," [34] with the ponderous NSC machinery straining mightily to produce not clear-cut analyses of alternate courses, but rather compromise and a carefully staffed "plastering over" of differences.

The Presidential decision, therefore, was based on no deliberate measuring of opposing views against each other, but on a blurred generalization in which the opportunity for choice had been submerged by the desire for compromise. Approved national policy statements, it was argued, were thus not only imprecise, but were also far too broad and sweeping to be applied to specific problems. They were, consequently, all things to all men, with each protagonist of a different line of action finding justification for his own view in the vague or general wording of an approved paper. Even with the best of intentions, an agency or department

[33] Millis, 391. Critics and defenders of the NSC under Eisenhower, especially the former, are amply represented, in *Organizing for National Security*. See also Hammond, "The National Security Council," 903–10.

[34] Dean Acheson, "Thoughts About Thought in High Places," The *New York Times Magazine*, October 11, 1959, reproduced in *Organizing for National Security*, II, 292. The theme of the legislation of strategy is developed at length in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Problems in National Politics* (New York, 1961), 146–66.

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head often could not divine the precise meaning of an approved policy—with consequent and obvious difficulties in implementing it.[35]

Nor was the OCB of much use in solving the problem. An interdepartmental committee with no authority, it engaged in the same sort of bargaining and negotiation in interpreting and implementing policy as had the Planning Board and Council in creating it. Frequently by-passed or ignored, also, the OCB in the final analysis had little effect on the actual coordination of policy execution.

To make matters worse, the critics went on, the NSC system by its very nature was restricted to continuing and developing already established policies and was incapable of originating new ideas and major innovations. Council members were either too busy in their own agencies or too intent on promoting departmental viewpoints to take the free and unfettered approach to their work on the NSC that was necessary to initiate fresh and imaginative policies. NSC members were well aware, also, that much of national security policy was in fact developed and coordinated outside of the Council, through the Budget Bureau, the Cabinet, or separate policy groups that dealt with matters like disarmament, manpower and reserve policy, or executive organization, or through individuals like the Secretaries of State or the Treasury who exercised personal influence with the President. Frequently departments or agencies purposely by-passed the NSC system in order to ensure the success of critical proposals. Indeed, the whole question of whether national policy was best developed by an NSC consisting of the officials who would implement this policy, and could thus best understand the attendant problems, or by independent bodies of thinkers not limited by operational restrictions was sharply underlined by President Eisenhower's increasing use of outside committees of private citizens to study important problems in the national security field.

To all of these criticisms, the supporters of the NSC system replied vigorously, either denying the accuracy of the

[35] The implications of this for military commanders and especially for the JCS were explained by former Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor before the Jackson subcommittee and in his own book: *Organizing for National Security*, I, 787–99; Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York, 1960), 82–83 and *passim*.

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critics' premises or the validity of their conclusions or arguing forcefully that if the Council machinery were less than perfect, it was nevertheless an extremely effective means of developing national security policy and the one best suited to the ideas and methods of President Eisenhower.

Some critics, in disparaging the Eisenhower NSC system, had admitted that the policies it developed would probably have been the policies of the Eisenhower administration in any event. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affiairs during most of Eisenhower's second term, implied strong agreement with this view. "I suspect," he said, "that the unhappiness of any knowledgeable person with respect to the NSC and its procedures really derives, not from a concern about how the machinery works, but what it produces. This, then, is substantive disagreement. For those, the only solution would seem to be to elect a different President." [36]

III

In April 1959, Senator Henry M. Jackson, in a memorable address to the students of the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, vigorously attacked the Eisenhower NSC system. Summing up many of the criticisms already voiced by others, he referred to the Council as it then functioned as "a dangerously misleading façade." He had, he announced, recently proposed a full-scale, nonpartisan congressional study of the whole problem of formulating national security policy with a view to making definite recommendations for "constructive remedies." [37]

Three months later Jackson found himself at the head of a Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, a subgroup of the Senate Committee on Government Operations newly established to implement his proposal. The subcommittee's "inquiry"—to use its own term—lasted more than two years, until the fall of 1961. During this period, it heard testimony from nearly three dozen individuals who had participated

[36] Gordon Gray, "Role of the National Security Council in the Formulation of National Policy," prepared for delivery to the American Political Science Association, September 1959, in *Organizing for National Security*, II, 189.

[37] Senator Henry M. Jackson, "How Shall We Forge a Strategy for Survival," April 16, 1959, *Organizing for National Security*, II, 266–77.

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in one way or another in the process of helping to formulate or execute national security policy. It also studied all the available literature on the problem and itself prepared studies, reports, and collections of background material. Its efforts constituted the first comprehensive review of the national security policy process since the period leading up to passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

By the winter of 1960–61, the Jackson subcommittee had advanced far enough in its work to come up with a number of conclusions and recommendations, which it published for the education of the incoming Kennedy administration. These findings and proposals dealt with many areas of the government, from the President on down to the individual private citizen in the national service, but the National Security Council was, of course, of prime concern.

The new President, said the subcommittee, could use the NSC either as "an intimate forum" to meet "with his chief advisers in searching discussion and debate of a limited number of critical problems" both long-range and immediate, or as "the apex of a comprehensive and highly institutionalized system for generating policy proposals and following through on presidentially approved decisions." [38] Based on its study, the subcommittee concluded that the "real worth of the Council to a President" lay in the former course. Only in this manner could he and his most important advisers "gain that intellectual intimacy and mutual understanding on which true coordination depends." Only thus could he "receive from his department and agency heads a full exposition of policy alternatives available to him, and, in turn, give them clear-cut guidance for action."

To establish a National Security Council of true value to the President, "to 'deinstitutionalize' and to 'humanize' the NSC process," the subcommittee made the following recommendations:

(1) The Council should meet only to advise the President or receive his decision on specific major items. "Council meetings and the Council agenda should never become ritualistic."

(2) The Council should offer a clear expression of alter-

[38] "The National Security Council," December 12, 1960, *ibid.*, III, 32–33. The material that follows is drawn from *ibid.*, 38–40. See also "Final Statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson," November 15, 1961, *ibid.*, 3–8.

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nate courses of action and their implications and "not spare the President the necessity of choice."

(3) Council meetings should be "considered gatherings of principals" and restricted to top officials, with staff attendance "tightly controlled." A written record of decisions should be kept.

(4) The Planning Board should be replaced by a group "used mainly to criticize and comment upon policy initiatives developed by the departments or stimulated by the President." This body should not negotiate or secure agency concurrences. More use might be made of "informal working groups" or outside consultants.

(5) "The President must rely mainly upon the Secretary of State for the initial synthesis of the political, military, economic, and other elements which go into the making of a coherent national strategy." The Secretary was "crucial to the successful operation of the Council."

(6) The OCB should be abolished and "responsibility for implementation of policies cutting across departmental lines should, wherever possible, be assigned to a particular department or . . . action officer, possibly assisted by an informal interdepartmental group."

(7) The NSC staff should be reduced and more closely integrated. A small presidential staff, working "outside the system," should closely assist the chief executive by providing information, suggesting "policy initiatives," and "spotting gaps in policy execution."

(8) The membership on the Council of the Chairman, NSRB, subsequently replaced by the Director, OCDM, was intended to provide the NSC with perspectives on the domestic economy and resources. Since OCDM was less concerned with these problems than with civil defense, the statutory membership of its director on the NSC might well be dropped.

(9) Ways and means should be found of better integrating NSC recommendations with budgetary decisions made outside the Council.

IV

The views of the Jackson subcommittee found a ready audience in the new administration that arrived in Washing-

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ton in January 1961, for in spirit and content they came very close to matching President John F. Kennedy's ideas of the nature and process of presidential decision-making. Within a very short period after taking office, the new chief executive dismantled the elaborate NSC system so carefully built by his predecessor and replaced it with a loose, flexible, fairly pragmatic set of procedures more suited to his own concepts and methods. Gone was the NSC Planning Board with its highly systematized development of papers, gone the formal, crowded, regularly scheduled meetings of the Council, gone the OCB with its elaborate, interdepartmental follow-up on NSC actions. In their place was a new method of decision-making for national security problems, one that seemed to combine the better features of the informal mechanism developed by Truman and the institutionalized system created by Eisenhower.[39]

Of the old NSC system, all that now remains is the statutory membership in the Council itself—the President, Vice-President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and Director, Office of Emergency Planning[40]—and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs who, assisted by a Deputy and the Executive Secretary, runs the small NSC staff. The Director, CIA, and Chairman, JCS, continue as advisers. Other officials participate in Council deliberations as and when directed by the President, but their participation is on a much more informal and *ad hoc* basis than before.

Under President Eisenhower, the NSC was a form of superdepartment placed atop the traditional structure of executive departments and agencies to solve the problems that individual departments were unable to handle. Under Kennedy, the NSC became only one of several means by which problems may be solved. It took its place beside special Cabinet committees, informal groups of officials, and other bodies organized on an *ad hoc* basis to assist and advise in the

[39] This section is based on the testimony of then Budget Director David E. Bell, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk before the Jackson subcommittee and on a letter from Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, to Senator Jackson, reproduced in the published hearings. *Organizing for National Security*, I, 1173–81, 1215–27, 1323–33, 1335–38.

[40] OEP replaced the former OCDM.

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national security process. Primary emphasis was returned to the regular departments and agencies and their planning and operational staffs. These, reinforced by interdepartmental committees or task forces and close working, and often personal, relationships between the operating officials, bore the heaviest workload in the national security process.

Normally the President assigned the preparation of a study or recommendation to a Cabinet official or one of his top subordinates. This official, in turn, was responsible for obtaining other departmental views and checking and coordinating with other responsible individuals. Sometimes he did this within small, interdepartmental groups, specially created to study the problem, sometimes by arranging for subordinates in each interested agency to develop the matter. Where appropriate, this included close consultation with the Budget Bureau. Fiscal matters were considered during the development of a study and in drawing up recommendations and proposals; papers no longer had separate financial appendices. The completed report included not only the responsible official's own analysis and recommendations for action, but also a full statement of any differing views held by other agencies or individuals. This was true whether the report was prepared by one person or by a special task force.

The final version, presented to President Kennedy at a formal meeting of the NSC or within smaller or larger panel or subcommittee meetings, was then discussed and, if necessary, debated further before the President made his decision. Once the chief executive approved a specific recommendation, the responsible agency or department made a written record of the decision and the head of that agency, or a high-level action officer, was charged with overseeing its implementation. By placing in the same agency or individual—always the agency or official of primary interest—the responsibility for both planning and implementation, Kennedy deliberately eliminated the distinction between theory and operation that had existed under the Planning Board–OCB balance, a distinction felt by many to have been unrealistic and impractical. If the course of action decided upon was so broad that a single department did not have overriding responsibility, the decision was written up by the NSC staff and the President himself might direct its implementation.

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Presidential decisions, incidentally, were no longer recorded as part of elaborate position papers, but stated briefly in National Security Action Memoranda—referred to by the initiate as NSAM's—which merely indicated the issue at hand and what Kennedy had decided to do about it.

In an administration that placed great emphasis on individual responsibility, initiative, and action, as well as on personal relationships, probably the most important member of the NSC after the President himself was Secretary of State Dean Rusk. President Kennedy firmly established the primacy of the State Department in foreign policy matters and in all national security matters that come within this area. To the Secretary of State and his top deputies—in this context normally the Assistant Secretaries for the various geographic areas—fell the job of pulling together many of the elements of national security planning and implementation. In placing "increased reliance on the leadership of the Department of State," one NSC official has written,

> . . . the President has made it very clear that he does not want a large separate organization [such as the NSC] between him and his Secretary of State. Neither does he wish any question to arise as to the clear authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State, not only in his own Department, and not only in such large-scale related areas as foreign aid and information policy, but also as the agent of coordination of all major policies toward other nations.[41]

Next in importance to the Secretary of State was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who bore a heavy burden of responsibility in advising the President and carrying out his decisions. He worked closely with Secretary Rusk, and the top action officers of both departments were in immediate and constant touch with each other. Such day-to-day relationships enabled the Defense Department to operate with a full awareness of current political guidance and the State Department to have a proper understanding of the military implications of any new or proposed policy. The end result was to increase the effectiveness and ease of action of the President's two top advisers on the National Security Council.

[41] McGeorge Bundy to Senator Jackson, September 4, 1961, *Organizing for National Security*, I, 1337–38.

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Another statutory member of the NSC is the Director, Office of Emergency Planning, Edward A. McDermott. Under the Kennedy reorganization of the national government, the OEP came much closer to filling the presidential staff role originally visualized for the NSRB in coordinating government-wide planning for emergency management of national resources. The membership of its director in the NSC thus answered to a considerable extent the criticism of the Jackson subcommittee of the participation in the Council of the OCDM Director. McDermott was present at formal NSC meetings and his staff prepared studies and analyses of the nation's resources as they affect the development and implementation of national security policy.

One regular participant in the NSC who is not a statutory member of the Council but whose position was obviously unique was the Attorney General. As the President's brother, Robert Kennedy had the trust and confidence of the chief executive and ready access to the White House. He participated actively in the national security process and served on subgroups or panels of the Council. He also received the reports of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, which hitherto had been responsible to the Council through the NSC staff.

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, also played an important role in the national security process. Not only was he a top presidential adviser, but as overall director of the NSC staff he participated in all Council-related activities. He and his assistants had a variety of responsibilities in addition to their normal secretariat functions. They suggested areas for consideration and the mechanisms for handling these and other problems; followed studies through the planning stage and saw that they were properly coordinated, staffed, and responsive to the needs and desires of the President; ensured that a written record was made of all decisions, whether they were reached at formal NSC meetings or at other top conferences; and kept tabs on the implementation of whatever policy had been adopted. In this work, Bundy and the NSC staff coordinated closely with other parts of the presidential staff and the Budget Bureau, performed whatever liaison

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was necessary, and met frequently with the President at regular White House staff meetings.[42]

Formal NSC meetings were held often but irregularly, sometimes as frequently as three times a week and usually at least once every two weeks. In the first half year of the Kennedy administration, for example, the Council met sixteen times. Many matters that had been considered at regular NSC meetings under Eisenhower were now handled in separate meetings of the President with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara or with a single Cabinet officer, or in committees of the NSC that included only some of the statutory members but also several of their top deputies or other government officials, or at meetings below the presidential level. During the height of the Cuban crisis in October 1962, for instance, Kennedy met almost daily with the so-called Executive Committee of the NSC. This committee consisted of the Chief Executive, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, Attorney General Kennedy, CIA Director John A. McCone, JCS Chairman General Maxwell D. Taylor, Presidential Assistant Bundy, and the President's Special Counsel, Theodore C. Sorenson. Also in attendance at many of these meetings were Vice-President Johnson, Under Secretary of State George Ball, Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatrick, Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson, UN Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, and former Secretary of State Acheson.[43]

The NSC under President Kennedy, it is clear, was thus a flexible organization within the overall national security structure. Used pragmatically and in a variety of ways, it was only one of several tools that Kennedy employed to help him reach decisions on major issues affecting the security of the nation.

V

"Fundamentally," as Robert Cutler observed in 1956,

42 For an interesting comparison of Bundy with earlier "White House advisers," see Chalmers M. Roberts, "About Mr. Bundy," *Washington Post and Times Herald,* November 3, 1962, A-9. See also Joseph Kraft, "Kennedy's Working Staff," *Harper's,* CCXXV (December 1962), 31–32.

43 Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, "In Time of Crisis," *Saturday Evening Post,* CCXXXV (December 8, 1962), 15–20; *Washington Post and Times Herald,* November 1, 1962, A-13.

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"the Council is a vehicle for the President to use in accordance with its suitability to his plan for conducting his great office." A "peculiar virtue of the National Security Act is its flexibility . . . each President may use the Council as *he* finds most suitable at a given time." [44]

The history of the NSC under three chief executives amply bears this out. As a means of assisting the President in the difficult task of forming and implementing national security policy, the Council has played a varied role since its inception. Its role under future presidents may be equally changed, but the need for an NSC or for something similar would appear to be self-evident.

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[44] Cutler, 442–43.

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REVIEWS

Shaping the Future: Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition. By Robert R. Bowie. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1964.—viii, 118 pp. $3.50.

This book combines two qualities which are rare singly, and even more rare in combination.

It is short.

And it goes to the heart of the matter.

In fact, it goes to the heart of several matters.

In little over one hundred pages, Professor Bowie manages to deal with the essentials of sound policy-making, what we should do about Europe, and how the United States government should be organized for foreign affairs.

In each case, I think he makes good sense.

The essentials of sound policy, according to Professor Bowie, are: a clear view of the goal, agreement on intermediate programs, and patience in pursuing both.

This kind of persistence in working toward agreed objectives runs, as Bowie points out, against the American grain. Our impatience, our pragmatism, our zeal for novelty all argue against it.

All the more reason for those engaged in foreign policy to read the book and ponder the lesson.

It is a lesson that was understood by a great American before this book was written. Few previous presidents have equaled President Truman's clarity in purpose and tenacity in execution. "Flexibility" and "compromise"—those deadly enemies of continuity in foreign policy—held no attraction for him. He tried to judge the course that made sense, and then he plowed ahead. The Marshall Plan and NATO are among the many monuments to this steadfastness.

Bowie's discussion of next steps in this European policy illustrates his view of what is needed. That discussion focuses, in good part, on the nuclear issue.

First, he tries to define our goal: sharing nuclear responsibility in ways which will reinforce both European unity and Atlantic partnership.

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Next, he considers possible intermediate programs. Bowie argues for the proposed multilateral fleet as the most promising presently feasible step—one which can evolve with time. He is right. The MLF has imperfections; no proposal can avoid them. But it is the best answer now practicable; it points in the right direction.

Finally, Bowie speaks for continuity and persistence in prosecuting this program. He cautions against possible diversions—notably help to national forces, either directly or via some loose multi-national combination of these forces. There is another diversion that I am sorry he did not also despatch: the notion that the whole problem can somehow be made to go away by improved "consultation" about the use of U.S. nuclear forces. There is a dangerous confusion here: If this means European control of SAC, it isn't feasible. If it means our discussing SAC plans and targetting with our allies, it is already being done; and it does not fully meet the allied concerns that are already reflected in two national nuclear programs and could lead to others.

In discussing organization of the U.S. government, Professor Bowie makes the point which has always seemed to me elementary, though it has often eluded sensible men: that both the President and the Secretary of State should be clear as to who is President and who is Secretary of State.

The President must fix the basic goals, approve the key programs, ward off the pressures for diversion and change. The Secretary must be his chief adviser in these matters, and the chief instrument by which actions to fulfill his wishes on external affairs are carried out and coordinated in the executive branch.

Diversions from this pattern have almost always produced bad results—whether it is a Secretary who wants to assume the role of President (Seward) or a President who believes that either his or the Secretary's responsibilities can be delegated (for example, to the Operations Coordination Board, of late unhappy pre-1961 memory).

Bowie deals with other useful ways in which clarity of purpose and consistency of execution can be assured in Washington, but this is the heart of the matter.

In case I haven't made my point clear by now, I will repeat it. This is a good book. If you are concerned with foreign affairs, you should read it.

DEAN ACHESON

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Power and the Pursuit of Peace. By F. H. HINSLEY. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963.—416 pp. $6.95.

Mr. Hinsley, a sharp-tongued Cambridge historian, introduces his study of power and peace with a sweeping attack on contemporary views and programs of international politics, "the outstanding failure of recent times." He finds that the international experiments of the last fifty years have been largely ignored or misinterpreted, our "stupidity" revealed by the widespread acceptance of seventeenth-century peace schemes, even our more enlightened notions alloyed with much "rubbish" and "ignorance." The book is presented as a first effort to raise the study of international relations to a more scientific level; it is to bring rigor and sanity to international theory and "to ridicule the improbable hypotheses which now so generally pass for wisdom." These bristling and condescending introductory remarks may have suggested the publisher's claim of novel and "even sensational" conclusions, but the reader should not be unduly misled. Mr. Hinsley is no lone voice in the wilderness, much as he may like to appear to be. His principal thesis is that under the present national states' system, peace rests essentially on an equilibrium of power and that internationalist schemes for eliminating war which ignore that fact mislead us and tend to misdirect our efforts. This is hardly a novel theme; Mr. Hinsely himself places great emphasis on his conclusion that governments today accept and understand the power deadlock and its restraining effects. Indeed his final chapter is as emphatically optimistic about the chances of peace because of this understanding as his first chapter is pessimistic about present ideas of international relations.

Between these two chapters is the solid historical substance of the book and in this Mr. Hinsley demonstrates a high order of professional skill and style. In Part One he dissects the principal peace schemes elaborated since medieval times with a keen eye for their intellectual origins, logical inconsistencies, and political naïveté. The criticism levelled against the international organization schemes of William Penn and Saint-Pierre by Rousseau, Kant, and Bentham is given emphasis, almost as if directed against present over-evaluation of similar ideas. The chapters on the nineteenth century reveal the special influence of lawyers and peace societies and show how peace plans began to enter into practical foreign policy initiatives. Many of the ideas then discussed are hardly distinguishable from proposals put forward today, particularly in regard to dispute settlement and peaceful change; perhaps it is just as well that this is not generally realized by their proponents. Part II on the origin and development

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of the national states' system up to 1900 is an admirable summary of European diplomatic history, designed to demonstrate the book's central theme on the relation of power to peace. Although this is a well trodden ground, the author's thesis imparts fresh meaning to the events, especially in describing the shift from the Congress system to the Concert of Europe and the reasons for the demise of the Concert.

Part III on the twentieth century does not quite maintain the same solid standard as the other portions. Some of the more polemical chapters seem to have originated as book reviews and several inaccuracies reveal that the author has left his area of expertise (for example, Security Council "recommendations" are said to be binding and Article 53 is cited as the article on self-defense). In the last chapter the author forcefully maintains that danger of general war has been virtually eliminated for some time to come—a situation which he attributes primarily to the equilibrium of power that had emerged in 1945, some years before nuclear parity. He makes much of the point that the resulting political restraints have been effective independently of atomic weapons, but his arguments (for example, that forcible intervention or conquest is no longer a rational objective and that ideological struggle has subsided) only demonstrate that war is not sensible, not that it is impossible or highly improbable. After all, even under the nuclear threat (which is certainly the crowning deterrent) Great Powers have been willing to use force or the threat of force when considered by them necessary and "legitimate," although they are at the same time concerned to avoid escalation into general war. In fact, it can be argued that the awareness of a strategic balance fosters complacency about deterrence and therefore makes it more likely that the Great Powers will run risks in local and limited wars. Hinsley barely touches on this aspect and takes no note of the positions expressed on both sides regarding limited warfare and wars of liberation.

Hinsley's faith in the restraining effect of power equilibrium is matched by his skepticism as to action by international institutions. He believes disarmament efforts increase distrust, and the United Nations should "prefer words to deeds." Yet in his introduction he warns of future danger when power will shift again and expresses a muted hope that a sense of "common responsibility" will enable us to weather the next crisis. But it is hard to see how the notion of common responsibility for international order can be given vitality if the United Nations and other international organs are not developed through "deeds." This would not necessarily call for the greater use of compulsory interna-

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tional authority but more realistically for the extension of collective measures undertaken by general consensus, as, for example, assisting the emergent and less developed countries, reducing and controlling armaments, and fostering throughout the world new perspectives of international responsibility. However optimistic one may be about the present period of stability, the task of strengthening the structure for "perpetual peace" still remains high on the agenda.

OSCAR SCHACHTER

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making. By JOSEPH FRANKEL. London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1963.—xv, 231 pp. $5.60.

With this comprehensive treatise on foreign policy, Professor Joseph Frankel, head of the department of politics at the University of Aberdeen, joins a small but growing list of first-rank international relations theorists. If the reviewer is asked to single out the most notable quality of the treatise, it is the effort made to bridge divergent trends of thought. In present-day international studies the clash between the behavioral and historical-philosophical schools dominates most discussions. It colors the majority of critical reviews and is oftentimes controlling in the formation of leading faculties. Certain political science departments in great American universities are overwhelmingly one-viewpoint departments. Professor Frankel's approach, drawn from the classical British tradition of breadth of spirit and learning, provides a sobering reminder that this need not be.

Essentially, this study of foreign policy is of the decision-making process but viewed in a wider historical and philosophical context. Frankel finds much of value in the better American studies of decision-making. Indeed he appropriates many of their categories and concepts. The author describes his approach as "non-technical" and proceeds "with a minimum of special technology." With Aristotle he looks "for precision in each class of things just as far as the nature of the subject admits." There is a logical progression from identifying the decision-makers, to describing the environment in which they must work, to grappling with the baffling problem of values, and to formulating an intellectual structure for studying the stages in decision-making. The process itself is successively appraised from the pre-decisional stages, to explicit choices in decision-making, to the post-decisional stages.

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The fact that Professor Frankel is in search of a theory of foreign policy formation lends order and focus to his study. He postulates a variety of working hypotheses and tests them against the data of British, American, German, and non-Western experience. He deals with international society made up of numerous nation states. Their experiences are check points for what he suspects may be true of the relation, say, between the domestic and foreign environment in which leaders make choices. By casting his net widely, Frankel avoids the temptation to generalize from a single national experience.

In the same way, he draws on the findings of a wide-ranging group of scholars: philosophers and psychologists, historians and communication specialists, and theorists and practitioners. He is particularly conversant with recent American literature across a broad spectrum of thought and approach. It is a commentary on the sweep of Frankel's knowledge to suggest that American college students might find his text a useful introduction to much of the writing of American scholars.

When all this is said, and more could be added, the reader carries away one important and persisting query and doubt. Is Professor Frankel's approach, admittedly inclusive and broad-gauged, the best route to an understanding of foreign policy? Has the study brought the student closer to what is both unique and general in the formulation and execution of foreign policy? Has he succeeded in uncovering the core of the decision-making process? Has his rather formidable intellectual apparatus brought us closer to the center of the business of foreign affairs?

The test of these questions must be in seminars, analysis and observation, and research into different national experiments. In such a laboratory, the student of foreign policy can put concepts, categories, and definitions to the test. He can determine whether Frankel's "models" are operationally relevant or whether his study must stand as a skillful intellectual exercise. Whatever the outcome, the book is a storehouse of examples, insights, and constructs for every serious scholar. Whether the issue is the influence of political parties on foreign policy, the problem of ends and means, or the impact of international movements on national foreign policy, Professor Frankel has given it some measure of attention. He has helped his readers to grasp the fact that foreign policy, while complex and bewildering, can nonetheless be approached in orderly and systematic terms.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

NEW YORK CITY

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The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine. By HERBERT A. DEANE. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1963.—xix, 356 pp. $7.50.

Professor Deane's "concern to understand what Augustine said" led him to examine all the relevant material in Augustine's many works. This exceptionally adequate foundation supports a detailed presentation and discussion of Augustine's ideas on justice and law, the characteristics of the state, interstate relations, and the relations of the state with the City of God, substantiating the claim that these ideas "fall into coherent and consistent patterns." Numerous quotations let Augustine speak for himself and provide a comprehensive anthology of the important passages, which should be as useful to historians of ideas as to students of political theory. Professor Deane effectively marshals evidence that definitively refutes the recurrent thesis that Augustine thought the state could become just through being Christianized. His book opens with a lucid explanation of Augustinian doctrine on the fall and redemption, with particular attention to their psychological implications. A survey of previous Christian attitudes toward the state helps to define Augustine's significance in the rethinking of aloofness and pacifism. An account of the problems and policies of the Donatist crisis provides the setting for a sensitive treatment of his shifting views on state action against heretics. There is little discussion of Augustine's metaphysical and ethical premises, or of his intellectual sources; his grappling with the problem of evil needs, I think, more attention; the brief sketch of his influence on medieval political thinking is misleading, since it was actually diverse, pervasive, important, and, in general, based on an understanding of his meaning not unlike that of Professor Deane. But no other study of Augustine's political thought gives nearly so much so well.

Christianity "transferred the classical vision of the state to heaven," making possible Augustine's "realistic look at actual states," at "what they do and cannot do" and the means they use. As Professor Deane interprets it, the coherent pattern of Augustine's "politics of imperfection" is consistent with his penetrating analysis of the "psychology of fallen man," which contrasts sharply with the effects of grace. True justice is unattainable on earth, by state or church; the just republic needs just citizens. The goal of the City of God differs radically from that of the state, which, in spite of some utility of Christian rulers (and of bad ones, too) to the Christian pilgrimage, is inextricably linked with the Earthly City. In origin, function, and methods, it is geared to the actual imperfection of all men, not to the potential per-

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fection of the few. Originating in the antithesis between man's self-centered, particular desires and his continual striving toward the peace that such desires continually frustrate, what it can be and do cannot transcend the character of the men with whom it deals and the means that it must use. Its claims to Christian obedience and assistance are sufficiently based on its maintaining the minimal peace essential to earthly life. But its decisions can be, at best, choices of lesser evils; its law must differ from divine law; its justice is necessarily "rough justice." The coercion through which it operates cannot make men good, because it cannot alter what they love. What makes coercion externally effective is, indeed, what simultaneously requires and justifies it and limits what it can accomplish: the fact that man's desires are aimed too low.

Professor Deane's exposition, stressing this general pattern, is concrete, sophisticated, amply supported by evidence, and presented with felicitous precision and simplicity of style. I think his interpretation sound and acute, though it raises occasional questions. Was Augustine's doctrine of non-resistance the result of a Hobbesian "concentration on the necessity of maintaining peace and order" or of his *contemptus mundi* and confidence in God's control? Is there a "contradiction" in his acceptance of coerced conformity as facilitating the work of grace more "fundamental" than that already resolved in the great paradox of God's use of evil? Is any instrument too blunt for God? To what extent Augustine's practical conclusions should be related to his psychological concepts, to what extent to his theology, must perhaps remain debatable; there are some difficulties in using as a guide to the Earthly City a man obsessed with God. But Professor Dean has been remarkably successful in keeping different facets of Augustine's multi-dimensional thought in view, while his focus on the interrelations of human imperfection with the state significantly contributes both to historical understanding of Augustine's political thinking and to appreciation of its permanent relevance to the moral dilemmas of politics.

EWART LEWIS

OBERLIN, OHIO

The Life of Niccolò Machiavelli. By ROBERTO RIDOLFI. Translated from the Italian by Cecil Grayson. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1963.—x, 337 pp. $6.00.

The first edition of the marquese Ridolfi's biography of Machiavelli was published in March 1954 and was quickly followed by

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a second revised edition in November of the same year. All students of Machiavelli must be grateful to Mr. Cecil Grayson for translating it and to the author, newly inspired by "the importance of the translation itself, the reputation and skill of the translator and the prestige of the publishers," for revising his text in the light of the most recent research, thus giving it, in his own words, "the advantage over the existing Italian editions."

The principal biographical contributions to Machiavelli studies during the last ten years have been Nicolai Rubinstein's discovery of documents which give new details about Machiavelli's entry into the Florentine chancery (*Italian Studies,* XI [1956], 72–91) and a series of important articles on the composition, structure, and dating of the *Discorsi:* by Felix Gilbert (in *The Journal of the History of Ideas,* XIV [1953], 135–56), J. H. Hexter (in *Studies in the Renaissance,* III [1956], 73–96), Hans Baron (in *Bibl. d'Hum. et Ren.,* XVIII [1956], 405–28 and *Eng. Hist. Rev.,* LXXVI [1961], 217–53), J. H. Whitfield (in *Italian Studies,* XIII [1958], 21–46), and Gennaro Sasso (in *Gior. Storico d. Lett. Ital.,* CXXXIV [1957], 482–534 and CXXXV [1958], 215–59). Ridolfi incorporates Rubinstein's contribution in his second chapter. He discusses the controversy on the date of the *Discorsi* in his notes (especially p. 294, n. 10; p. 300, n. 10; and p. 301, n. 17) at less than adequate length, reasserting the traditional view that Machiavelli "had begun and made substantial progress with the *Discourses* before writing *The Prince.*" Yet several of the arguments for dating the *Discorsi* between 1515 and 1518 are strong; and one regrets that Machiavelli's definitive biographer has not seized this opportunity to defend his chronological judgments vigorously against the more persuasive arguments of the innovators. As he himself remarks about a recent and entertaining polemic between Whitfield and Sasso (in *Le Parole e le Idee,* I [1959], 80–94 and *Nuova Rivista Storica,* XLIV, [1960], 297–330), "it is from the collision of opposing views that rise the sparks of truth." Nor is the point a small one. The problem of the genesis and date of the *Discourses* is inseparable from the older and larger one of its substantive relation to *The Prince.*

Otherwise the book remains what it was at its first appearance: a superb *Life,* exhaustive, judicious, discriminating, and well balanced. Except for an awkward effort to reproduce the Italian historical present, Mr. Grayson's translation has accurately captured the clarity and grace of the original. Ridolfi's aim was to write a "straightforward" biography without what he calls "the usual fog of words about the concepts of 'virtù' and 'fortuna' or

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the land he loved 'more than his own soul'" (p. vii). This is promising. But even the most straightforward life of Machiavelli cannot altogether avoid suggesting an interpretation of his thought; and Ridolfi inevitably strays from a biographical narrative which is admirably straight and sure to sometimes less convincing generalizations about Machiavelli's fundamental convictions and attitudes. He is persuaded, for example, that "there is hardly a page of [Machiavelli] however cynical in which we do not catch a glimpse of a poet's sensitive and impassioned spirit, and there can be no real wickedness where there is poetry" (p. 13). No doubt a facet of Machiavelli's temperament can legitimately be called poetic; but to perceive in the last chapter of *The Prince* "new political theories, rewoven on the fabric of a dream, rise in the final lyrical exhortation, to the realms of poetry" (p. 150) is less helpful than many discussions of *fortuna* or *virtù*. Ridolfi has rightly banished the wicked man of "evil mind" from his pages. His Machiavelli is a scientist, an artist, and a Christian moralist. A "religious and Christian conscience . . . breathes from all his works" (p. 253), and he detects with Croce the "visible signs of austerity and painful moral conscience," suggesting that the *Esortazione alla penitenza* is the culmination of a spiritual itinerary. There is evidence to support these judgments. There is other and in my opinion better evidence which qualifies them. Its sifting need involve no "fog of words." It must be analyzed with the same kind of textual rigor and sophistication that Ridolfi has so skillfully brought to bear on the biographical narrative.

In any case these are matters of emphasis. Ridolfi's great achievement is to have beautifully ordered all the known facts of Machiavelli's life. Every student of the Florentine secretary must own this book. From it emerges a human portrait wiser and more just than any we have had before.

EUGENE F. RICE JR.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

English Landed Society in the Eighteenth Century. By G. E. MINGAY. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul and Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963.—x, 292 pp. $6.75.

The new series, "Studies in Social History," edited by Harold Perkin of Manchester, is rapidly establishing a solid reputation for useful works of synthesis and interpretation. Such is precisely the character of this recent addition to the series. Mr. Mingay surveys and synthesizes modern scholarship (not the

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least his own) on English rural society in the eighteenth century in its economic, social, and political aspects. He is at his fullest in his discussion of the landed proprietors, noblemen and gentlemen, the character of their income and expenditure, their way of life. In this post-Hammond, post-Tawney era, this seems to be the area where (under the inspiration perhaps of Professor Habakkuk) the most valuable work is being done—from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth. Mr. Mingay can offer us less that is new about the renting farmers and owner-occupiers, but what he does give us is solid fare, on some points richly detailed. About the Hammonds' poor cotters and landless laborers, he has relatively little to say, new or otherwise. Since he does not seem to omit any modern scholarship, this is less a reflection on him than on current tastes in research.

Mr. Mingay's is a good book, though not uniformly so. He is at his best in economic history. Here he has made his own valuable, earlier contributions, his references are commonly to manuscript material; here the tone is surer, the conclusions newer, the reader's immediacy to the material all the keener. In these sections, we get an intelligent estate agent's or solicitor's view of the finances of great families, their pride and extravagances, their family and other commitments, how their rents might be raised and new fortunes made, as well as how old fortunes were undone—all drawn from the sort of records to which only the most trusted steward would have access. When he turns to social history, Mr. Mingay is less original or even fresh in either method or materials. What we have is essentially the old anecdotal school of social history based upon printed and manuscript letters, diaries, travel accounts, and the like, with fascinating details of clothing and diet and feasts and trips to town and watering places and simpler country pleasure. Of its kind, it is very good, but after the economic sections we had expected more. The political sections are the least adequate and might well have been omitted. They are based primarily upon standard monographs, with some added reflections of the author. Here, he is much less sure; for example on page 261, Rockingham and C. J. Fox are described as "Pittite Whigs" which, of all things, they never were.

This book tells us much about the present state of English rural studies, economic and social. A lot of valuable work is being done on individual families and estates, based upon the increasingly large volume of records now moving out of country houses into county record offices. For these new studies we are extremely grateful and cry for more. But, at the same time, we must recognize that there are limitations to the conclusions

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that can be drawn from studies based upon such material. It is not simply that the surviving accounts tell us more about proprietors than about tenants or laborers. Within the class of proprietors, the records of great and successful and "rising" families are much more likely to have survived than those of marginal or "declining" families. Thus, Mr. Mingay, like previous workers in the field, can tell us much more about land owners with incomes in the thousands than about those with incomes in the hundreds. Is this the whole story? I suspect that for a fuller and deeper view of rural society, research will have to turn from the family or estate oriented study to that based on a geographic area, however small. Here quantification will be possible and the fuller spectrum of rural society perceived. For France we already have the model works of Robert Forster on Toulouse and of Pierre Goubert on the Beauvaisis. In England, however, though there have been flirtations, the banns have yet to be posted for the marriage of local history and aggregate quantification.

JACOB M. PRICE

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848. By E. J. HOBSBAWM. Cleveland and New York, The World Publishing Company, 1962.—xvi, 356 pp. $7.50.

This volume is the fourth to appear in a new series, "The World Histories of Civilization." As General Editor, Ronald Syme of the University of Oxford is assembling an international panel of experts to prepare some twenty projected volumes. It is not yet possible to appraise the general plan of the series or to judge how largely the individual volumes will remain separate and independent studies. Possibly later contributors will seek to relate their discussions to volumes already completed by their colleagues. Mr. Hobsbawm's volume, the first to appear on the modern period, stands alone in more than one sense. In his style and interpretation he proves himself an original thinker. In his evaluation of world developments between 1789 and 1848 he selects and emphasizes only those that he judges significant for his argument. Developments before 1789 he scants or neglects entirely, and he defends this treatment forthrightly in his introduction (p. 2).

> How far back into history the analyst should go—whether to the mid-seventeenth century English Revolution, to the Reformation and the beginning of European military world conquest and co-

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lonial exploitation in the early sixteenth century, or even earlier, is for our purposes irrelevant, for such analysis in depth would take us far beyond the chronological boundaries of this volume.

Mr. Hobsbawm's respect for the limiting dates assigned to his volume weakens the reader's sense of historical continuity. The Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution dominate the drama of these fifty-nine years, but they appear blind, intrusive, unmotivated forces rather than logical historical movements. Despite the division of the book into two parts, captioned "Developments" and "Results," the relation between cause and effect is not made manifest. Nor is the course of European and world events during these years traced in a manner that "the intelligent and educated citizen" for whom the volume is intended will readily comprehend.

What the author does offer is a series of meticulous dissections on a dozen selected aspects of European life between 1789 and 1848. Revolutions, industrial and political, war, peace, nationalism, land, the poor, the bourgeoisie, religious and secular ideology, the arts, and science all receive perceptive appraisal. Mr. Hobsbawm's deductions are always interesting and frequently illuminating. He is at his best when he analyzes the intellectual and artistic currents, the complex character of Romanticism, and the basic implication of the scientific discoveries of the age.

What these dissections lack is a comprehensive unity and integration. The pulse is dead, the synergy that united all these forces and currents into a living social body has escaped. As in an autopsy, the conclusions drawn from an examination of the separate organs can tell much to the specialist but little to the layman.

Two features the lay reader *can* enjoy to the full are the inclusion of a hundred pertinent contemporary illustrations and nine maps. For the serious student there is a seven-page annotated bibliography, critical and scholarly, which includes studies in six languages. Quotations in the text are identified in eleven pages of historical notes and there is a satisfactory index.

Despite admirable care in preparation and editing a few minor slips escaped correction. Twenty-one, not two, associates were guillotined with Robespierre on June 28, 1794 (p. 72). Saint-Just was born in 1767, not 1756 (illustration number 38). The statement (p. 100) that Talleyrand "presided over French foreign policy from 1814 to 1835" calls for modification; even if "presided" is taken in a figurative sense the statement exaggerates his influence.

GEOFFREY BRUUN

ITHACA, NEW YORK

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Munich. By KEITH EUBANK. Norman, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1963.—xiv, 322 pp. $5.00.

Munich: Prologue to Tragedy. By JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 2d ed., 1963. —xv, 507 pp. $7.95.

As alive as though it were yesterday is the memory of my generation of those tense days in 1938 when Prime Minister Chamberlain flew to Munich to settle with Hitler the fate of Czechoslovakia. There were those in and out of public life in the Western democracies who thought the Prime Minister's pleas were humiliating, and the resultant agreement disastrous. They were convinced that the evil they faced could not be appeased; and that by yielding to Hitler then, the odds in the war that was being only briefly postponed would be much the worse. But except for this minority, all rejoiced. They wanted to believe that the accord was not merely a "tragic necessity." They let hope and desire persuade them that it would bring "peace in our time." The subsequent disappointment was all the sharper, and sense of betrayal all the angrier.

Few decisions have been so ardently argued about or kept so constantly in the scales of historical reappraisal. Of the many books and articles written about it, the two under review are the most comprehensive and admirable in the English language.

The one written by Wheeler-Bennett is a reissue—unrevised—of a work which justly earned great interest and praise when first published in 1948. The immense flow of additional information which has since poured out compels only minor corrections in his narrative. In the main, it confirms his facts, his impressions of personalities, and his interpretations of national policies. And in my opinion, corroborates, by and large, his judgments of the causes and consequences of the decision. His book still impresses as a masterly study in which concern for truth controls but does not dim intensely, and in which intimate knowledge of the scene and the men vivifies the narrative without distorting it.

Keith Eubank's book on Munich justifies his temerity in retelling a tale as ably told as it had been by Wheeler-Bennett. The method of presentation is more straight away, and its effect less dramatic. The style and language are more in the pedantic tradition, and the ardor flickers here and there while Wheeler-Bennett's blazes on every page. But it is excellent; careful and thorough in use of the source material, and absorbing in its abundant detail. On two elements in the tale of circumstances,

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causes and effects, his study supplies fullness lacking in Wheeler-Bennett's. One is his account of the course of the quarrel between the Czechoslovakian government and the Sudetenland Germans—incited by Hitler always to demand more than was offered. The other is his marshalled factual information about the military strength of the propagandists at the time of Munich.

The two authors differ somewhat in their treatment of Hitler's behavior. Wheeler-Bennett stresses the indications that Hitler had decided long before Munich to make war against Czechoslovakia. He avers that although gratified over what had been ceded to him at Munich without war, Hitler felt cheated because he was balked in his wish to smash Czechoslovakia by force, while the worried world quailed. Eubank does not seem to have grasped the insensate depths of Hitler's cruelty and lust for war.

Plainer is the difference in their judgment about the actions, tactics, and purposes of the Soviet government. Wheeler-Bennett appears to believe that the treaties of non-aggression and mutual assistance into which the Soviet government entered, though hedged, were inspired primarily by concern for its own security. He presumes that the several proposals it advanced for coordinated measures to deter or defeat Nazi Germany were genuinely meant—or at least as genuinely meant as those made by the British and French governments; and that the Soviet government would have made an honest effort to fulfill whatever obligations it assumed. He gives credence to the opinion that, as a consequence of the failure of Great Britain and France to oppose Hitler's earlier act of defiance and their rebuffs, the Soviet government grew contemptuous of their diplomacy and more and more inclined to think they were governed by the wish to deflect German aggression from themselves against the Soviet Union. While admitting that some of the participants in the decision were influenced by this inclination, Wheeler-Bennett, however, does not regard it as among the primary explanations of the Western course. Yet, his narrative leaves the impression that there was a measure of justification for Soviet resentment of the way in which Great Britain and France dealt with the crisis over Czechoslovakia.

Eubank implicity denies this inference. For in his appraisal, the Soviet initiatives and proposals were one and all deceptive. He regards them either as feints to test the intentions of Great Britain and France or efforts to embarrass them, or to propel them into war against Germany while it stood aside. His inspection of texts leads to the belief that the Soviet Union foresaw that every case of its offers to join in collective resistance

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would be rejected because of the conditions attached to them. Neither the factual evidence which he gives for this judgment nor his reasoning seem to me to prove this conclusion.

These two historians appear to agree that because it procured time to prepare for war, the Munich accord was of greater military advantage to Great Britain and France than to Germany. But this estimation is dubious. The relative improvement in their military situation and readiness made possible by the year of grace (or disgrace) did not compensate for their loss of Czechoslovakian defensive power and their dissipation of the possibility of Soviet cooperation. However, having been in London just before Chamberlain left for Munich, I am sure that in the summer of 1938 the heads of the British and French governments could not have stood fast against Hitler's threat of war because of the state of mind of their people—their deep aversion to war and their general belief that the issue was neither clear nor vital enough. In this sense, it was a "tragic necessity."

HERBERT FEIS

YORK, MAINE

The Right in France, 1890–1919, Three Studies (St. Antony's Papers No. 13). Edited by D. M. SHAPIRO. Carbondale, Ill., Southern Illinois University Press, 1962.—144 pp. $3.50.

This short book analyzes in three well documented studies a period that marks the turning point in the political life of the Third Republic; in that period the "social question" came to take precedence over the issue of the regime and led former monarchists to the slow and grudging acceptance of the Republic.

The introduction thus states the dilemma of the Rightists:

> If they indulged to the full their political preferences they could not but aid the subversion of the social and economic order that they wished to preserve; yet the preservation of that order seemed, at least in the period before the First World War, to entail supporting a political regime that they detested.

In tactical terms the choice was between "la politique du pire" and an opportunistic support of the government. Although there were oscillations between intransigence and compromise, the trend was toward conditional support of the regime. This trend started in Parliament with the Meline ministry from 1896 to 1898 that was supported by both the Right and the "Républicains de gouvernement." As David Shapiro points out in the first study, the coalition of Catholic Rightists and conservative

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Republicans could not be translated into an electoral pact in 1898, as electors were reluctant to give up their stereotyped political attitudes. Yes it is clear that, despite the Dreyfus affair that tended to polarize political forces, two factors, the "Ralliement" and especially the Socialist successes in the nineties, precipitated in time a breach in the clerico-monarchist front and the passage from intransigent opposition to qualified support of the regime. Anti-Republicanism came to yield to the demands for an effective anti-Socialist coalition—a trend that culminated in the "Bloc national" of 1919.

In the third study, "The Right and the Social Question in Parliament, 1905–1919," Malcolm Anderson shows that conservatism, rather than clericalism or nationalism, was the main concern of the Right. Parliamentary support could be given to Poincaré or Briand despite their anti-clericalism, especially when they showed adequate firmness against working-class agitation. By contrast Caillaux aroused passionate opposition by his dangerous advocacy of a "party of progress" that would unite Radicals and Socialists. To a growing number of Rightists the only sound strategy demanded the creation of a "party of order" that would rally all "patriotic" Radicals behind the grand coalition of anti-socialist forces.

This conservative reflex is clearly born out by D. R. Watson's study of the Nationalist movement in Paris when after 1900 the city passed from the control of the Left to that of Right. In complete contrast with Boulangism, which was supported by extreme Right and Left and rejected by the Center, the Nationalist movement then appealed essentially to the conservative middle classes, as the distribution of votes by *quartiers* indicates. Many Radicals abandoned their Socialist allies to join the Nationalists who, the author makes it clear, were motivated by their fear of Socialism rather than by their concern for France's security. Since nothing distinguished the "Ligue de la Patrie française" from the conservative groups, it is not surprising that the latter absorbed the Nationalist movement after 1906, while continuing to use the theme of nationalism that had proved its political usefulness.

In a brief introduction Mr. Shapiro argues that the evolution of the Right during this period militates against the traditional Right-Left interpretation of French politics and suggests the validity of a tripartite analysis. The three studies corroborate this interpretation without making it explicit. The reader may regret that a conclusion does not attempt to present a reinterpretation of the traditional Right-Left division in the light of the evidence presented in the book. But the overcautious histo-

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rian would probably argue that this is a task to be left to the overambitious political scientist.

CHARLES A. MICAUD

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER

Laval: A Biography. By HUBERT COLE. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963.—314 pp. $5.95.

Pierre Laval is a tempting subject for the biographer. Whatever one may think of him, he was not colorless; future generations, like his contemporaries, are likely to feel strongly for or against him. Besides, the elements of drama in his career are obvious: the rise from humble obscurity to wealth and influence, the leap into the limelight in a moment of national crisis, the tangled web of intrigue during the Vichy years, the final humiliation ending (some would say) in martyrdom.

Mr. Cole has managed rather well to avoid strong partisanship; he has sought to understand rather than to eulogize or condemn. Laval's basic weakness during the Vichy era, he believes, lay in his conviction that he alone could handle the Germans, whereas "in fact he completely misunderstood their character." His behavior reflected "sinful pride; arrogant self-confidence: this was a man who surely nurtured within himself the seeds of his own destruction." "He had courage and determination; . . . he was supremely disdainful of other people's opinions. But when argument advanced from reason to force he lacked the ruthlessness to face it. . . . His greatest self-deception was that a moderate man could guide a beaten country when all the world was at war." Yet Cole's portrait of Laval is on the whole more sympathetic than his portrait of Pétain, whose vain, evasive, and hypocritical behavior is allowed to speak for itself. Cole understands why Laval's career ended in ignominy, and at the stake; by implication he clearly sees this tragic end as evidence of the limitations of human justice.

Although Cole's book is subtitled "a biography," the great bulk of it is devoted to the Vichy years; Laval's long political career before 1940 receives rather sketchy treatment. This is regrettable, for there are aspects of his political and business life between the wars that deserve more thorough investigation. His associations and activities after his fall from power in 1936, for example, need to be clarified; a passing reference to his anti-Munich attitude only whets the appetite—as does the story (p. 81) that a personal agent of Stalin urged him to "take over" the Popular Front in order to reinforce the Franco-Russian tie.

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There are gaps even in the detailed account of the Vichy years; for example, Cole provides little new information on Laval's activities in Paris during his exclusion from power in 1941–42.

Perhaps because Cole is a literary man rather than a professional historian, he has not always resisted the temptation to embellish the drama inherent in his subject. His first chapter—a tense account of Laval's last hours and gruesome execution—is a case in point. Occasionally, too, his biases obtrude a bit: notably in his passing references to the Germans and to de Gaulle. ("The German is different. Whether raising one arm in salute or both in surrender, he will undertake the most solemn promises and keep them only as long as it suits him to do so.") Scholars will particularly regret Cole's decision not to document his account; one would like to know the sources of some of his anecdotes and assertions.

Although this is the first English-language biography of Laval, it is not likely to be the last. But until a better one comes along, Cole's book will serve as a thoughtful and generally fair-minded attempt to portray one of the most paradoxical and controversial figures of our time.

GORDON WRIGHT
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

The Early Goebbels Diaries, 1925–1926. Edited by HELMUT HEIBER. Trans. by Oliver Watson. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.—156 pp. $5.50.

The Struggle for Germany, 1914–1945. By LIONEL KOCHAN. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1963.—viii, 150 pp. $3.95.

Joseph Goebbels has interested students of National Socialism perhaps more than any of its leaders other than Adolf Hitler. Goebbels expected this interest in himself—he both shared and fed it. He kept a diary most of his adult life and published parts of it in suitably edited form. A complete text of the original appears to have fallen into Russian hands; only pieces came into Western custody. Excerpts from the 1942–43 fragments were edited by Louis Lochner soon after the war, but the 1925–26 fragment was merely quoted briefly in that edition. In 1961 Helmut Heiber published the full text (*Das Tagebuch von Joseph Goebbels 1925/26* [Stuttgart]), together with eighteen related documents. In this fairly adequate translation, a brief preface by Alan Bullock has been added, but most of Heiber's notes and a third of the documents have been omitted. The

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publisher has made up for these omissions, and for hiding the remaining footnotes, by quadrupling the price.

The diary is an important source on three aspects of National Socialism. It adds substantially to our knowledge of the struggle between the Strasser wing of the party and Hitler. It provides considerable detail on the development of the party organization in the years after Hitler's release from jail. Finally, it gives us a clearer picture of Goebbels himself. He was adept at lying to himself, while lying regularly to others. But pity he reserved to himself: his girl friends did not write often enough; the seats on the trains were too hard; he had trouble going to sleep. It is difficult to reconcile the adolescent character of the diary with the fact that it records Goebbels' twenty-eighth birthday. There can be no doubt of authenticity, however; the handwritten original is in the Hoover Institution.

It is difficult to understand the nature and purpose of Kochan's book. While it is supposed to be a history of the alternating phases in the conflict of Russia and the Western powers for the allegiance of Germany, the methodology is such as to raise serious questions about classifying the book as non-fiction. In a chronologically organized series of chapters, Kochan traces the competition for Germany that ends in partition. The account is annotated and documented in notes occupying a quarter of the total text.

Careful scholars will be warned by the introduction. Kochan frankly asserts (p. vii) that he has "used as much hindsight as possible" and that he "always attempted to read the past in the light of the present." Faced with the generally recognized discrepancy between intentions and consequences in history, Kochan attempts to understand consequences—in this instance the partition of Germany—by concentrating on whatever seemed to him "of practical importance"; in other words, whatever fits his scheme. The result is a construction in which bits of evidence, often lifted out of context, are arranged to illustrate a preconceived notion. When the sources cannot be made to fit, the events to which they testify are ignored. Because World War I peace efforts fit into the theory only after the Russian Revolution of March 1917, there were none before that time (p. 4). Since Germany must be shown to be "aligned" with the Western Powers in 1933–34 (p. 61), her departure from the League cannot be mentioned. To make the Treaty of Rapallo comparable with the Franco-Soviet and Czech-Soviet pacts of 1935, the provisions of these agreements must be passed in silence (p. 66). Americans will be surprised to learn that the Battle of the Bulge was merely

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a mirage of those who failed to understand that Germany was not fighting energetically on the Western Front (p. 95). When one leaves such general absurdities to examine specifics, the result is equally disturbing. The reviewer checked the sources listed for the assertions and quotations in the first full paragraph on page 17—they bear no discernible relationship to each other.

Hindsight can be useful to the historian, but not if used as an arbitrary tool for making facts conform to theories. The result of such manipulations, as Kochan's book exemplifies, is unlikely to make a substantial contribution to knowledge.

GERHARD L. WEINBERG

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised. By MARSHALL D. SHULMAN. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963.—vi, 320 pp. $6.50.

The Soviet Union at the United Nations. By ALEXANDER DALLIN. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—viii, 244 pp. $5.75.

Professor Shulman's study is focused on a short, but vital, period of Soviet foreign policy: from the spring of 1949 until the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952. His object was to subject to the critical scrutiny of meticulous scholarship the popularly held view, often fostered for obvious political purposes, that it was Stalin's death alone which precipitated all the changes that have taken place in the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet leaders. One may perhaps be forgiven for remarking that so obvious a fallacy scarcely needed exploding, among scholars at all events. But Professor Shulman's study is important in many more respects than in providing this corrective to the delusions of some politicians and newspapermen, and it would be a pity if this were the only lesson to be drawn from it. In fact, this study may well come to be recognized as a significant contribution to our understanding of the kind of factors which do and do not influence the Soviet Union in planning its foreign relations. Among those which do not may be mentioned ideology—except to the limited extent that a belief in the historical rightness of their destiny or in the divine right of an ultimately Communist party-dominated world may serve to sustain Soviet leaders at times when retreat becomes necessary. Otherwise it is difficult to discern in this almost day-to-day study of the changes in Soviet tactics, in which the predominant influence is above all a recognition of realities, any part played by Marxist abstrac-

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tions, otherwise than as a conventional cloak for power considerations. What is equally clear is that modifications in Soviet policy were brought about as the result of a realistic assessment of the balance of material strength between the communist world and the United States and its allies. Conciliatory moves from the Western side were effective only to the extent that they spurred the Soviet leaders on to greater effort to drive wedges between the members of NATO, and to exploit to the utmost the areas of potential weakness in the alliance.

The dominant feature of this period of Soviet foreign policy was the continuing weakness of the Soviet Union in the balance of material and military power. Between 1946 and 1949 what looked like a revival of the world revolutionary drive should be seen as an attempt to hold, as far as was possible, the gains of the Red Army since 1939 in the face of anticipated action by the United States, which was now involved in Western Europe. (Perhaps the moral of this is, though Professor Shulman does not draw it, that the policy of "commitment" was misconceived, and that a policy of "liberation"—at that date—might have been successful.) After 1949, with the failure of the Berlin Blockade and the consolidation of the NATO alliance the position became stabilized—indeed Soviet militancy had decisively contributed to the stabilization. The prime Soviet need, therefore, was to relax the tension and to try to the utmost by political and economic means to weaken the alliance which had formed, and to divide the United States from its allies. Professor Shulman's detailed study—based on little known material—of the Peace Movement, and in particular of the key part played in it by the French Communist party and the Left in France, is perhaps the most valuable and original part of his book. But the Peace Movement was only a political holding action; the vital aim, from the Soviet point of view, was to build up as fast as possible the industrial and nuclear base which was designed to give the U.S.S.R. a superiority over the United States. This was not in fact achieved until 1957. Professor Shulman does not suggest that Soviet policy since 1957 is mainly a continuation of the strategy evolved by Stalin. New factors have emerged since then of imponderable consequences—the breach with China, with its disastrous effects on the world Communist movement, the enormous advances in nuclear and military potential achieved by the United States, the pressing domestic problem (which Stalin could ignore) of the Soviet consumer, and others. But Professor Shulman maintains, with the logic and meticulous regard for evidence which always distinguish him, that, viewed in the perspective of the decade

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which has since elapsed, the foundation of present Soviet foreign policy was laid between 1949 and 1952. This consisted of the recognition that world balance of material power would henceforth be dominated by the confrontation of the two principal military powers, the United States and the Soviet Union; and that the promotion of social change would henceforth have to be subordinated to this fact of life.

That the United Nations should, from the Soviet point of view, be merely one factor in the overall strategy of political warfare, must be clear enough by now to anyone with an open mind. Professor Dallin's valuable and penetrating new study shows this clearly enough, with the wealth of detail and scholarship that one now expects from him. So long as the Soviet Union remains committed, as it is still committed, to its policy of ultimate all-out victory, there would seem to be little hope of any real and lasting acceptance by the Soviet Union of the principles of international legal order. But international relations are never as clear cut as they seem. Even to the Soviet Union the existence of an international organ of cooperation may provide the escape from an impasse. At all events, what has happened since Professor Dallin closed his account does not suggest that the Soviet Union is anxious to pursue the wrecking tactics which the suggestion of the *troika* put forward in 1960 entailed. One criticism: this book would be more useful if it had been provided with an index.

LEONARD SCHAPIRO

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism. By SAMUEL H. BARON. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1963. —x, 400 pp. $8.50.

This is a major book on a major subject. Professor Baron's study constitutes a rich, full, and thorough intellectual and political biography of Georgii Valentinovich Plekhanov, the redoubtable "father of Russian Marxism." Perhaps surprisingly, no camparable up-to-date work on Plekhanov exists in any language, making the present volume particularly useful and important. The author follows his hero through life, combining in a skillful, if conventional, manner sections on the flow of events with those on the evolution of Plekhanov's thought. Much less interesting are the fortunately brief summaries meant to provide the minimal background information for a reader who knows no Russian history. After his "formative years,"

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Plekhanov emerges as a *narodnik* who, however, after an active and disappointing theoretical and practical participation in the movement makes the crucial transition "from populism to Marxism." The following chapters are devoted to the Emancipation of Labor Group and to such other aspects of Plekhanov's radical activities and thought as his struggle against revisionism, his struggle against economism, and his work "in harness with Lenin." "1905: testing time" marked, as Professor Baron emphasizes, the failure of Plekhanov's revolutionary scheme for Russia and, in effect, of his entire "orthodox Marxist" ideology. The period between 1905 and 1917 is covered in two sizable chapters dealing with their subject's evolution "from politics to scholarship" and "from internationalism to nationalism." The book concludes with a tragic account of "1917: the prophet rejected." There is a preface, a table of contents, notes relegated to the back of the volume, a bibliography, an index, and a section of excellent illustrations.

Professor Baron's *Plekhanov* deserves commendation on many counts. In addition to the painstaking and massive research and the precise and lucid narration, there is the judiciousness and restraint of a scholar, but also empathy with the subject. It is this last quality that makes the author follow with understanding and sympathy Plekhanov's interminable ideological ratiocinations and political and personal quarrels. And it is also this empathy that time and again makes Plekhanov suddenly become human and close to the reader in a biography where the personal element is underplayed.

Still, Professor Baron's *Plekhanov* is not entirely convincing. For one thing, the author may well be exaggerating his hero's stature and contribution as historian, literary critic, and in general as intellectual at large. More important, Professor Baron's interpretation of Plekhanov's role within Marxism also seems too charitable. Not that criticism is absent, either in small matters or in large ones. Indeed, the author argues that Plekhanov failed because of his inflexibility, because his rigidly orthodox Marxism would not take into account the changing economic and social scene. Both Bernstein and Lenin proved to be more realistic in their opposite ways. Nevertheless, this formulation of the issue makes Plekhanov—except, of course, for his last unexplained and possibly inexplicable "defensist" years—the true Marxist and even the arbiter of Marxism. This was Plekhanov's view of himself, but it appears too sweeping and simple as a critical evaluation. In addition, Professor Baron does not make sufficient allowance for Plekhanov's compulsive, authoritarian personality and vicious temper. The outbreaks of rage of "the

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father of Russian Marxism" are presented more as occasional episodes which spoiled this or that relationship than as part of a destructive personality which did so much to isolate Plekhanov from other radicals and which found an abiding reflection in his attitudes and beliefs.

But, in spite of these and other possible criticisms, this is a good and valuable book.

NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Poland, 1944–1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People. By RICHARD F. STAAR. Baton Rouge, La., Louisiana State University Press, 1962.–xviii, 300 pp. $7.50.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. It suggests a chronological history of Poland during the indicated time span, but in fact introduces a strictly compartmentalized description of various governmental and public institutions of contemporary Poland. Analytically dividing his book into four parts (Governmental Dynamics, Communist Policies, The Ruling Party, Pressure Groups), Professor Staar proves himself an indefatigable enthusiast for "organizational anatomy," for charts, tables, maps, statistics, and the like, while simultaneously demonstrating a reluctance to engage in fundamental political analysis and policy investigation. As a result, the book has become a reference work in which the interested student can look up such facts, dates, names, and statistics as he may, from time to time, require for his own research work, but in which he will not–alas–find an adequate explanation of why or how anything in Poland is or has become what it is. For example, on pages 74–78 Professor Staar gives a description of the Polish Communist party between the two world wars which is so cluttered with names and so lacking in analysis of the problems which at that time confronted the party, that the result is confusion, especially since no attempt is made to explain the criteria by which the distinction between "left" and "right" Communists was drawn. Or again, the statistically-detailed description of the government's fiscal and monetary and social policies which begins on page 98 simply fails to convey anything but boredom to the reader thanks to Professor Staar's adamant refusal to engage in any *analysis* of the *politics* of these policies. On occasion, Professor Staar's passion for statistical data leads him into seeming naïveté. Thus he complains that he was unable to determine exactly how much Poland spends for military purposes because "many items are

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concealed under various ministries other than National Defense" (p. 133). But Poland is hardly exceptional in thus "hiding" its defense expenditures. It is, finally, a thousand pities that Professor Staar devotes an entire chapter to Polish youth but shuns any discussion of its morale, aspirations, expectations, or politics. Here, as throughout the book, the author's concentration is exclusively on statistics and organizational structures to the exclusion of political or social dynamics.

Having now sufficiently deplored this reluctance to analyze and to interpret, this reviewer must, in turn, express his debt to Professor Staar for collecting and presenting so much raw material, some of which is new (in English) and much of which is fascinating. Particularly interesting are Chapters 8 (Policies for Defense) and 15 (The Anti-Church Movements), as well as the biographical profiles of some leading Polish Communists (pp. 179–88, 199–203). In addition, there are frequent isolated facts which are presented *en passant* but which invite reflection. For example: the black market accounts for approximately fifteen per cent of domestic trade (p. 6); Polish industrial workers spend 47.4 per cent of their income on food in contrast to twenty-four per cent for American workers (p. 99); Polish per capita consumption of liquor has tripled from one liter annually before the war to 3.11 liters in 1953 and continues to mount (p. 99); at the Zeran automobile plant it requires 270 man hours to produce one car whereas the Renault works in Paris need but sixty man hours (p. 100); in April 1960 the Secretariat of the Central Committee issued elaborate instructions for protecting those who criticize bureaucrats in letters of complaint to newspapers from revenge by these same functionaries (p. 207).

One item presented by Professor Staar is particularly interesting and one regrets his inability to document it categorically and beyond doubt. This refers to a reported complaint by the Warsaw Pact headquarters to the Polish authorities that the political education of Polish army troops was reputedly too nationalistic and tended to inculcate a "formal, insincere, and even unwilling" attitude toward the U.S.S.R. (p. 136).

There are a number of political assertions sprinkled throughout this book which are open to challenge. References to the alleged increasing isolation of the Polish public from contacts with the West (pp. 7, 107) seem dubious, as does the claim that the Rapacki Plan for de-nuclearization in Central Europe is merely a Polish screen for a Soviet initiative (p. 108). Nor is it quite true that in Poland the Communist party possesses "total control over the press . . ." (p. 2). It is equally an abuse of rhetoric to write that the United States has, since 1957, "sub-

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sidized communism" in Poland with loans totalling $487 million through May 1962 (p. 117). Where, furthermore, is the evidence justifying Professor Staar's suggestion (p. 140) that Polish youth is less averse to war than its elders or his strong implication (pp. 268–69) that the Communist regime *prefers* children in state schools to be dirty and lice-ridden? Finally, this reviewer finds quite over-simplified Professor Staar's attempt to attribute the post-1958 retightening of political controls in Poland to an alleged preference on Gomulka's part for Muscovite over native Communists. Surely Gomulka's political record of the years 1943–48 and 1956–57 is such as to render highly implausible Professor Staar's suggestion that Gomulka's reputed commitment to Polish nationalism is a "myth" (p. 203).

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Enterprise of a Free People: Aspects of Economic Development in New York State During the Canal Period, 1792–1838. By NATHAN MILLER. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press for the American Historical Association, 1962.—xv, 293 pp. $6.00.

This is a perceptive and extremely well written study of the sources and uses of the New York State Canal Fund. The title seems to refer to one of the conclusions of the study, which is that there were no objections in principle on the part of any group of importance in the state to the utilization of the Canal Fund for many kinds of intervention in the economy—some of which were for developmental purposes. In this respect, Miller confirms for New York what the work of the past decade by Goodrich, Handlin, Hartz, Heath, and others has so decisively proven for other states and for the country as a whole during the ante-bellum period. The principal contribution of the book, however, is its surprising account of the early sources of finance for the Erie and Champlain Canals and its even more surprising description of the multifarious uses to which the Canal Fund was put.

Professor Miller's research reveals that in the period of greatest uncertainty, when construction of the Erie had just begun, the Canal bonds were bought for the most part in small amounts by local businessmen. Only after 1821, when the success of the project was far more certain, did the wealthy professional investors enter the market, to be followed in short order by the foreign investors who finally accumulated the bulk of the bonds.

The problem of what to do with the Canal Fund was the

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product of the unprecedented success of the Erie. Unwilling to pay large premiums to retire the bonds, the Canal commissioners had to find a profitable field for the rapidly accumulating funds. A bill to permit the lending of the funds to the banks was pushed through by western legislators against the opposition of the capital-surplus eastern and southern areas of the state. The commissioners distributed their loans to some degree in accordance with local developmental needs, and the smaller western banks became heavily dependent upon them. Subsequently, the Canal Fund was used in many other ways: to support the banks in the 1834 struggle with the Bank of the United States, to aid New York City after the great fire of 1835, and to aid the banks and maintain the credit of the state in the Panic of 1837.

These discoveries help to place the great nineteenth-century transportation innovations in a context quite different from the customary Schumpeterian one. For they were hardly the work merely of one or a few "innovators." Just as the decision to construct the Erie received a crucial impetus from large numbers of burgeoning businessmen, particularly in the western part of the state, so, too, was the early financing of the Erie and the utilization of the Canal Fund, as well as the rapid development of the state on the basis of the canal, a product of the optimism, farsightedness, and political autonomy of large numbers of smaller men. The title then is justified in still another sense: success depended upon the enterprise of a significant proportion of a free people.

JULIUS RUBIN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference. By CALVIN DEARMOND DAVIS. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1962.—xii, 236 pp. $5.00.

This study, winner of the 1961 Albert J. Beveridge Award of the American Historical Association, is concerned with "a strange duality" which marked American foreign policy at the close of the nineteenth century. While pursuing national interest, wherever it led, even along an aggressive imperialist path, the United States at the same time advocated peaceful arbitration of international disputes. These two themes of foreign policy, which came to a focus in the First Hague Peace Conference, are examined by Professor Davis in detail.

On the discussion of the reduction of the burden of armaments, for which Czar Nicholas II issued his famous rescript,

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the declarations and recommendations of the conference, and the hyprocisy of all the great powers, including the United States, the author makes no new revelations. While drawing heavily from published sources on the subject, he also examined the personal papers of four members of the American delegations: Frederick W. Holls, Andrew D. White, Captain Alfred T. Mahan, and Seth Low, as well as the correspondence of other personages who had some official relation to the conference, as did President McKinley, or who directed a cynical eye on the proceedings at The Hague, as did Theodore Roosevelt and Whitelaw Reid. This reviewer cannot agree with Mr. Davis that "by conspicuous participation in the First Hague Conference," the United States "claimed leadership as an advocate of international peace" (p. 2). Not until Woodrow Wilson journeyed to Paris in 1918 was this true.

The role of the American delegates in the promotion of arbitration is the important feature of the study and this is the area in which Professor Davis makes his contribution. When their recommendation for a permanent court was not well received, they supported a British plan for a panel of jurisconsults from which parties to arbitration could make selections. When this proposal was threatened by German opposition, Frederick W. Holls, secretary of the American delegation, and Philipp Zorn, a German delegate, went to Berlin in an effort to modify policy there. Germany withdrew her opposition to an international tribunal, but insisted that there could be no compulsory arbitration. The United States also had reservations. Captain Mahan interjected the Monroe Doctrine, which was finally protected by a declaration that prevented the construing of anything in the convention "to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions" (p. 179). This reservation weakened the Permanent Court of Arbitration which we had supported.

Professor Davis sadly concludes (p. 213)

> that the First Hague Peace Conference achieved little in the way of progress for humanity. . . . Dreams of empire prevailed over international law and a permanent court, and the conventions and declarations at The Hague in 1899 and later agreements based upon those documents were paper achievements—masks concealing failure.

This conclusion, already arrived at by several other writers, hardly warranted the extensive research and brilliant effort of Mr. Davis. Nevertheless, he has spelled out and placed in true perspective the role of the United States at the First Hague Con-

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ference and indicated that while she advocated peace and arbitration, some of her statesmen—if not as vocal—were as cynical as Europeans on these subjects.

MERZE TATE

HOWARD UNIVERSITY

The Future of Federalism. By NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962.—83 pp. $2.75.

Comparative Federalism: States' Rights and National Power. By EDWARD MCWHINNEY. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962.—ix, 103 pp. $5.00.

It is a major thesis of Governor Rockefeller, in these Godkin lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1962, that the preservation of states' rights depends upon the exercise of states' responsibilities. The Governor's recital of the recent accomplishments of the states, particularly those of New York, is impressive; but still one cannot escape the feeling that in making the usual ritualistic obeisance to states' rights, now expected of presidential aspirants, particularly Republican aspirants, he has stretched his case a bit. Nevertheless, there is much good sense in these lectures, and political expediency, too, for standing foursquare for states' rights gratifies the conservatives, while pioneering constructive new ventures in state government attracts the liberals. (However, the Governor would not be pleased with this breakdown into "conservatives" and "liberals," for he believes strongly that this represents an unrealistic classification.)

Most of the Governor's illustrations of the vitality of the states come from New York, and the others from a few equally urban states. But today, even in the advanced industrial and urban states, the most significant and pervasive social measures affecting individual citizens are federal or dependent on federal aid. Governor Rockefeller points to the social experiments by the states prior to the New Deal, and he cites social security as one of them, but state social security was peripheral, and it still is. Since the New Deal it has been the federal government which has been the pace-setter; even the state fair-employment statutes were suggested by federal directives.

Most of what the Governor has to say is irrelevant for the old one-party, legislatively malapportioned, non-industrial or semi-industrial states. These states are dominated by well-to-do rural and small-town legislators, neglect and exploit their cities, and would not have the services provided by federal grants-in-aid,

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even if they could afford them, were it not for the federal bounties. The less prosperous farmers, organized labor, the minority groups, and the urban areas of these states are more democratically represented in Washington than in their state capitals. The budgets of these states have increased greatly in recent years, but this is largely because of the rocketing costs of maintaining and expanding the *traditional* functions.

Professor McWhinney's study is a richly suggestive examination of judicial review in the federal systems of the United States, Canada, and West Germany with special reference to judicial activism and restraint; national or state security and civil liberties; states' rights, minority rights, and the limits of unity and diversity; and how far the federal treaty and foreign-affairs power reaches in its internal, domestic law aspects, matters which in the absence of the treaty or foreign-affairs power would not be within the national scope. It is held that, despite their complexities and differences in detail, these three federal systems work effectively because of a non-doctrinaire, pragmatic, realistic spirit (operating in their political processes and now consciously motivating their judiciaries) of give and take, comity, cooperation, and compromise. But this question naturally follows: Apart from their procedures, how do mature federal systems operating in this fashion differ significantly in their actual effects from unitary systems which provide large measures of self-government for their intermediate and local districts?

Both Governor Rockefeller and Professor McWhinney point to the vitality of the federal idea in today's burgeoning regional and supranational organizations. Professor McWhinney cautions new nations, able to make a start toward unity without resort to federalism, that in the beginning they will find in the unitary system greater facility for overall economic and social planning, from the center, in the interest of accelerating industrial and national growth. Incidentally, this is a reminder of Lord Bryce's observation that federalism is merely a transient governmental form on the way to unity, something the opponents of our own Constitution of 1787 knew full well, except for "unity" they would have substituted the word "centralization."

WILLIAM G. CARLETON

THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

The United States in World Affairs, 1962. Edited by RICHARD P. STEBBINS. New York, Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1963.—xi, 429 pp. $6.95.

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Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962. Edited by RICHARD P. STEBBINS. New York, Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1963.—xxiv, 550 pp. $7.50.

"We were very close—very, very close—to a thermonuclear war," said Soviet Premier Khrushchev after the Soviet-American confrontation in Cuba late in 1962. This episode might well be cited to illustrate Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's judgment that "Either democracy is less bumbling than we fear, or communism is less efficient than it claims." In any case, the Cuban issue dominated the diplomatic scene during 1962. Not unexpectedly, it likewise emerges as the dominant issue in the Council on Foreign Relations' annual review of American foreign policy. The Soviet-American encounter in Cuba, along with lesser crises and sources of tension witnessed on the Sino-Indian border, in Laos, in South Vietnam, in Indonesian claims to "West Irian," in the birth pangs of an independent Algeria, in ongoing efforts to stabilize the Congo, and in controversies within the Western alliance, were sufficient to introduce during 1962 what the survey calls "the possibility of major changes in the relationship among the leading world powers."

In the chronological account and the *Documents,* information on major international developments for the year encompassed is presented clearly, logically, and in general as objectively as the student of foreign relations is likely to encounter in any discussion of contemporary events. Under Mr. Stebbins' editorship, both volumes continue to maintain the high tradition the reader has come to expect of these two series. Scholar and layman alike could scarcely find better sources for beginning research on selected aspects of American foreign relations than these companion volumes.

Particularly noteworthy in the survey for 1962 is the treatment accorded to two areas of policy about which American understanding tends to remain inadequate. One of these is Latin America. The annual review, together with the documentary materials offered, provides useful, not to say disturbing, insight into the chronic difficulties besetting the Alliance for Progress. The reader is likely to be left with the feeling that obstacles to genuine progress in Latin America are much more formidable than he had previously supposed. The other area is foreign economic policy, the intricacies of which are often prone to baffle the scholar who lacks a background in economics, fully as much as the layman. The survey's presentation of the elements in the balance of payments problem, for instance, is a model of lucid handling of a highly complex subject.

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As with every installment of the annual survey, the reviewer will discover a few instances in which the treatment fails to measure up to the overall standard of excellence usually maintained. Inevitably, these lapses will seem particularly pronounced in the treatment of subjects about which the reviewer himself has some competence.

Take the survey's discussion of the Sino-Indian crisis in the Himalayas. We are told that the Chinese attack "dramatized the hollowness of the 'nonaligned' position," that it made "clear . . . that nonalignment . . . offered no real protection against a predatory neighbor" and that the reactions of other non-aligned states to India's plight was "disappointing." Such statements are either factually incorrect, or they convey misleading implications. As for the "hollowness" of non-alignment, for instance, neither Nehru's government, nor any other non-aligned state, has *abandoned* the doctrine since the Himalayan episode. Indeed, officials from such countries have told this reviewer that they see even more compelling reasons since the crisis than before for remaining diplomatically or militarily uncommitted to East or West. What may be even more significant, officials of the Kennedy administration have several times stated publicly that Washington did not *want* New Delhi to forsake non-alignment. Similarly, the editors of the survey would be hard put to document the contention that after the crisis Nehru of India voiced "his disagreement with the United States on most of the key issues of international politics." Indeed, it is doubtful that a gulf as vast as this statement suggests has *ever* separated Indian and American policy.

As always, the collection of documentary materials issued as a companion volume to the annual review of American relations is extraordinarily useful, particularly as a boon to researchers. The selections in almost all instances are timely, pertinent, and varied, in their inclusion of everything from the texts of disarmament proposals and diplomatic notes to speeches by American officials on both broad and specific aspects of foreign relations.

CECIL V. CRABB JR.

VASSAR COLLEGE

Black Nationalism. By E. H. ESSIEN-UDOM. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962.—xv, 367 pp. $6.95.

Now that Americans are diligently studying all the obscure areas of the world, it was to be expected that we become fair

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game ourselves. *Black Nationalism* is a study of the Black Muslims in the United States by a young Nigerian political scientist —and a good study it is. Mr. Essien-Udom combines the right degree of involvement and detachment to give us very sober insight into an important social movement. He has managed to secure considerable access to the organization and has used it well.

Much of the book is inevitably taken up with the sheer ethnographic description of the history and characteristics of the Nation of Islam, as it is formally called, and of its leader, Elijah Muhammed. But the author does not stop there. He seeks to describe what functions such a movement plays in the contemporary American scene. To this end, he attempted to use survey techniques, but could not get cooperation from the authorities of the movement, partly because of the "lack of appreciation of the 'scientific' value of the information they would provide" and partly because of "their deep-seated suspicion of the outsider." Nevertheless, he was able to have depth interviews with some sixteen members and to obtain "indirectly" data on membership and finances, which data he believes to be "reasonably accurate" after "checking and cross-checking."

Essien-Udom basically regards the movement as one of lower-class Negroes with middle-class aspirations, who feel these aspirations can only be achieved in the present American opportunity structure by this mildly deviant route. It is "a search for identity in America," as the subtitle reads.

The movement appeals primarily to those lower-class Negroes who are uneducated and living in northern cities. Their social situation is "desperate." "Their life is devoid of meaning and purpose. They are estranged from the larger society which they seek to enter, but which rejects them." For some of these people—Essien-Udom emphasizes that black nationalism is not actively supported by the Negro masses and is an "atypical Negro orientation"—the Nation of Islam points a way out.

It is not an easy way, however. It is a way only for "those who have the capacity and motivation for developing character through self-discipline, hard-work, and individual sense of responsibility." The Muslims lead an austere life and their values are those of the Victorian middle class. Among the taboo activities, of which there is a long list, are the use of narcotics, abusing one's wife, lying, adultery, and "gossiping with one another."

In these attributes, the Nation of Islam is quite comparable to the many syncretistic cults that have arisen in the colonial situation throughout the world. The role of the prophet, too, is

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similar. Muhammed sees himself as "first and foremost, a reformer" of the mores of his own community, for he is convinced that "the chief obstacle to be overcome is the 'mentality' of the masses of Negroes." Far from being somewhat frenetic purveyors of violence, the Black Muslims appear in this book as sustainers of the civic order. For them it is the threat of counter-violence rather than its original use that is of importance. It is a threat they clearly, even desperately, hope never to have to fulfill.

Muhammed's answer to the cultural alienation and social estrangement of the urban Negro masses is to insist on substantive rather than formal freedom. But he sees substantive freedom as self-bestowed, which can only be done by people who, in Essien-Udom's words, are "prepared to help themselves and make the sacrifices necessary for its attainment." This is why, for Essien-Udom, it is a gross oversimplification to think of this as a wholly anti-white movement. Rather, "properly conceived, it is uncompromisingly anti-lower-class Negro values, anti-Negro middle-class complacency and opportunism, and anti-white paternalism and injustice."

His closing note is to warn us against the danger of self-fulfilling alarmist prophecies, for, as he early notes, "it may be said that black nationalism is a tortuous route to social mobility, recognition and status or a spurious way by which black nationalists seek to gain a sense of identity and membership in American society."

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers, 1928–1958. By OWEN LATTIMORE. London, Oxford University Press, 1962. —565 pp. $12.00.

Owen Lattimore is among the most provocative thinkers, and is surely one of the most prolific writers, on the American intellectual scene. Widely read and widely traveled, his scholarly interests range from ethnology and historical geography through social history and international politics. As editor of *Pacific Affairs* from 1933 to 1941 he made it an outstanding journal of scholarship and opinion about Eastern Asia. The incomplete list of his publications at the back of this volume shows fourteen books, twelve chapters in other works, and 152 articles in learned and popular journals.

Lattimore's central scholarly interest was defined in his most

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important book, *The Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, published in 1940. Before that date he had worked, studied, and traveled for years in North China, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Seven of his other books deal with these frontier regions. In the volume under review he reproduces twenty-nine articles he evidently considered important or representative, and this is valuable since they originally appeared in a great variety of journals and other books. The articles are grouped under six topical headings and thereunder arranged chronologically. As might be expected with such an assemblage, written over thirty years, the quality of the work is uneven and there is much repetition. Unfortunately the book is inadequately indexed and poorly proofread.

The articles fall into three categories. One is the descriptive account of a region or people known to the author through his travels. The longest essay is an ethnographic report, "The Gold Tribe, 'Fishskin Tartars' of the Lower Sungari" (1933), which expands the field notes and journal Lattimore kept during a few days travel among these vanishing people. Another of this type is a lecture given in 1928 before the Royal Geographic Society in London on "Caravan Routes in Inner Asia." In this the youthful Lattimore recounted his observations during a four-month trek from railhead at Kweihwa in Suiyuan to Kuchengtze in Sinkiang, a distance of some 1,500 miles which he traveled with two Chinese and nine camels by a dangerous and little-used route. The articles of this sort have coherence and lasting usefulness.

A second type reflects Lattimore's interest in the relations between Chinese and non-Chinese, a persistent theme in this book. "The Chinese as a Dominant Race" (1928) is a penetrating account of how the Chinese minority maintained its rule in Sinkiang. "On the Wickedness of Being Nomads," published in a Chinese journal in 1935, lectures the Chinese on their treatment of Mongols in Inner Mongolia, whom, he believes, they should have been courting in an alliance against the Japanese rather than submerging in the attempt to "civilize."

A third type of writing, to which Lattimore becomes increasingly devoted, is the generalizing article. He can throw off hypotheses as easily as a blacksmith flashing out sparks from his anvil. In generalizing he roams all over Europe and Asia from antiquity to the present. For example, in "Inner Asian Frontiers: Defensive Empires and Conquest Empires" (1957) he summarizes the interrelations between the civilizations of China, India, Iran, and the Greco-Roman world on the one hand and

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the "barbarian" peoples to the north on the other, and compares British, Chinese, and Russian types of empire-building. This is a rather wide field. "Satellite Politics: the Mongolian Prototype" is disappointing: it suggests an important subject for political science inquiry but gets bogged down in controversy. Lattimore handled the subject better in several chapters of his book, *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia* (Leiden, 1955).

The most engaging part of this book to me is the preface, the autobiography of a scholar's career. At times amusing and at times sharply critical of American academic life, it is a reflective account of the successes and adversities as well as the intellectual development of a courageous and very interesting man.

C. MARTIN WILBUR

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Indonesian Communism: A History. By ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.—xvi, 336 pp. $6.50.

The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. By HERBERT FEITH. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1962. —xx, 618 pp. $8.75.

In these two volumes Brackman and Feith analyze the tortuous political path which Indonesia has followed since independence, an era during which that country has experienced political and economic changes of major proportions. This period has seen the end of constitutional democracy, establishment of President Sukarno's own brand of guided democracy, and the creation of the delicate balance between army and communism with Sukarno as the balancer. Concomitant with these developments has been the decline in civil liberties, detention of leaders such as Soetan Sjahrir, elimination of effective party control, outlawing of the two major parties opposing Sukarno (the Masjumi and Socialists) and the appearance of *de facto* decentralization. Within a single decade the Communist party (PKI) had recovered from its abortive attempt to overthrow the government in 1948 and rose from 7,910 members to two million. It now stands as the largest Communist party outside the Iron Curtain and claims front organizations with a total membership of over ten million. Meanwhile, the economy of the country has floundered as exports have suffered due to mismanagement, revolts, and smuggling; Dutch and Chinese businessmen have been forced out; and the rupiah has jumped from its original eleven to the

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U. S. dollar to between 1,000 and 1,800. Neither author considers that this trend was necessarily irreversible during this period.

Brackman's history begins at the time of World War I and is an effort to review the tangled policies, frequent mistakes, and recent expansion of the Indonesian Communist party. Feith's book is more restricted in time, emphasizing the period from full independence in 1949 to the fall of the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet in March 1957. Within that era he provides both a political history and an analysis of the political and social setting. Feith also bases his study on long personal observation, combined with very thorough use of Indonesian materials and the research of the Cornell Modern Indonesia project. Within their separate frameworks the two authors display quite different emphases in method and outlook, although in many ways the books complement one another and together help to round out the picture of recent Indonesian political history. Perhaps it should be stated at the outset that although Brackman's book is a generally good journalist's account, Feith's is the best and most balanced analysis of Indonesia's post-independence politics that I have seen.

The authors differ initially in their asserted values. While both appear personally wedded to constitutional democracy, Brackman continually emphasizes his support for Western democratic institutions in Indonesia, his strong dislike for the Communists, distrust of Sukarno, and admiration for the political ideals of Hatta and Sjahrir. He is often willing to generalize and editorialize in his remarks. Feith prefers the more scholarly approach, analyzing the events and what caused them without making value judgments of the type presented by Brackman. This is not to state that Feith does not make judgments, but they are generally of a different kind, based more upon the ability of political leaders to achieve specific goals and policies.

Secondly, the two books vary in the emphasis given different causative factors. Brackman tends to emphasize the role of personalities (particularly Sukarno's), organizations, and conspiracies, although he does not neglect other underlying causes. Feith stresses more the social, economic, and political milieu in which Indonesian politics operated. The most interesting and at the same time provocative sections of Feith's book are those in which he attempts either to present the interrelationship between environment and policy or to judge the attitudes of groups within the populace. Although this reviewer usually agrees with the author's analyses, he often finds little concrete evidence to support them.

Both books help to fill important gaps in our knowledge of

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Indonesia. Brackman's is the only complete history of the PKI other than Communist sources and Petrus Blumberger's classic prewar studies. We have long needed a full-scale political history of post-independence Indonesia. Feith has more than filled that need. The present Indonesian government is not likely to appreciate these books, or to allow them into the country for that matter. It is regrettable, for they would be helpful to the Indonesian as well as the Western layman and scholar.

FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

The Economics of Middle Eastern Oil. By CHARLES ISSAWI and MOHAMMED YEGANEH. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—xiv, 230 pp. $8.00.

Le Pétrole et les Economies Arabes. By NICOLAS SARKIS. Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1963.—x, 279 pp. 32, 40 F.

Ever since the publication, in 1952, of the Federal Trade Commission report, "The International Petroleum Cartel," opponents of the present institutional arrangements governing world oil operations have utilized the detailed evidence of the noncompetitive features of the world oil industry presented therein to reinforce their attacks on the existing structure. One would not expect representatives of the producing countries addressing the oil committee of the Arab League or a meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to offer an objective evaluation of the difficult policy issues plaguing the industry today. But none of these, not even the representative of the Soviet Union, ever attempted a more biased, one-sided and short-sighted exposition than Dr. Sarkis, whose thesis has the redoubtable sponsorship of the Faculty of Law and Economics of the University of Paris.

M. Sarkis contends, *inter alia,* that the oil companies constitute the sole survivors of an odious capitalism in a world ruled by state dirigism; that the freedom of action granted them under concessionary arrangements infringes upon the host countries' sovereignty; that the companies block the normal channels of economic development, keeping the majority of the population in poverty; and that the producing countries remain heavily dependent on the oil companies' home countries, chiefly Britain. Recent modifications in concession terms have ameliorated these conditions only slightly, he argues. A real solution is impossible

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unless and until all the Arab countries (including transit countries such as Egypt) unite in a common, supranational organization which would confront the companies with superior bargaining power. The terms on which oil is exported would then be negotiated directly between producing and importing countries under an international commodity agreement.

Whatever merits M. Sarkis' criticisms and policy suggestions might have had are completely negated, in the opinion of this reviewer, by his unbalanced presentation, emotional style, and numerous inaccuracies. Thus he completely ignores the role of the oil companies as a buffer between producing and consuming countries, the elimination of which would force every commercial issue—dealing with prices, production, investment decisions, and the like—into the political realm where it could quickly become a source of international friction. Experience with other commodity agreements hardly justifies the conclusion that political negotiations lead to results superior to those attained by market forces, even where these are admittedly far from perfect, unless the commercial mechanism has broken down completely. Major errors include attribution of General Eisenhower's 1952 election victory to the support of the oil cartel; repeated references to the activities of German, but not American, independent oil companies in the Middle East; and the complete omission of any discussion of inter-Arab political rivalries as an obstacle to united action on oil policy matters.

Professor Issawi of Columbia University and Dr. Yeganeh, United Nations economist, both happen to be of Middle Eastern background. But they take an approach diametrically opposed to that of M. Sarkis, limiting themselves to a strictly objective presentation and factual analysis of Middle East oil operations. Policy conclusions are entirely beyond their scope. The reader will find here a wealth of revealing, accurate, and up-to-date information relating to production and reserves in the Middle East and other major oil producing countries, comparative production costs, capital investment, rates of return, and the relative importance of oil to the economies of the producing countries. Many of these data, though not all, have been available to specialists from such sources as the Chase Manhattan Bank and oil company testimony before congressional committees, but they are here assembled for the first time in book form and thus likely to attract the attention of a much wider public.

The authors' efforts to be strictly neutral may leave even nonpartisan readers somewhat frustrated at times. Thus it is difficult to determine whether, in their opinion, the world oil industry continues to be dominated by the prewar cartel of seven (eight?)

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major companies. Likewise they refuse to comment on the charge that posted prices for Middle East crude have been unduly high in relation to costs of production, or to analyze the broader influence of the oil industry on the economies of producing countries. Neither is the study wholly free from error. One may, for example, question the assumption that company profits precisely equal government receipts, that the outlook for European coal is bright, or that natural gas from North Africa will play an important part in supplying the European energy market in the foreseeable future.

This is not a book that the average person, even if he has a strong interest in Middle Eastern affairs, will find fascinating to read or easy to digest. But the wealth of the factual material it presents and the sound, thorough, and objective analysis make it a valuable addition to the growing literature of world oil operations.

HELMUT J. FRANK

UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law. By EDGAR BODENHEIMER. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962.—xiv, 402 pp. $8.75.

Writing textbooks is an occupational disease among American academics and this book by Professor Bodenheimer is one of the latest manifestations of the malady. Intended, it would seem, to be used in courses which will "survey" the whole of Western jurisprudence in some thirty-odd classroom hours, the book leaves none of the traditional problems untouched. Part I is a "historical introduction," from Greek to contemporary thought; Part II is concerned with the "Nature and Function of Law"; Part III with "The Sources and Techniques of the Law." And all of this in four hundred pages!

The price of such a design is, of necessity, that the excitement, and the unsettling, untidy challenge of profound inquiry into a limited subject matter must be sacrificed to vague characterizations, neat summarizations, and pat "answers" to each and every problem which the history of jurisprudence has put forward. In the case of some writers, paying such a price might not be cause for concern; there is evidently a market for intellectual pap and some men are capable of nothing more. In Professor Bodenheimer's case, however, one knows this is not true and that he has sacrificed his considerable talents to an unworthy purpose. For despite the crippling limitations of its genre, the book ex-

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hibits its author's scholarship and reveals snatches of his intellectual fire.

One gets the sense that Professor Bodenheimer would really have liked to write a critical study of analytic jurisprudence. In the preface he says that most basic to his viewpoint is the "firm conviction that no jurisprudential treatise should bypass or ignore the burning questions connected with the achievement of justice in human relations, notwithstanding the difficulties encountered in any attempt to apply objective criteria in dealing with this subject" (p. viii). This is, of course, an oblique criticism of the analytic school; more direct attacks punctuate the entire book.

Professor Bodenheimer's chief sources of disagreement with the analytical school are two. In the first place, he challenges the endeavor of the analysts or positivists "to free legal theory from all qualifications or value judgments of a moral, political, social or economic nature" (pp. 101–02) and he argues that "no philosophical or sociological treatment of the law which refuses to face the question of the 'goodness' of the law in addition to that of its formal validity and technical organization can provide us with an adequate insight into legal reality" (p. 178). In the second place, he charges the analysts with subjectivism in morals—"legal positivists like Austin and Kelsen," he says, "relegated the problem of justice entirely to the nonlegal and wholly subjective domain of personal evaluation" (p. 212) and insists that "the notion of justice, as a specialized category belonging to the realm of ethics, is amenable to rational cognition" (p. 178).

His arguments on both these scores—necessarily truncated in this volume—seem weak and unconvincing. To say, as Kelsen has, that a legal norm is different from a moral norm is not to say that law develops free of moral influences, nor is it to say that students of law and politics should be unconcerned about whether laws are just. It is rather only to say that law as a complex social institution is not to be confused with the institution of morality and that a statute or legal judgment is different in its logical form from a moral commandment.

As for the contention that the analytic school of jurisprudence is wedded to moral subjectivism, it need only be pointed out that Austin, the founder of modern positivism in jurisprudence, was a utilitarian, hardly a subjectivist in morals. Furthermore, although some contemporary positivists—Kelsen, for one—are subjectivists, others—Hart, I believe—are not, and there is no theoretical or doctrinal reason why positivism in jurisprudence requires any commitment to a particular moral theory, whether objectivist or subjectivist.

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For what texts are worth, this is a good one. One is nevertheless compelled to ask—compelled in the interest of scholarship no less than in the interest of pedagogy—whether this text was necessary.

EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BOOK NOTES

The first comprehensive look at its subject, *The Man Bilbo* (Baton Rouge, La., Louisiana State University Press, 1963; xiii, 150 pp., $5.00) by A. Wigfall Green is also a scholarly dissection of an archetypal American demagogue. Professor Green relentlessly explores the backwoods Mississippi habitat from which Theodore Gilmore Bilbo rose to be elected Governor and three times U. S. Senator, fulfilling a friend's prophecy that he would become either a governor or a jailbird. From his early distortions about his education up to the final scandals that provoked the Senate's attempt to unseat him, the jailbird was the more in evidence. Rustic chicanery surrounded almost his every public act, and an atmosphere of *opéra bouffe,* heightened by noisy self-vindications, became a dependable part of the Bilbo repertoire. Professor Green attributes the strength of Bilbo's following to his belief in the politician's helping hand, unencumbered by principle: "Bilbo never really sought power for the sake of power; unlike his contemporary Huey Long, he never had dreams of occupying the White House. He wished only to represent a small group of his own people in his own state" (p. 124). And what is characteristically American in Bilbo's demagoguery is this conspicuous lack of pretension. Guided by naked pragmatic impulse, Bilbo was admittedly the author of numerous local benefactions, from better roads to better hospitals. But neither such handouts nor the oratory that steadily charmed rural audiences can disguise the deep-rooted amorality which made his name a symbol of one of the ugliest currents in American political life.—ANNETTE K. BAXTER, Barnard College.

The *Yearbook of World Affairs, 1962* (New York, under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs by Frederick

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A. Praeger, 1962; xv, 344 pp., $12.50), like its predecessors, contains a series of articles on a variety of subjects of contemporary concern and an extensive section devoted to the review of books appearing within the year dealing with the broadly social aspects of world affairs. For the scholar, this section is the most valuable part of the book. The articles are quite uneven in quality as is to be expected of publications of this kind. Sir Dermot Boyle's "Thoughts on the Nuclear Deterrent" is a brief, superficial, and not too convincing argument for an independent nuclear deterrent for Britain. Dr. A. Graber of the University of Chicago has contributed a thoughtful summary and analysis of "United States Intervention in Latin America." Dorothy Pickles' "France under General de Gaulle" is a concise, informed review of some of the major constitutional and policy issues of the year under the Fifth Republic. Mr. E. I. J. Rosenthal's article on "The Role of Islam in the Modern National State" is a readable and informing treatment of a subject which should have interest to generalists in the fields of international relations and comparative politics as well as the area specialists. Considering the extent to which questions of United Nations organization and activities (the Congo, for example) were in the center of public and scholarly interest during this period, it is surprising that no articles dealing with such matters are included.—LELAND M. GOODRICH, Columbia University.

A rather mixed bag of four essays for the general reader, this book—*Communist Economy Under Change: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Markets and Competition in Russia, Poland and Yugoslavia* (London, A. Deutsch for The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1963; xiii, 272 pp. 25s. net) by Margaret Miller, Teresa M. Piotrowicz, Ljubo Sirc, and Henry Smith—would live up better to its promise without the lengthy subtitle. After giving a concise history and description of Soviet economic institutions, Dr. Miller discusses, with the aid of much anecdotal material, "Markets in Russia." Her aim is to dispel the myth of a monolithic system and to emphasize the importance of "market influences." The last she understands so broadly as to comprise virtually all kinds of resource use outside or in violation of official directives (plans) and regulations: legal activities, such as peasants' private plots; self-serving illegal activities; and illicit or gray acts for officially approved purposes (for example, for plan fulfillment). Miss Piotrowicz's contribution is a balanced and, for the non-specialist, useful concise account of institutional developments in Poland since the war, emphasizing the rather

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limited and short-lived nature of the post-October reforms (outside agriculture). Dr. Sirc is primarily concerned with contesting Yugoslav economic achievements, using a free enterprise (capitalist) economy as his yardstick. Mr. Smith's essay is a confutation—familiar to readers of his *Economics of Socialism Reconsidered*—of the Marxian labor theory of value and of the communists' adherence to it. But probably not all readers will agree that this theoretical error is "at the foundation of the conflict" between East and West.—GREGORY GROSSMAN, University of California, Berkeley.

The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1962; 339 pp., 38 guilders) by D. Perman, a book on diplomatic history, covers a good deal of familiar territory. It is nevertheless a welcome contribution to the growing scholarly literature on East European history and politics. Meticulously researched and bountifully documented, it retells the circumstances that led to the creation of an independent Czechoslovak state and the difficulties that confronted the peacemakers of 1919 in delineating the new country's boundaries. The book has no new "thesis" to propound. The Czechoslovak state was the product of the skill of Masaryk and Beneš and the will of Allied statesmen. The motivation of all concerned was honorable if not always entirely clear. It was nobody's fault in particular that Czechoslovakia "became an island in a sea of hostile forces," and eventually succumbed to the "encirclement, first apparent in 1919 and in 1920." The chief merit of D. Perman's presentation consists in its dispassionate tone and authoritative source citations from government documents and private papers which few people have perused before him for this specific purpose. At the same time the inclusion of a greater number of maps (there are two at the end of the volume) and of some tables and charts of ethnic and economic data would have made the reader's task easier. The omission of bibliographical references to secondary sources such as Kennan's two-volume study, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1920,* and Kann's *The Habsburg Empire* is puzzling, as is the failure to consult recent Czechoslovak Communist sources.—PAUL ZINNER, University of California, Davis.

The experiences of a securely established Western democracy which suddenly finds itself under totalitarian occupation are recounted in Werner Warmbrunn's *The Dutch Under German Occupation, 1940–1945* (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University

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Press and London, Oxford University Press, 1963; xiv, 338 pp., $7.50). Through the Netherlands State Institute of War Documentation in Amsterdam the Dutch have been studying their fateful years of German rule in a more thorough and scholarly fashion than any of their fellow victims. Numerous excellent monographs, such as Rüter's on the great railroad strike of 1944–45 and Sijes' on the Amsterdam demonstrations of 1941, have already appeared. Others, such as Presser's account of the fate of the Jews and de Jong's multi-volume history, are still in the offing. Dr. Warmbrunn, an American with considerable knowledge of the Netherlands, provides a useful survey in English of many of the problems under study in Amsterdam. For example, he presents a carefully balanced view of the rather lame public reaction to the segregation, deportation, and extermination of the Jews (the horrors of the extermination policy were, in fact, "unimaginable" to the Jews and their non-Jewish countrymen). He depicts with remarkable fairness the various dilemmas of Dutch civil servants in their attempts to determine the point beyond which collaboration with the occupier became unacceptable. He includes reliable accounts of the several mass demonstrations against the Germans, the acts of rebellion of the churches, the universities, and the medical profession, and the general organization, range, and effectiveness of resistance activities. He rightly points to the traditionally potent roles of the Dutch family and the Protestant and Catholic clergy as factors influencing the negative public attitude toward the Nazis. However, because of the very breadth of its scope, Warmbrunn's probe remains somewhat at the surface, even where the underlying problems are touched. The publisher is to blame for a most inconvenient system of footnoting, which requires continuous searching in the back of the book.—HENRY L. MASON, Tulane University.

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IN MEMORIAM

JOHN MAURICE CLARK

John Maurice Clark died on June 27, 1963, at the age of seventy-nine, leaving a sad gap in the ranks of social scientists. The termination of his teaching career in 1957 was a serious loss to the department of economics of which he had been a member for thirty-one years. He became an emeritus professor in 1953 but continued to lecture until 1957.

He came to the department from the University of Chicago in 1926, having already held teaching appointments at Colorado and Amherst Colleges as well as at the University of Chicago. Subsequently he undertook occasional teaching at Mount Holyoke College, The Johns Hopkins University, and Stanford University, and was consultant to innumerable government agencies. He was president of the American Economic Association in 1935 and the Association awarded him the Francis A. Walker medal in 1952.

When he arrived at Columbia, Maurice Clark had been actively and notably contributing to the literature of economics for more than a decade. In fact he had already published two of his most outstanding books, *Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs* (1923) and *Social Control of Business* (1926). An early interest in discriminatory charges by railroads broadened into studies of railroad and other public utility costs and charges which continued throughout his life. But there were many other important themes in his work: cycles of business activity and their causes and consequences; the costs of war; the effectiveness of competition as a regulator of business behavior; the broader aspects of the performance of the business system; and appraisal of the methods and achievements of economic science.

It was typical of Maurice Clark that, as president of the American Economic Association, at the fiftieth anniversary of its formation in 1935, surveying the "Past Accomplishments and Present Prospects of American Economics," he should conclude that now was a "time for rather deep humility and searching examination of our results, our methods, our standards. . . . The story I must try to tell is an unfinished one, and there is no guarantee of a happy ending." It was "in a mood of doubtful potency" that the United States "entered the gravest crisis of economic policy which this country has faced since the slavery question," and he could not be entirely happy about the contributions of economics. On the one hand, its increasing concern with inductive

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studies, and especially with quantitative methods, seemed to be slowing up results. On the other hand, general economic theory must unavoidably "steer a course somewhere between what is futile and what is impossible." The only remedy seemed to lie in the preservation of the opportunity for "thinking which is free, but disciplined," even though "it is not certain how much time the world will give us for finding answers . . . ; indeed it is not certain that free scientific enquiry itself has a perpetual undisturbed lease on life." This note of skepticism regarding the future recurred more than once in his work.

In 1924, in one of his most striking articles, "The Socializing of Theoretical Economics," he attempted to appraise the performance of the "system of private industry," and found it failing to use to the full "the productive powers it has so plentifully developed, and to give everyone an opportunity to produce and to earn a living." Welcoming "modern policies of social welfare," and sympathizing with "many democratic and human values which are now striving for practical recognition," he whimsically reversed a number of then widely accepted economic generalizations because their opposite contained "a more urgent and vital truth for the present generation." For instance, rejecting in part the notion that consumption is the end of economic activity and production a means to that end, he suggested that "instead of taking the quality of man for granted and focussing attention on quantity output, it may be more pertinent for the social student to take quantity output for granted—business will not neglect that—and direct his chief attention to the qualitative effects on humanity of the things they do in their inevitable (but largely self defeating) striving after increased per capita wealth."

After contemplating what he called the empire of machines, Clark wryly concluded that "human beings are instruments of production utilized by machines for the machines' increase and biological development," rather than the reverse, as was commonly asserted. Machines had "given man unnatural working conditions which are now leading to incipient revolt, and living conditions that go far to defeat democracy." Conventional economics had "directed attention to the bribes offered by machines and away from the conditions they exact." He pleaded for a reasonable racial equality between men and machines.

Lastly, and on a perhaps uncharacteristically astringent note, Clark remarked that "individualism may be regarded, not so much as a system calculated to get the utmost out of a people of extremely high intelligence, as the system in which human stupidity can do the least harm."

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Maurice Clark's mind was subtle but also his moral strength was always evident. In particular he was deeply convinced that social scientists must set the achievements of society against some measuring rod of social acceptability, although he well knew that hard quantitative appraisals could not be expected. He also realized that earnest and persistent contemplation of important practical economic problems sometimes petered out into vague benevolence without lighting the way to effective action. Nevertheless he could not forsake the responsibility for social appraisal. One must do one's best and perfect diagnoses may never be possible.

Indeed, at the youthful age of thirty-one he published his conception of the discipline of a scholar, a dedication as noble in expression as in commitment. Among other ideals, his scholar is dedicated to "pain that comes with knowledge of the world's pain, and of man's helplessness to end it, and to the responsibility thus laid upon us that we sin not against reason in rash blundering, nor yet, in easy mistrust of all such efforts, sin more deeply against the needs of men." His scholar was dedicated "to the bond of the scholars' brotherhood. To light that leaps between us when we meet, more subtle than the light of common understanding, which touches us mean and petty men with a touch that purges of pettiness and meanness. . . . To the self-conceit that distrusts our wisest teachers, even to the eager jealousy with which we rend one another so that those who know not, may know each other's work if it be good. . . . To something greater than the arts of argument, or projects of reform, or the inspiration of great teachers, but which comprehends and commands all these. . . ." And, finally, "To the god of things hidden, of questionings unanswered, of mysteries unrevealed."

Maurice Clark scrupulously lived up to his dedication. Fully conscious of the stern and often sad realities of life, he steadily and eagerly sought to improve the human condition. Fully conscious also of the intractable problems of economic investigation and social appraisal, he nevertheless sought until three days before the end of his life to cultivate his major field of economics. Now his work is finished, but he has left a noble memory.

Frederick Cecil Mills

Frederick Cecil Mills died February 9, 1964, at Princeton, New Jersey. Born in Santa Rosa, California, he obtained his bach-

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elor's degree from the University of California at Berkeley in 1914 and his Ph.D. from Columbia in 1917. After two years of postdoctoral study at the London School of Economics, he joined the Columbia faculty in 1919, teaching both in the School of Business and the department of economics. Later, as Hepburn Professor, he devoted himself to the department and was its chairman from 1943 to 1946. He retired in 1959 as professor emeritus.

Apart from his widely used textbook, *Statistical Methods* (1924), most of his publications embodied work done at the National Bureau of Economic Research, of which he was a staff member from 1925 to 1953. In a leading controversy of the period, his *Behavior of Prices* (1927) ranged him clearly on the side of the purest of empiricists, but methodological disputes were distasteful to him and he was tolerant of approaches other than his own. The fierceness with which he sometimes defended his opinions, however, led to his being known to his friends as "Turk." A long record of public service began with a study of migratory labor in California and included an appraisal of the consumer price index. With Clarence Long he did a study for the Hoover Commission on the reorganization of federal statistical activities. He was generally conservative by temperament, but was highly critical of privately-owned utilities, perhaps partly because of a lengthy legal dispute which he conducted with a New England power company that (he alleged) wished to ruin his summer home by changing the level of a lake. Although sometimes severe in doctoral examinations, he attracted and retained the loyalty of students. He was president of the American Statistical Association in 1934 and the American Economic Association in 1940. He will be mourned by a long list of students and colleagues.

Nathaniel Peffer

Nathaniel Peffer, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, was born in New York City on June 30, 1890. Shortly after his graduation from the University of Chicago in 1911, he became a Far Eastern correspondent for the New York *Tribune;* thus he began a lifelong career as an observer and analyst of Far Eastern, and especially Chinese, problems. He had a deep interest in and sympathy with the people of China, who were caught up in the rapid transition from a traditional and isolated society to a role in the modern world of industrialism, national-

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ism, and imperalism. In his articles and in a series of books—*The White Man's Dilemma: Climax of the Age of Imperialism* (1927), *China: The Collapse of a Civilization* (1930), and *Must We Fight in Asia?* (1935)—he endeavored to report to the people of the West, and especially of the United States, the realities of the new China that was emerging and to warn them that Western imperialist control of Asia and Africa could not continue. The Western powers could either withdraw voluntarily, a course that would allow them to maintain friendly relations with the independent Asian and African countries, or they would be driven out by force and would then face a legacy of distrust and bitterness.

During his twenty-five-year residence in China, he returned to the United States on a number of occasions to lecture on the Far East. Several of these lectures were given at Columbia University, and as a result he was asked in 1937 to join the University as a lecturer; in 1939 he was appointed associate professor of international relations in the department of public law and government, and in 1943, professor of international relations, a post he held with great distinction until his retirement in 1958. During his twenty years at Columbia he published three more books, *Basis for Peace in the Far East* (1942), *America's Place in the World* (1945), and *The Far East: A Modern History* (1958), as well as a large number of articles and reviews which dealt with international politics, and particularly with the themes of imperialism and China in world politics.

For two decades Nat Peffer was one of the most devoted, hard-working, and beloved teachers in the department of public law and government and in the Faculty of Political Science. The number of dissertations which he sponsored was very large, probably larger than that of any other member of the department. He was devoted to his students, as they were to him, and in lectures, seminars, and hours of individual supervision he taught them far more than the subjects covered in his courses. He refused to give graduate students pat answers to complex problems or to digest the material for them. He tried always, often with amazing success, to stimulate students to ask important and searching questions and then to go off to the library to try to dig out the answers to them. He showed enormous patience with students who were less gifted or less well prepared than their fellows, but he had no patience at all with glibness or shoddiness, and he insisted on the maintenance of the highest standards of scholarship and writing.

As a colleague, Nat Peffer was unusually conscientious—he was always ready to do far more than his share of department, Fac-

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ulty, and University business; he was always kind and generous toward his juniors; and he was unfailingly thoughtful and good-humored in his relations with all his colleagues. That sense of humor and that capacity to laugh at himself did not desert him, even during his last year at Columbia when he had to adjust to the loss of his wife, his retirement from active service, and his leaving his home in Essex, Connecticut. During that year and during the years after his retirement and before he was taken ill in 1962, none of us ever heard him utter a word of complaint or self-pity. He continued to read, to write, to travel, to be deeply interested in what his friends and colleagues were doing and in national and international affairs. Until he was stricken with a massive cerebral hemorrhage in June 1962, he was constantly active and alert. He was a gallant and devoted scholar, teacher, and friend; he was a thoroughly good man; no one had a livelier sense of indignation in the face of injustice or wrong, whether it affected a single person or a whole society. His death on Sunday, April 12 of this year, after almost two years of illness, was, for him, a release and, for us, an occasion for remembering how much he gave to us and to the University and how great was our loss when he left.

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